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Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) have received much attention in recent moral 
philosophy. These types of arguments draw upon speculative evolutionary premises in 
order to challenge various philosophical viewpoints and theories. In some cases, empirical 
evidence has also been used to supplement the more speculative evolutionary premises in 
debunking arguments. 
This thesis examines three prominent EDAs, from Sharon Street, Richard Joyce 
and Joshua Greene. Street’s debunking target is the metaethical position of moral realism, 
particularly non-naturalistic realism. Joyce’s target is the epistemic justification of moral 
judgements in general, leading to his conclusion of moral scepticism. Greene targets 
deontological approaches to moral philosophy, while maintaining that consequentialist 
theories are unaffected by his debunking claims. The main similarity between these three 
EDAs is the notion that evolutionary theory can be used to ‘explain away’ certain views in 
moral philosophy, by providing a scientific explanation of moral views that does not need 
to assume their truth. 
The discussed EDAs face some common problems as well as problems specific to 
each argument. One of the main ways of resisting these arguments is to focus on the 
human capacity for rational reflection; it will thus be argued that our complex mental 
capacities enable us to overcome possible evolutionary influences on our moral thinking. 
This applies not only to the basic level of moral intuitions, but also to the complex moral 
theories that philosophers develop. 
It is ultimately concluded that none of the discussed EDAs are successful. 
However, the possibility of more viable EDAs being developed in the future is not ruled 
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In moral philosophy, one topic that has attracted considerable attention in recent years is 
that of evolutionary debunking arguments, hereafter referred to as EDAs. These types of 
arguments draw upon speculative evolutionary premises in addition to standard 
philosophical premises, leading to conclusions that challenge various philosophical 
viewpoints and theories, such as moral realism or deontological moral philosophy (Greene 
2008, 2014; Joyce 2006; Street 2006). The evolutionary premises in EDAs are speculative 
as they cannot be directly confirmed: for instance, it is not possible to test whether 
tendencies towards certain moral beliefs affected the reproductive success of our early 
human ancestors. Various authors have acknowledged the speculative nature of 
evolutionary claims about morality, with some using this point to criticise EDAs (Buller 
2009; Copp 2008; Joyce 2014; Shafer-Landau 2017; Street 2006). However, debunkers 
may also appeal to varying amounts of empirical evidence in order to supplement their 
speculative evolutionary premises. Thus, in addition to evolutionary biology, some 
debunking arguments have also referred to more experimental fields such as neuroscience 
(Greene 2008, 2014). 
Evolutionary and empirical premises contrast with ‘traditional’ philosophical 
premises in that the latter have not typically been based on scientific claims. Apart from 
the fact that scientific investigations of morality are a relatively recent phenomenon, this 
may also be due to a long-standing assumption that philosophy as a discipline is 
fundamentally distinct from scientific inquiry. Although the relation between these 
disciplines tends to be an overlooked issue in EDA discussions, it is more explicitly noted 
in some works that focus on issues of relevance to certain EDAs (Audi 2014; Copp 1990; 
FitzPatrick 2016, 2017; Hartman 1963; Majors 2003; Sayre-McCord 1988). Debunkers’ 
attempts to resolve persistent philosophical debates by appealing to science may be partly 
motivated by the view that science has been much more successful than philosophy. It is 
relatively easy to identify scientific success with the development of increasingly 
sophisticated technologies throughout human history, so even the more theoretical fields 
such as evolutionary biology may appear to be vindicated by their use of the same general 
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scientific methods. In contrast, the standing of philosophy is not helped by the fact that 
many philosophical debates have continued for centuries or longer. As such, EDAs are 
intended to reach significant philosophical conclusions by drawing upon evolutionary 
premises that have the apparent advantage of scientific credibility. However, it will 
become clear throughout the thesis that evolutionary debunking arguments do not 
necessarily perform any better than traditional philosophical arguments that lack any 
scientific claims. 
After providing a general background to the concept of evolutionary debunking in 
this chapter, the following three chapters critically examine three prominent EDAs: the 
arguments are from Sharon Street, Richard Joyce and Joshua Greene respectively. Street’s 
debunking target is the metaethical position of moral realism, particularly non-naturalistic 
versions of realism. Joyce aims to undermine the epistemic justification of moral beliefs in 
general, leading to a conclusion of moral scepticism. Greene aims to debunk deontological 
moral theories, while maintaining that consequentialist theories are unaffected. One of the 
main similarities between these EDAs is the underlying notion that evolutionary theory can 
‘explain away’ certain views in moral philosophy, by providing a scientifically plausible 
explanation of moral views that does not need to assume their truth. For example, an 
explanation of why humans typically perceive certain actions as objectively morally wrong 
may simply refer to the evolutionary advantages of our ancestors’ social cooperation being 
facilitated by shared moral beliefs. On the issue of evolutionary explanations, some authors 
have discussed the capacity of science to explain human morality in general, not just in 
relation to specific debunking arguments (Bruni, Mameli & Rini 2014; FitzPatrick 2016; 
Hales 2007; Mason 2010; Mogensen 2016; Singer 2005). The more specific applications of 
evolutionary explanations will become apparent in the chapters focused on Street, Joyce 
and Greene. 
Ultimately, all three of the debunking arguments covered in the following chapters 
will be rejected due to a wide variety of problems with them; some of the problems are 
common to all three, while other issues mainly apply to individual arguments. A positive 
account of the capacity for moral knowledge will also be sketched in response to these 
EDAs, particularly Street’s argument: the objective is to develop an account of the human 
capacity for rational reflection. The rational reflection account will be used to argue that 
our advanced reasoning capacities enable us to overcome possible evolutionary influences 
on our moral thinking; this applies not only to simple moral intuitions, but also to the 
complex moral theories that philosophers develop. This is just one of the various ways in 
which the discussed debunking arguments will be resisted. After rejecting the three 
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prominent EDAs in Chapters 2 to 4, the final chapter briefly considers some more general 
issues that are relevant to these types of arguments. This includes questions about the 
relevance of specifically evolutionary premises in EDAs, as well as the issue of whether 
scientific and philosophical accounts of morality necessarily compete with each other. The 
purpose of Chapter 5 is primarily to raise awareness of these underlying issues that affect 
the standing of EDAs in general. Identifying the general issues that need to be resolved is 
important in order for EDAs to have any chance of progressing from the unsuccessful ones 
presented by Street, Joyce and Greene. Ultimately, this thesis does not attempt to rule out 
the possibility of more successful EDAs being developed in the future, but first they need 
to overcome the problems facing the current arguments. 
With the overall direction of the thesis now summarised, the remainder of this 
chapter examines the general concept of evolutionary debunking, including a brief 
overview of how some earlier works on evolution and ethics have led towards the more 
recent and widely discussed EDAs. 
 
Compared to other philosophical arguments, the main distinctive feature of EDAs is that 
they provide an evolutionary explanation of some aspect of moral philosophy—such as a 
particular moral theory—that does not seem conducive to that viewpoint being true. Thus, 
one of the common themes in debunking arguments is the notion that an evolutionary 
explanation of human morality does not need to posit any moral truths. This has been 
noted by many authors in the EDA literature (Behrends 2013; Carruthers & James 2008; 
Das 2016; Deem 2016; Enoch 2010; Hopster 2018; Kahane 2011; Mogensen 2016; 
Vavova 2015; Wielenberg 2010). Debunkers then use their evolutionary explanations to 
support a negative conclusion regarding their targeted moral view. Debunking arguments 
can be applied to metaethical views such as moral realism, or to various types of normative 
theories, such as deontological or consequentialist theories (Kelly 2017). Since all of these 
philosophical viewpoints are essentially sets of particular beliefs about morality, a 
debunking explanation of a targeted view must be able to account for the origins of the 
relevant beliefs. Evolutionary explanations appear to be well-suited to this purpose, as their 
focus is much further back in time as compared to explanations based on more immediate 
influences on moral views, such as personal biases and sociological factors. In this way, 
evolutionary explanations could be considered more fundamental than other explanations, 
including philosophers’ own stated reasons for favouring certain moral views. This notion 
can be observed particularly in Joshua Greene’s debunking argument that is covered in 
Chapter 4, as he argues that deontologists merely rationalise their intuitive moral 
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judgements that can be attributed to evolutionary factors (Greene 2008). More broadly, the 
idea that so many aspects of human thought and behaviour can be traced back to 
evolutionary factors seems to be part of the appeal of EDAs, at least to those who present 
and support them. 
Although debunkers supposedly have the plausibility of evolutionary theory on 
their side, they face resistance from the majority of philosophers who are doubtful of the 
debunking capacity of these evolutionary accounts. In any discipline, resistance to 
unfamiliar new approaches is to be expected. Philosophy has traditionally been a discipline 
in which abstract theories and arguments are developed independently of the 
considerations that feature in EDAs: namely the evolutionary origins of our moral views. 
Despite being outnumbered by the proponents of traditional philosophical arguments that 
do not engage with evolutionary theory, some debunkers have argued that evolutionary 
accounts of morality can shift the burden of proof over to defenders of more conventional 
views. For instance, Richard Joyce argues that the epistemic justification of moral beliefs 
is undermined by his evolutionary genealogy of morality, thus placing the burden of proof 
on those who wish to reinstate the justification of any moral beliefs (Joyce 2006, 2016). 
However, since this thesis argues that certain philosophical views are not threatened by the 
EDAs from Street, Joyce and Greene, it will be maintained that debunkers are the ones 
who owe us better arguments. 
If the overall argument of the thesis is convincing, it will support a fairly modest 
outcome: the philosophical positions targeted by debunkers—such as moral realism—will 
return to whatever standing they have in the absence of evolutionary challenges. As such, 
until any better EDAs are developed in the future, debunkers’ targeted views should 
continue to be assessed from a non-evolutionary perspective. It is beyond the scope of the 
thesis to consider how well these targeted philosophical viewpoints fare against non-
evolutionary challenges. Since it is being suggested that the rejection of current EDAs 
should lead us back to non-evolutionary arguments, it is worth examining how EDAs rose 
to prominence in the first place. 
 
 
1.2 The Rise of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments 
 
Evolutionary debunking arguments have become increasingly relevant in recent years, with 
the amount of literature on the topic increasing significantly since 2006. This was the year 
in which Sharon Street’s “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” (Street 
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2006) and Richard Joyce’s The Evolution of Morality (Joyce 2006) were published, both 
instigating a great deal of debate. Since then, many philosophers have become more 
concerned with the origins and causes of moral beliefs and theories, particularly the ways 
in which these origins may affect their plausibility. Although the surge of interest in EDAs 
is relatively recent, modern debunking arguments have surely been influenced to some 
degree by earlier attempts at deriving philosophical conclusions from evolutionary 
premises. One notable early example of the debunking approach is a 1986 article by 
Michael Ruse and Edward O. Wilson, who expressed dissatisfaction with the traditional 
approach to moral philosophy: 
For much of this century, moral philosophy has been constrained by the supposed 
absolute gap between is and ought, and the consequent belief that the facts of life 
cannot of themselves yield an ethical blueprint for future action. For this reason, 
ethics has sustained an eerie existence largely apart from science. Its most respected 
interpreters still believe that reasoning about right and wrong can be successful 
without a knowledge of the brain, the human organ where all the decisions about 
right and wrong are made. Ethical premises are typically treated in the manner of 
mathematical propositions: directives supposedly independent of human evolution, 
with a claim to ideal, eternal truth (Ruse & Wilson 1986, p. 173). 
As such, Ruse and Wilson intended to challenge the view of ethics being a mysterious 
phenomenon that cannot be explained scientifically. Although it is now more common to 
grant that human morality can be scientifically explained, this does not mean that there is 
now widespread acceptance of Ruse and Wilson’s views from the time. One particularly 
contentious aspect of their early work is their suggestion that moral philosophy should 
become a branch of science, which is a more radical approach than that of recent 
debunking arguments: “While many substantial gains have been made in our 
understanding of the nature of moral thought and action, insufficient use has been made of 
knowledge of the brain and its evolution. … The time has come to turn moral philosophy 
into an applied science” (Ruse & Wilson 1986, p. 173). Although moral philosophy is not 
considered a scientific discipline by recent debunkers, knowledge of the human brain and 
our evolved mental capacities is used in modern EDAs. Among the EDAs examined in this 
thesis, Sharon Street and Richard Joyce are primarily concerned with evolutionary 
speculations about our mental capacities, whereas Joshua Greene combines evolutionary 
claims with empirical findings from neuroscientific studies of brain activity. 
Returning to the early debunking approach exemplified by Ruse and Wilson, the 
applications of their view can be demonstrated by considering a specific example from 
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their work. One particular moral issue that they mention is sibling incest: due to its 
potential negative effects on reproductive fitness, the ubiquitous moral opposition to it is 
amenable to an evolutionary explanation: “Formal incest taboos are the cultural 
reinforcement of the automatic inhibition, an example of the way culture is shaped by 
biology” (Ruse & Wilson 1986, p. 184). This point raised the idea that examining morality 
from a biological rather than purely philosophical perspective could have implications for 
the moral status of particular issues. However, apart from this brief consideration of one 
specific moral issue, Ruse and Wilson’s view that moral philosophy can be directly 
informed by evolutionary biology is not adequately supported by the rest of their 
discussion. Much of their discussion is purely descriptive, lacking in examples of 
normative conclusions that could be derived from biological facts. Merely knowing about 
the biological basis of incest avoidance does not tell us whether it is right or wrong, unless 
we include some normative assumptions. For example, the assumption could be that we all 
ought to adopt ‘natural’ human behaviour, but this would require a consensus on how to 
define natural versus unnatural behaviour. Peter Singer has highlighted the important role 
of such assumptions; this can be seen in his book The Expanding Circle which was 
originally published in 1981, before Ruse and Wilson’s article: “Where an ethical belief is 
explicitly based on an assumption about what is natural for human beings, there is no 
difficulty in seeing how biology can be a tool of criticism” (Singer 2011, p. 68). Singer’s 
point does not necessarily help Ruse and Wilson’s case, as it is not clear how biological 
facts could help us identify what is ‘natural’ behaviour for humans. This is just one 
example of the difficulties facing any attempt to derive moral conclusions from biological 
facts. 
Compared to Ruse and Wilson’s bold claims about moral philosophy and science, 
Singer’s view from the same period was closer to that of modern EDAs: “Neither 
evolutionary theory, nor biology, nor science as a whole, can provide the ultimate premises 
of ethics. Biological explanations of ethics can only perform the negative role of making us 
think again about moral intuitions which we take to be self-evident” (2011, p. 84). The 
general concept of a ‘negative role’ is evident in the recent EDAs from Street, Joyce and 
Greene: these debunkers combine biological explanations of morality with independent 
philosophical premises in order to reach debunking conclusions. Street describes 
widespread moral belief tendencies as evolutionary adaptations, combining this 
speculation with the premise that such adaptations would be highly unlikely to align with 
moral facts posited by moral realists (Street 2006). Joyce develops the idea of humans 
having evolved an adaptive ‘moral sense’ that explains the concepts in our moral 
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judgements; he argues that we should be sceptical of moral judgements since they can be 
explained purely in terms of this adaptation, without needing to assume their truth (Joyce 
2006). Greene describes deontological moral philosophy as a rationalisation of adaptive 
emotion-based responses to certain factors in moral dilemmas; this is combined with 
assumptions about the moral irrelevance of those factors, thus forming part of his argument 
against deontology (Greene 2008, 2014). Each of these EDAs utilises evolutionary claims 
in the negative role of ‘explaining away’ certain philosophical targets, such as moral 
realism or deontological philosophy. Although this approach avoids the problems with 
Ruse and Wilson’s attempts at directly drawing ethical conclusions from evolutionary 
biology, it will become clear in the following chapters that evolutionary premises have a 
limited impact in the discussed EDAs. As such, it will turn out that even the more modest 
role for evolutionary explanations provides little advantage to evolutionary arguments over 
more traditional philosophical arguments that do not appeal to science. 
As indicated by the idea of evolutionary explanations only playing a negative role, 
Singer’s early views on biological explanations in moral philosophy can be seen as a 
pathway from Ruse and Wilson’s ambitious views of the time to the somewhat more 
modest approach of recent EDAs. In discussing the evolutionary origins of the human 
conception of morality, Singer noted that despite the complexity and diversity of our moral 
views, they can nevertheless be traced back to relatively simple patterns of social 
behaviour seen in other animals: 
[W]hile the diversity of ethics is indisputable, there are common elements underlying 
this diversity. Moreover, some of these common elements are so closely parallel to 
the forms of altruism observable in other social animals that they render implausible 
attempts to deny that human ethics has its origin in evolved patterns of behavior 
among social animals (Singer 2011, p. 29). 
Now that it is widely accepted that human morality can be explained in evolutionary terms, 
modern philosophical discussions concerning evolution and ethics are mainly focused on 
the implications this may have for the plausibility of various moral theories and the 
reliability of moral intuitions. Singer’s observation regarding the common elements of 
morality also provides an early example of a point that features in some recent EDAs, such 
as Street’s argument. Street specifically refers to the ubiquity of certain moral belief 
tendencies, such as the view that it is right to care for one’s own offspring more than we 
care for strangers (Street 2006, p. 115). By pointing out how widespread certain moral 
beliefs are, she appeals to the idea that this can be explained in evolutionary terms. 
However, while critics of EDAs often grant for the sake of argument that debunkers’ 
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evolutionary claims may be plausible, it will be demonstrated in later chapters that 
debunkers’ reliance on speculation is problematic. 
Singer in his early work also discussed the problems with philosophers relying on 
ungrounded claims, although he was more aligned with debunkers in that he criticised 
traditional philosophy for its reliance on intuitions. Thus, he observed that many 
philosophers have been content with ethics merely systematising pre-existing moral 
intuitions: 
Almost all the thinking we do about ethics involves connecting one ethical judgment 
to another, more fundamental one. Even moral philosophers who develop theories 
about what we ought to do rarely press deeper. Some of them explicitly say that 
philosophy can do no more than systematize our moral intuitions. We can criticize 
one moral intuition on the basis of others, they say, but we cannot criticize all or most 
of our moral intuitions at once (Singer 2011, p. 70). 
As such, Singer suggested that science could facilitate progress in moral philosophy by 
allowing us to discover the underlying causes and origins of our moral intuitions. In his 
words, “Science provides leverage against some ethical principles when it helps us 
understand why we hold our ethical principles. What we take as an untouchable moral 
intuition may be no more than a relic of our evolutionary history” (Singer 2011, p. 70). 
Thus, Singer assumed that certain causal explanations of intuitions can have a debunking 
effect. Although recent debunkers maintain that evolutionary explanations can have such 
an effect, defenders of moral beliefs and theories are generally unconcerned by these types 
of purported explanations of their views. Since the thesis rejects the three main EDAs that 
are discussed, the non-debunking view of evolutionary explanations will be favoured. 
Thus, although the explanations offered by debunkers will be criticised in various ways, 
the general concept of evolutionary accounts of morality will not be rejected; rather, the 
aim is to oppose the idea that such explanations can debunk the targeted philosophical 
views. 
This chapter has briefly examined early examples of debunking ideas based on 
evolutionary considerations, in order to introduce the general approach of EDAs. The more 
recent debunking arguments that are examined in the following chapters have built upon 
some of these earlier ideas, although it will be demonstrated that they are still far from 
being plausible. Chapter 2 will now begin the main focus of assessing modern EDAs by 









2.1 Overview of Street’s Argument 
 
Sharon Street’s influential EDA against moral realism is one of the most prominent 
debunking arguments in the literature, having received much attention from other 
philosophers (Braddock 2016; Brosnan 2011; Clarke-Doane 2012; Copp 2008; Das 2016; 
Deem 2016; Enoch 2010; FitzPatrick 2014, 2015; Hanson 2017; Hopster 2018; Kahane 
2011; Klenk 2017; Mogensen 2016; Shafer-Landau 2013; Skarsaune 2011; Street 2006; 
Tropman 2014; Vavova 2015; White 2010; Wielenberg 2010). This chapter examines 
several major problems with the argument, which may also apply to any other EDAs that 
depend on similar ideas. The current section begins by outlining the main points in Street’s 
argument, with later sections focusing on the issues that are raised. 
Street’s EDA aims to undermine evaluative realism by drawing upon evolutionary 
biology. Evaluative realism is broader than moral realism: it is the view that evaluative 
beliefs can be true or false in virtue of their relation to mind-independent evaluative facts. 
As Street describes this position, “There are at least some evaluative facts or truths that 
hold independently of all our evaluative attitudes” (2006, p. 110). Moral facts are only one 
type of evaluative fact: non-moral evaluative facts may concern reasons in favour of 
certain actions that have no apparent moral relevance. However, the discussion from this 
point onwards will proceed as though Street is directly targeting moral realism, with any of 
her references to evaluative facts or beliefs being referred to as moral facts or beliefs. 
Many philosophers have taken this approach when discussing Street’s argument, including 
David Copp (2008). 
Street’s conception of moral beliefs includes the approval or disapproval of certain 
actions and states of affairs, and judgements about what we have a reason to do, or ‘ought’ 
to do (Street 2006, p. 110). Street also notes that there are both non-natural and naturalistic 
versions of moral realism. It will be argued in this chapter that naturalistic moral realism is 
safer from Street’s argument. For now, it is important to note that her argument directly 
targets non-natural moral realism; Street recognises that it is a more complex issue whether 
naturalistic realism is also undermined by her argument (Street 2006, p. 112). She 
describes her targeted position of non-natural realism as the following view: “[E]valuative 
facts or truths are not reducible to any kind of natural fact, and are not the kinds of things 
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that play a role in causal explanations; instead, they are irreducibly normative facts or 
truths” (Street 2006, pp. 111-112). In contrast, moral naturalists assert that morality can be 
accounted for in a completely natural conception of the world, which rules out the 
existence of any non-natural or supernatural entities. 
Since Street’s argument draws upon speculative evolutionary biology, she begins 
with the following statement: 
I try to rest my arguments on the least controversial, most well-founded evolutionary 
speculations possible. … [A] cognitive trait such as the widespread human tendency 
to value the survival of one’s offspring may, according to evolutionary psychology, 
be just as susceptible to evolutionary explanation as physical traits such as our 
bipedalism or our having opposable thumbs (Street 2006, pp. 112-113). 
Although she is aware of her reliance on speculation, Street maintains that there is enough 
certainty for her argument to be taken as a serious threat to realism: “[W]hile I am 
skeptical of the details of the evolutionary picture I offer, I think its outlines are certain 
enough to make it well worth exploring the philosophical implications” (Street 2006, p. 
113). This element of speculation is criticised later on, but for now it is important to keep 
this in mind when considering her evolutionary claims. Street’s evolutionary account 
begins with the following speculations about the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs: 
The forces of natural selection have had a tremendous influence on the content of 
human evaluative judgements. This is by no means to deny that all kinds of other 
forces have also shaped the content of our evaluative judgements. No doubt there 
have been numerous other influences: some of them were perhaps evolutionary 
factors other than natural selection — for example, genetic drift; and many other 
forces were not evolutionary at all, but rather social, cultural, historical, or of some 
other kind. And then there is the crucial and sui generis influence of rational 
reflection that must also be taken into account … I am discounting none of these 
other influences. My claim is simply that one enormous factor in shaping the content 
of human values has been the forces of natural selection, such that our system of 
evaluative judgements is thoroughly saturated with evolutionary influence (Street 
2006, pp. 113-114). 
Apart from the bold speculation that our judgements are ‘thoroughly saturated’ with 
evolutionary influences, it is also notable that Street acknowledges the influence of other 
factors such as rational reflection. As will become clear later, this point is particularly 
important to focus on when opposing her argument. 
 
 11 
Street’s evolutionary account quickly moves on to the details of how evolutionary 
influences have ultimately influenced our current moral judgements. The first point is that 
the survival and reproductive success of early humans would have been affected by their 
tendencies towards different types of moral beliefs, with some tendencies being much 
more likely to get passed down than others. For example, it would be harmful to think that 
endangering one’s own life is good, whereas it would be beneficial to think that one’s own 
survival is good and therefore worth promoting (Street 2006, pp. 114-115). Assuming that 
tendencies towards different moral beliefs affected the behaviour of early humans, we 
would expect different rates of reproductive success between individuals, depending on 
their particular belief tendencies. This allows for an evolutionary explanation of the 
prevalence of certain belief tendencies in the present day, as the process of natural 
selection would favour humans whose tendencies were more conducive to survival and 
reproduction. Thus, at least some of our beliefs and values seem to be explainable by this 
evolutionary account. 
Apart from straightforward beliefs about value, beliefs concerning moral 
‘rightness’ and ‘wrongness’ could also have evolutionary explanations; for instance, social 
cooperation requires some level of agreement on right and wrong behaviour. It is fairly 
self-explanatory that social cooperation would benefit individuals living in a hostile 
environment, although there is debate around the biological issue of individual versus 
group selection. Street does not examine these biological details since they are not 
particularly relevant to her objections against realism. Ultimately, any plausible account of 
natural selection can be used as long as it is assumed that certain belief tendencies were 
more conducive to survival and reproduction. 
Presumably, early humans would not have held moral beliefs of the same level of 
complexity as those we have now. As such, Street speculates that natural selection 
operated on “proto” versions of the more complex moral beliefs that we currently have 
(Street 2006, p. 114). This claim is important since it provides a link between our 
evolutionary history and contemporary morality, including the complex reasoning involved 
in moral philosophy. The idea is that many aspects of contemporary morality can be traced 
back to basic proto-moral beliefs that served the simpler needs of early humans. Street also 
asserts that despite the diversity of moral judgements in the present day, they exhibit 
patterns that are constant throughout history and across different cultures. She lists several 
examples of such beliefs: 
(1)  The fact that something would promote one’s survival is a reason in favor of it. 
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(2)  The fact that something would promote the interests of a family member is a 
reason to do it. 
(3)  We have greater obligations to help our own children than we do to help 
complete strangers. 
(4)  The fact that someone has treated one well is a reason to treat that person well in 
return. 
(5)  The fact that someone is altruistic is a reason to admire, praise, and reward him 
or her. 
(6)  The fact that someone has done one deliberate harm is a reason to shun that 
person or seek his or her punishment (Street 2006, p. 115). 
These examples are supposed to support the idea that our diverse moral judgements can be 
reduced to a straightforward evolutionary explanation, since natural selection likely would 
have favoured humans with these belief tendencies. To illustrate how such tendencies 
could be favoured, Street provides an explanation of example (1): people who tend towards 
this belief would do more to promote their survival than those who lack this belief, thus 
allowing them to pass down this tendency to their offspring. This would gradually increase 
the proportion of individuals with this belief tendency over each subsequent generation 
(Street 2006, p. 116). 
Street clarifies that moral beliefs cannot themselves be genetically inherited, at 
least not in a complex form with specific content. Rather, it is the more basic evaluative 
tendencies that she claims to be genetically heritable traits (Street 2006, p. 119). Street 
defines such a basic tendency in these terms: “[A]n unreflective, non-linguistic, 
motivational tendency to experience something as ‘called for’ or ‘demanded’ in itself, or to 
experience one thing as ‘calling for’ or ‘counting in favor of’ something else. We may 
think of these as ‘proto’ forms of evaluative judgement” (Street 2006, p. 119). She 
speculates that variations in these basic tendencies may have been based in genetic 
differences throughout most of our evolutionary history. This is a scientific claim that 
cannot be easily validated. However, the finer details of evolutionary biology are not as 
important as the way Street uses these speculations to support her argument: the claim is 
that natural selection has directly influenced our basic evaluative tendencies, which then 
significantly affect the content of our more complex moral beliefs. Thus, the influence of 
natural selection on the specific content of moral beliefs has been indirect (Street 2006, pp. 
119-120). 
The indirect nature of evolutionary influences on our moral beliefs would seem to 
allow plenty of room for other influences, most notably the human capacity for rational 
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reflection. This capacity has clearly been developed to a significant degree throughout 
human evolution. However, despite the extensive development of human mental capacities 
compared to the basic reasoning our early ancestors would have required, Street downplays 
the evolutionary autonomy of rational reflection: “[H]ad the general content of our basic 
evaluative tendencies been very different, then the general content of our full-fledged 
evaluative judgements would also have been very different, and in loosely corresponding 
ways” (Street 2006, p. 120). Thus, despite our capacity for ‘full-fledged’ reflective beliefs 
that are more sophisticated than our basic evolved belief tendencies, it is claimed that they 
are nevertheless contingent on evolutionary factors. As such, our capacity to critically 
reflect upon our moral beliefs is just another mental capacity that is apparently saturated 
with evolutionary influence (Street 2006, p. 124). This would suggest that the influence of 
evolutionary forces such as natural selection is inescapable, even affecting the complex 
moral theories that philosophers develop. Importantly, this raises the question of whether 
any domains of knowledge are relatively unaffected by evolutionary influences, such as 
science and mathematics. Comparing moral knowledge to scientific knowledge turns out to 
be an important way in which moral realists can resist Street’s EDA, as will be argued later 
in this chapter. 
The discussion so far has covered the evolutionary premises of Street’s argument. 
The next part of her EDA is the crucial point where she presents a ‘Darwinian dilemma’ 
for moral realists: 
The basic problem for realism is that it needs to take a position on what relation there 
is, if any, between the selective forces that have influenced the content of our 
evaluative judgements, on the one hand, and the independent evaluative truths that 
realism posits, on the other. Realists have two options: they may either assert or deny 
a relation (Street 2006, p. 121). 
Street considers both of these options to be untenable, thus encouraging us to drop moral 
realism in favour of anti-realism. On one horn of the dilemma, the realist denies any 
relation between evolutionary forces and independent moral truths. According to moral 
realism, moral facts are mind-independent in the sense that they are not determined by the 
views of any actual or possible believers. Thus, the facts would remain the same whether 
or not anyone correctly recognised them. Street asserts that if there is no relation between 
evolutionary influences and mind-independent moral facts, then evolution must be 
considered a distorting influence on our moral beliefs (2006, p. 121). In this case, the only 
way realists could deny a ‘distorting’ influence on this horn of the dilemma would be to 
assert that our beliefs reliably track moral facts by pure coincidence. However, it seems 
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incredibly unlikely that such a coincidence would occur for any substantial portion of our 
moral beliefs (Street 2006, pp. 121-122). Thus, denying any relation leads realists to an 
unacceptable epistemic position, as depending on pure chance is not a sufficiently reliable 
method for recognising mind-independent moral facts. To reinforce the idea that a great 
deal of moral ‘luck’ would be required, Street asserts that the range of moral beliefs that 
humans actually have is only a tiny selection from a huge universe of ‘logically possible’ 
beliefs. In other words, there are countless other coherent sets of moral beliefs that humans 
could have ended up with, had our evolutionary history been different (Street 2006, p. 
122). 
On the other horn of the dilemma, the realist asserts that there is a relation between 
evolutionary influences and independent moral facts. Street considers this option to have 
more initial plausibility than denying a relation, since it does not require a purely 
coincidental alignment of our evolved evaluative tendencies with moral truths (Street 
2006, p. 125). Street suggests that a realist taking this option would posit a moral truth-
tracking mental capacity. The realist might argue that just as truth-tracking perceptual 
beliefs promoted our ancestors’ survival by allowing them to detect predators and food, 
moral beliefs could have benefited them by reliably tracking moral facts, which would then 
guide their social behaviour (Street 2006, pp. 125-126). This will be called the ‘truth-
tracking’ account. Street notes that since this is a hypothesis about evolution, it must be 
evaluated scientifically rather than philosophically. 
Unfortunately for realists, a moral truth-tracking account appears to have much less 
scientific plausibility than an ‘adaptive link account’, as Street describes it. According to 
this latter type of explanation, tendencies towards certain types of moral beliefs were 
naturally selected due to their advantages in promoting survival and reproduction. It is 
called the ‘adaptive link’ account because the behaviours linked to certain evaluative 
tendencies are comparable to other biological mechanisms that allow organisms to adapt to 
their environment and living circumstances. Street gives the example of automatic reflex 
responses to danger, such as withdrawing one’s hand from a hot surface (Street 2006, p. 
127). In these non-moral cases involving perceptual beliefs, it is clear that tracking mind-
independent natural facts about the world is adaptive; we can detect real danger such as a 
hot surface, and we respond appropriately. Although mental states are generally more 
complex than somatic adaptive link mechanisms, Street is nevertheless suggesting that 
mental adaptations could ultimately serve the same biological purpose. Thus, tendencies 
towards certain types of moral beliefs may have encouraged early humans to favour 
actions that promoted survival and reproductive success (Street 2006, p. 127). Importantly, 
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this adaptive link account does not posit the existence of any independent moral facts. 
Having described both the moral truth-tracking account and the adaptive link account, 
Street asserts that the latter is clearly superior by all the usual standards of scientific 
plausibility. She lists three points in support of this claim: the adaptive link account is 
more parsimonious, it is clearer, and it has more explanatory power (Street 2006, p. 129). 
Each of these points will now be examined. 
The first point concerns the principle of parsimony, which is the notion that it is 
more plausible to propose simpler mechanisms in a theory or explanation. Whereas the 
adaptive link account simply states that certain moral belief tendencies were selected due 
to their greater promotion of survival and reproductive success, the truth-tracking account 
states that these tendencies were selected because humans recognised independent moral 
truths that promoted these same advantages. Thus, the tracking account posits an extra 
entity—independent moral facts—which makes it less parsimonious. 
As for Street’s second point that the adaptive link account is clearer, the idea is that 
it is obscure to conceive of the independent truth of certain moral beliefs having any 
relevance to evolutionary forces such as natural selection. Compared to moral beliefs, it is 
much clearer how the mind-independent truth of perceptual beliefs would be relevant to 
natural selection; for example, it is clearly beneficial to accurately perceive a predator in 
one’s field of vision. The realist is said to be burdened with explaining how the ability to 
track independent moral truths could have affected our ancestors’ chances of survival and 
reproduction at all (Street 2006, pp. 129-130). However, there are countless widely 
accepted facts about the natural world that would not have been knowable to early humans, 
thus making such facts irrelevant to natural selection. Street uses some non-moral facts as 
an example, namely facts about the existence of low-frequency electromagnetic 
wavelengths. A capacity to detect such obscure features of the world could even be 
disadvantageous, since it would use more biological resources without providing any 
survival benefits (Street 2006, p. 130). Since we have scientific reasons to believe that 
these sorts of mind-independent properties exist, this raises the question of why moral 
realists cannot claim that we also have reasons to believe there are mind-independent 
moral facts. The answer is that Street’s denial of this possibility relies on the fact that her 
argument mainly targets non-natural versions of realism. 
Non-naturalist realists cannot easily compare a purported capacity to detect non-
natural moral facts with our capacity to discover obscure natural facts through scientific 
reasoning. Street recognises that naturalistic moral realism may initially appear to be safer 
from her debunking argument in this regard (Street 2006, p. 131). After all, naturalists 
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identify moral facts with certain natural facts, which are the kinds of facts that have a 
causal influence on the world; this makes it possible for us to identify them. However, 
Street uses the parsimony point again when she opposes the naturalist’s potential response 
to her argument. She demonstrates this point by referring to the ubiquitous moral belief 
that we are obliged to care for our offspring. On one hand, naturalistic moral realists would 
claim that we have this obligation as a matter of mind-independent moral fact, such that 
our belief in this obligation is both independently true and also would have been favoured 
by natural selection. On the other hand, Street maintains that this posited moral fact is an 
unnecessary extra entity, as the simpler explanation is that this belief tendency was 
selected purely because it promoted behaviour that was beneficial to survival and 
reproduction (Street 2006, pp. 131-132). 
Street’s third reason for favouring the adaptive link account over the realist’s truth-
tracking account is that the former has more explanatory power: it explains why there are 
widespread tendencies towards certain moral beliefs rather than others. These include the 
six examples listed earlier, such as the belief that our survival is important and worth 
promoting, that we have greater obligations to our own children than to strangers or distant 
relatives, and so on. The adaptive link account simply explains the ubiquity of these beliefs 
as resulting from their promotion of behaviours that were conducive to our ancestors’ 
survival and reproduction. In contrast, the truth-tracking account seems to require an 
implausible coincidence: 
[H]ow does the tracking account explain the remarkable coincidence that so many of 
the truths it posits turn out to be exactly the same judgements that forge adaptive 
links between circumstance and response — the very same judgements we would 
expect to see if our judgements had been selected on those grounds alone, regardless 
of their truth? (Street 2006, p. 132) 
Thus, Street maintains that the greater scientific plausibility of the adaptive link account 
makes any truth-tracking account unnecessary, assuming that the realist cannot provide 
enough examples of plausible non-adaptive beliefs. However, even if realists attempted to 
provide such examples, Street would likely refer back to one of her claims about the earlier 
six examples of widespread adaptive beliefs: 
There is, of course, a seemingly unlimited diversity to the evaluative judgements that 
human beings affirm. Yet even as we note this diversity, we also see deep and striking 
patterns, across both time and cultures, in many of the most basic evaluative 
judgements that human beings tend to make (Street 2006, p. 115). 
 
 17 
Continuing with her point about explanatory power, Street also suggests that the tracking 
account is worse off when attempting to explain the prevalence of moral beliefs that most 
of us do not endorse after critically reflecting on them. For example, we may consider the 
widespread default tendency to believe that people from ‘out-groups’ do not deserve to be 
treated as well as those in our own communities. This belief is not as widely supported 
now that many societies have collectively reflected upon this tendency. Whereas the 
adaptive link account would explain the prevalence of this initial tendency in terms of its 
benefits to our ancestors’ reproductive success, it may seem that the tracking account has 
to maintain that the belief is true. 
The issue of moral realism and explanatory power has been examined by 
philosophers in a general sense as well as in the context of EDAs. For instance, as 
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord observes: “As many would have it, we have positive reason to 
believe something only if supposing it true contributes in some way to explaining our 
experiences” (Sayre-McCord 2007, p. 10). Realists could respond by maintaining that 
moral facts do play an explanatory role with regard to forming our moral beliefs and 
justifying moral claims. This option is available to moral naturalists as well as non-
naturalists. However, it seems clear that naturalists are in a better position: they can 
identify moral facts with certain natural facts that are involved in causal explanations of 
our moral beliefs. For example, our perception of natural facts about pleasure and pain can 
influence our beliefs about the moral status of these facts. Alternatively, realists could deny 
that moral facts necessarily have an explanatory role with regard to moral beliefs. Sayre-
McCord raises the possibility that the role of moral facts might be to justify moral beliefs, 
not to explain them (Sayre-McCord 2007, pp. 10-11). This option of denying an 
explanatory role will not be considered, as the main focus will be on the naturalistic 
realist’s other option of maintaining an explanatory role for natural moral facts. This latter 
option is examined in Section 2.2, which develops the idea that our evolved capacity for 
rational reflection is what allows us to identify the moral status of certain natural facts. 
As for the current issue of the seemingly superior explanation provided by the 
adaptive link account, there is another point that Street cites in support of it. She claims 
that there are countless logically possible moral beliefs that humans could have, yet we 
only endorse a very limited selection of these possible beliefs (Street 2006, p. 133). The 
adaptive link account can explain this by stating that other logically possible beliefs would 
be useless or maladaptive in an evolutionary sense, so a tendency towards such beliefs 
would not be favoured by natural selection. Street lists some examples of these 
hypothetical moral judgements: “[F]rom the judgement that infanticide is laudable, to the 
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judgement that plants are more valuable than human beings, to the judgement that the fact 
that something is purple is a reason to scream at it” (Street 2006, p. 133). On the other 
hand, the truth-tracking account can only reassure us that such judgements are false, 
without offering any explanation of why we think so. As with Street’s previous point, it 
will be argued in Section 2.2 that moral realists can respond by defending the explanatory 
power of moral facts, which is more viable for naturalists than non-naturalists. 
The aforementioned points have focused on the truth-tracking account that realists 
are expected to endorse if they take the horn of the dilemma in which they affirm a relation 
between evolutionary influences and independent moral facts. In the next section it will be 
argued that there is no need for evolutionary forces to have directly granted us a truth-
tracking capacity in other domains of knowledge, such as science. Rather, it will turn out 
that an indirect relation between evolutionary influences and independent facts is 
sufficient. Importantly, this notion also extends to knowledge of independent moral facts, 
at least for naturalistic versions of moral realism. The comparison between scientific and 
moral knowledge will demonstrate that the realist’s truth-tracking account is defensible, 
which undermines Street’s supposed dilemma that is central to her argument. 
 
 
2.2 Evolutionary Influences and Autonomous Rationality 
 
When considering how Street applies scientific methodology to moral philosophy, it is 
notable that her argument is primarily an epistemological challenge to realist views. This 
may be because it is easier to challenge a moral truth-tracking capacity on scientific 
grounds, rather than trying to scientifically disprove the existence of moral facts 
themselves. The main way in which Street follows scientific practice is in suggesting that 
we should not assume the existence of something unless it is required for the best 
explanation of a phenomenon; this relates to her points about parsimony and clarity. 
However, it is debatable whether moral philosophy should be held to the same standards of 
explanation as science, even for naturalistic approaches to morality. This issue of 
explanatory standards across different disciplines is relevant to EDAs in general, since they 
appeal to the scientific field of evolutionary biology. As such, the main discussion of this 
issue is saved for Chapter 5, which follows the individual assessment of each prominent 
EDA. 
Street’s use of scientific reasoning is important in relation to her points about our 
evolved mental capacity for rational reflection. One of the central ideas in her argument is 
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that we cannot completely escape the evolutionary influences on this capacity that we use 
to rationalise or reject various moral beliefs. Rationality is obviously also used extensively 
in a vast array of other domains of knowledge, most notably in science. As such, Street’s 
argument will be opposed on the grounds that it denies a plausible comparison between 
scientific and moral knowledge. Specifically, her argument denies that we can reliably 
track mind-independent moral facts even though we can discover many obscure and 
complex natural facts through scientific reasoning. This includes our scientific knowledge 
of electromagnetic wavelengths, to use the previously mentioned example. 
Street’s distinction between moral knowledge and other domains of knowledge is 
connected to the fact that her argument mainly targets non-natural versions of realism. It 
will be argued that this aspect of her argument is much less effective against naturalistic 
moral realism. Street is not sceptical of our most basic capacities to track certain natural 
facts, given that she supports a standard evolutionary explanation of reliable truth-tracking 
perceptual beliefs. This capacity was presumably selected since it allowed our ancestors to 
detect real features of the natural world that were relevant to their survival and 
reproductive success, such as the presence of predators (Street 2006, p. 130). Any heritable 
trait, including our perceptual capacities, can be susceptible to natural selection if it affects 
the chances of passing on genes to subsequent generations. Street asserts that our basic 
evaluative belief tendencies are heritable, which means that our current moral reasoning is 
ultimately the product of evolutionary influences (Street 2006, pp. 118-119). Unlike the 
case of perceptual beliefs, it is not clear how a capacity to track non-natural moral facts 
could be favoured by natural selection. To understand why, we may recall Street’s 
definition of non-natural moral realism: “[E]valuative facts or truths are not reducible to 
any kind of natural fact, and are not the kinds of things that play a role in causal 
explanations; instead, they are irreducibly normative facts or truths” (Street 2006, pp. 111-
112). The crucial point here is the causal isolation problem for non-natural realism. 
Although it is beyond the current scope to consider how non-naturalism might be defended 
in light of this problem, what matters for Street’s argument is that this would rule out any 
truth-tracking relation between our mental capacities and non-natural moral facts. Non-
naturalist realists are therefore left with the implausible option of postulating a purely 
coincidental alignment of our mental capacities with moral facts. 
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that non-natural moral facts exist, 
Street’s argument seems to suggest that any mental capacity with evolutionary origins 
would be unable to reliably track non-natural moral facts due to their causal isolation. 
Leaving aside the issue of whether even an evolutionarily autonomous mental capacity 
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could detect such facts, Street focuses on the apparent inescapability of evolutionary 
influences in order to rule out the possibility of such a capacity. Notably, this 
inescapability even extends to rational reflection: “[A]ll our reflection over the ages has 
really just been a process of assessing evaluative judgements that are mostly off the mark 
in terms of others that are mostly off the mark. And reflection of this kind isn’t going to get 
one any closer to evaluative truth” (Street 2006, p. 124). Presumably, moral realists would 
not want to be limited to positing moral facts that happen to align with naturally selected 
belief tendencies; for one thing, many contemporary moral beliefs concern issues that are 
completely unrelated to the living circumstances of our distant ancestors. To allow for the 
existence of a wide variety of moral facts, including facts that are relevant to modern 
issues such as climate change and bioethics, realists must oppose Street’s claim about the 
inescapable distorting evolutionary influences on rational reflection. 
One way that realists could argue for the autonomy of our mental capacities is by 
comparing the use of rational thinking in moral philosophy with its use in other fields such 
as science. William FitzPatrick has defended a position along these lines (2015, 2016). He 
suggests that Street’s debunking argument is invalid, and that in order to become valid it 
would need the following additional premise: 
If natural selection is responsible for our having certain basic cognitive capacities, 
which we employ in some domain of thought, then the only way for such exercises 
of those capacities to be non-accidentally and reliably truth-tracking in that domain 
would be for natural selection to have made things that way (FitzPatrick 2015, pp. 
885-886). 
Although this premise would help Street’s case against realism, it is unclear how this 
would be compatible with complex scientific knowledge, including the field of 
evolutionary biology that Street herself appeals to. Opposing Street’s view, FitzPatrick 
argues that we clearly have transcended the evolutionary function of our mental capacities 
in some domains of knowledge: 
Truths about abstract mathematics or physics or philosophy had no more role in 
shaping the cognitive capacities and dispositions of Pleistocene humans than moral 
truths did, yet we have been able to develop those capacities and dispositions in ways 
that make for reasonably reliable, truth-tracking exercises of them today, exhibiting 
significant autonomy from the particular evolutionary influences that gave us the raw 
materials to begin with (FitzPatrick 2016, p. 396). 
First, it is important to clarify that the autonomy claim is still compatible with taking the 
relation-affirming horn of the dilemma, as it only entails that the relation is somewhat 
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indirect. It is not as though rationality involves a mysterious mental faculty that somehow 
emerged independently of any evolutionary factors; rather, it is simply that human mental 
capacities have developed significantly throughout our evolutionary history. 
Clearly some aspects of human knowledge and rationality must be autonomous 
from distorting influences, as Street’s argument itself depends on the assumption that her 
own philosophical reasoning is not distorted. Although one could attempt to undermine 
Street’s argument by arguing that it is self-defeating, this does not appear to be a promising 
objection. It would be difficult to demonstrate that distorting evolutionary influences apply 
to her argument but not to philosophical reflection more generally, including the argument 
of this thesis. Thus, an argument along these lines would risk collapsing into a more 
general scepticism about philosophical reasoning. FitzPatrick also observes the importance 
of assuming some degree of autonomy: 
Few would deny the autonomy assumption altogether. To do so in the name of 
providing alternative evolutionary causal explanations of our beliefs would risk self-
defeat: for if we lack the relevant intellectual autonomy across the board, then even 
the biologist's beliefs about evolutionary biology and its implications would just be 
attributable to such biological causes, rather than to reasons that provide real warrant 
for such beliefs within a rational framework with truth-tracking integrity (FitzPatrick 
2014, Section 2.4).  
Rationality is essential for knowledge and progress in science, just as it is in philosophy. 
Humans can develop complex philosophical arguments even though natural selection did 
not directly select for the capacity to think about philosophical topics, such as metaphysics 
(FitzPatrick 2015, p. 886). Nevertheless, having a capacity for autonomous rationality does 
not necessarily entail that we can reliably track mind-independent moral facts. After all, 
there is a gap between ruling out a distorting influence and affirming the truth-tracking 
reliability of a mental capacity. When faced with this explanatory gap, realists can 
maintain that their response to EDAs does not require them to provide a full positive 
account of their view. EDAs simply provide a new scientific challenge to a position that 
has long been debated on purely philosophical grounds. Given that philosophers already 
struggle to convince their opponents of the merits of their theories, it would be 
unreasonable to expect realists to fully vindicate their philosophical position in addition to 
overcoming evolutionary challenges. Nevertheless, moral realists need to at least establish 
the possibility of a positive argument that would resist debunkers’ claims. 
Fortunately for realists, there is at least one clear example to demonstrate that the 
norms of rationality do not need to have been directly provided by evolutionary forces in 
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order for us to be capable of tracking mind-independent truths: the example is the case of 
scientific knowledge. Complex theories about the physical properties of the universe, such 
as subatomic particles and various principles of astrophysics, clearly extend well beyond 
the basic capacities and knowledge that our ancestors needed in order to survive. As 
FitzPatrick argues, a ‘parsimonious’ evolutionary explanation of our reasons for believing 
certain scientific claims would hardly be conducive to any progress in science (FitzPatrick 
2016, pp. 398-399). Street would not want to claim that we only believe certain scientific 
theories due to some contingencies of human evolution, yet her appeal to parsimony could 
undermine scientific knowledge just as she takes it to undermine the realist’s moral 
knowledge. Street tries to maintain a distinction between these domains of knowledge, by 
referring to the evolutionary advantages of truth-tracking perceptual capacities to 
exclusively defend science. However, this fails for the aforementioned reason that modern 
scientific knowledge extends well beyond our evolved sensory capacities. Rationality 
provides the link between observable phenomena and abstract scientific theories, and the 
naturalistic realist can argue that this parallels the case of moral knowledge: we can 
perceive natural properties with our senses, but we must use our rational capacities to 
recognise the moral status of some of these properties. 
These points can allow moral realists to tackle the horn of Street’s dilemma in 
which they affirm a relation between evolution and mind-independent moral facts, by 
comparing moral knowledge to scientific knowledge. Thus, realists may argue that the 
capacity to track moral facts through rational reflection is a by-product of our evolved 
mental capacities that were originally selected for relatively basic reasoning processes. 
This by-product claim allows realists to not only explain how we can discover obscure 
mind-independent natural facts in the sciences, but also why the same should be possible 
for mind-independent moral facts. On this point about comparing scientific and moral 
knowledge, moral realists can also question Street’s treatment of different disciplines: if 
she is permitted to speculate so freely about our evolutionary history, why must realists be 
held to a higher standard of explanation when defending their view? Street’s explanatory 
expectations of each discipline appear to be the wrong way around: moral philosophy 
should not be expected to be as precise as science, particularly the natural sciences. Given 
the more speculative nature of moral philosophy, it may not be reasonable to expect any 
method of ‘testing’ or confirming moral facts. As noted earlier, the issue of different 
explanatory standards across science and philosophy is relevant to all EDAs due to their 
appeal to evolutionary explanations. 
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Although Street does not address the issue of different explanatory standards across 
disciplines, she does address the ‘by-product hypothesis’, anticipating it as a possible 
objection to her argument. She responds by presenting a slightly modified objection to the 
realist’s second option when faced with the dilemma. The modified objection is presented 
against the scenario in which the realist now affirms a more indirect relation between our 
evolved evaluative tendencies and the mind-independent moral facts, which we can detect 
as a by-product of these tendencies’ selection for more basic reasoning. The only 
difference between this and the original second option is the by-product claim, as the 
realist in the original dilemma was presumed to be claiming a more direct evolutionary 
cause of our moral truth-tracking capacities. The other option of denying any relation rules 
out the possibility of a by-product account in the first place, as even the most indirect 
relation would be more than just a coincidental alignment between beliefs and facts. As 
such, the status of the denial option is unchanged. 
Since the denial option is unaffected by the introduction of the by-product 
hypothesis, Street focuses on how this hypothesis affects the realist’s other option. She 
denies that realists can compare a moral truth-tracking capacity to the by-product of 
advanced scientific knowledge that has developed from a more basic capacity to perceive 
simple facts about the physical world (Street 2006, pp. 143-144). Her main point is the 
following: 
[T]he realist has to give some account of how this more basic sort of ability to grasp 
independent evaluative truths arose. And given what has to be the complexity and 
specialization of even this more basic ability (a point of comparison is the complexity 
and specialization of the more basic abilities on which the ability to do astrophysics 
is based), it is implausible to suggest that the emergence of this more basic ability 
was a mere fluke. The only alternative to saying that the emergence of this ability 
was a fluke is to claim that we were in some way selected to track the independent 
evaluative truths posited by the realist (Street 2006, p. 144). 
Since Street directly targets non-natural moral realism, it is worth focusing on the non-
naturalist’s potential line of response first. It is not clear why non-naturalist realists must 
accept that even a more basic capacity to detect independent moral truths must be highly 
complex and specialised. Non-naturalists could argue that although morality in general is a 
complex phenomenon, it has its foundations in relatively simple moral facts. Thus, even 
though it would be more difficult for non-naturalists to draw a comparison with scientific 
knowledge, they can at least identify a similar structure of complex knowledge built upon 
basic foundations: it may be similar to how scientific theories are ultimately built upon 
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very basic perceptual beliefs. Non-naturalists could also reduce the force of Street’s claim 
by arguing that an imperfect tracking capacity is sufficient; we do not need to always 
correctly identify moral facts to regard a tracking capacity as being reliable. Moral realists 
are not necessarily committed to the view that we can know all or even most moral facts; 
their only definite commitment is to the existence of moral facts in general. 
Compared to simply perceiving the external world, morality is a more complex 
phenomenon to understand. This is precisely why rational reflection is necessary in order 
to identify moral facts. As such, Street demands too much from moral realists if she holds 
a moral truth-tracking capacity to the same standard of reliability as our evolved perceptual 
capacities, which reliably track simple natural facts such as the presence of predators in 
one’s environment. Overall, although non-natural realism may ultimately be more difficult 
to defend than naturalistic realism, it is clear that non-naturalists do not need to accept the 
commitments that Street seems to expect from their view. The focus will now turn to the 
naturalistic perspective that seems to provide a stronger case against Street’s debunking 
argument. 
Moral naturalists are on safer ground if they appeal to the by-product view, as they 
can argue that moral facts are related to or identical with certain natural facts. Whereas it is 
questionable whether non-natural facts even exist, the naturalist only needs to show that 
some natural facts are identifiable as moral facts. If this can be shown, then it allows 
naturalistic moral realists to affirm a relation between our evolved mental capacities and 
mind-independent natural moral facts. Street’s claim about the complexity required of a 
moral truth-tracking capacity thus appears to have less force against naturalistic realism, 
since a capacity to identify the moral status of natural facts is presumably less complex 
than a purported capacity to identify causally inert non-natural facts. However, for the 
purpose of resisting Street’s argument, the more important difference between naturalistic 
and non-natural realism is that the former view does not posit any causally isolated facts. 
This matters because the realist’s by-product claim is best supported by comparing 
knowledge of moral facts to complex scientific knowledge, which only involves natural 
facts. Given the success of science, it is reasonable to assert that even the more abstract 
scientific facts are causally connected to us through our rational reflection. Just as 
scientists’ knowledge of astrophysics utilises advanced mental capacities that are a by-
product of our more basic evolved mental capacities, our knowledge of the moral status of 
certain natural facts may also be a by-product of the same capacities. Thus, naturalists can 
escape Street’s dilemma by affirming a by-product relation between evolutionary 
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influences and independent natural moral facts. Although the by-product view involves a 
somewhat indirect relation, this is still distinct from taking the other horn of the dilemma. 
It is worth elaborating on the importance of the non-natural versus natural 
conception of moral facts in Street’s argument. From a moral naturalist’s perspective, one 
of the main problems with her argument is that it is primarily based on the non-naturalist’s 
metaphysical distinction between moral and natural facts. If it is plausible for moral 
naturalists to compare knowledge of natural moral facts with our knowledge of obscure 
non-moral facts, Street would then be unable to maintain her own philosophical and 
scientific claims while simultaneously rejecting naturalists’ philosophical claims. 
Removing the non-naturalist’s sharp distinction between natural and moral facts actually 
creates a dilemma for Street: on one hand, she could accept that rational reflection is 
reliable in both the moral and scientific domains, thus defeating her argument against 
moral realism. On the other hand, she could assert that rational reflection is unreliable in 
general, which would undermine scientific knowledge along with moral realism. It is safe 
to assume that Street’s argument is not intended to encourage any scepticism about 
science, given her own appeals to evolutionary theory. Knowledge of obscure scientific 
facts does not require a miraculous coincidence between our evolved mental capacities and 
the mind-independent natural facts about the universe. After all, natural selection clearly 
did not directly select for the ability to track facts about astrophysics, evolutionary biology 
or advanced mathematics. This demonstrates that we can extend well beyond the original 
function of our basic evolved mental capacities, so we have no need to reject scientific 
theories or moral realism on evolutionary grounds. Thus, rather than rejecting both 
scientific and moral knowledge, it is surely more reasonable to reject Street’s view that 
knowledge of independent moral facts cannot occur as an evolutionary by-product. 
Ultimately, to avoid total scepticism in any given domain of knowledge, we must assume 
the truth of some of our basic beliefs in that domain. 
Although the points in this chapter undermine Street’s argument against moral 
realism, realists obviously still need to develop their positive account of moral knowledge 
and the nature of moral facts. However, they do not owe a fully developed account to 
debunkers, as the finer philosophical details of moral realism are fundamentally separate 
from evolutionary considerations. More generally, defenders of any philosophical position 
only need to demonstrate that their views are not undermined by any relevant EDAs, as has 
been done in this chapter. While this section has focused on rational reflection and the 
associated by-product view as a response to Street’s EDA, some of Street’s responses to 
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potential criticisms of her argument are focused more on moral naturalism. As such, the 
next section examines Street’s objections specifically to naturalistic moral realism. 
 
 
2.3 Street’s Opposition to Moral Naturalists 
 
Street has several objections to naturalistic versions of moral realism. She first describes 
one possible naturalistic account of moral realism: “Given that we have the evaluative 
attitudes we do, evaluative facts are identical with natural facts N. But if we had possessed 
a completely different set of evaluative attitudes, the evaluative facts would have been 
identical with the very different natural facts M” (Street 2006, p. 136). Street gives this 
example mainly to clarify that she would not regard this as a properly realist view, as it 
makes the moral facts depend on which beliefs we happen to have. This view would not be 
subject to the Darwinian dilemma, as it is closer to the anti-realist position that Street 
endorses. Thus, it only avoids the dilemma by failing to be a properly realist view. A 
genuinely realist position would not make the moral facts depend in any way on our actual 
or possible moral beliefs (Street 2006, p. 137). 
Street then considers an example of what she regards as a genuine realist view, 
specifically focusing on the kind of view defended by philosophers such as David Brink 
and Nicholas Sturgeon (Brink 1989, 2001; Sturgeon 1985). As Street understands them, 
their views state that we can determine which natural facts are moral facts by following 
standard practice in moral philosophy. Specifically, this refers to the method in which 
philosophers begin with certain moral judgements that seem intuitively true, then attempt 
to incorporate them into a coherent moral theory. In the case of naturalism, the moral 
judgements must also be compatible with a naturalistic worldview (Street 2006, pp. 139-
140). Street opposes this type of realist view by posing essentially the same dilemma as 
before, since this view begins by taking for granted some of our default moral judgements 
that are potentially ‘saturated’ with evolutionary influence. We may recall that the more 
viable horn of the dilemma for realists to take is the option of affirming a truth-tracking 
relation between independent moral facts and our evolved evaluative tendencies. However, 
Street thinks it is even less plausible for realists to posit a truth-tracking relation in this 
particular naturalistic account of realism: “[I]f the tracking account failed as a scientific 
explanation when it came to arguing that we were selected to track independent evaluative 
truths, then it will fail even more seriously when it comes to arguing that we were selected 
to track independent facts about natural-normative identities” (Street 2006, p. 141). The 
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term ‘natural-normative identities’ refers to the identification of moral facts with some 
particular natural facts, which is an aspect of the naturalistic accounts given by the 
aforementioned philosophers. Thus, Street is suggesting that it is especially unclear how a 
capacity to identify moral facts with certain natural facts could be relevant to the survival 
or reproductive success of our ancestors. Therefore, there is apparently no reason to think 
that such a capacity would be favoured by natural selection. 
However, this notion depends on Street’s aforementioned points against the by-
product hypothesis, which have been opposed on the grounds that undermining the by-
product claim would undermine scientific knowledge. The comparison to science remains 
relevant here, as the concept of a ‘natural-normative identity’ hardly seems as complex or 
obscure as any advanced scientific theory. For instance, knowledge of astrophysics is at 
least as obscure as knowledge of the moral status of certain natural facts; if anything, it is 
more likely that moral knowledge would have affected the reproductive success of our 
ancestors. After all, a great deal of our scientific knowledge is much further removed from 
the everyday concerns of human beings, compared to moral knowledge. So unless we are 
willing to be sceptical of science, we cannot simply rule out the possibility that we are 
capable of reliably tracking natural-normative identities. Importantly, we need not suppose 
that early humans had the sophisticated concept of ‘natural-normative identities’ as we 
understand it now. As with any other philosophical concept, this results from rational 
reflection, which is a by-product of the more basic mental capacities possessed by our 
ancestors. These basic capacities would merely need to allow our ancestors to identify 
certain natural facts as ‘calling for’ certain actions or meaning that they ‘ought’ to act in 
certain ways. It is reasonable to assume that these evaluative tendencies could have 
influenced our ancestors’ behaviour, sometimes in ways that affected their chances of 
survival and reproduction. 
The important point is that basic mental capacities would be sufficient for the by-
product hypothesis. Considering that we have the by-product of many highly successful 
scientific theories (their success is exemplified by modern technology) despite their 
irrelevance to our ancestors’ survival, it seems at least equally likely that our capacity for 
rational reflection also enables us to track natural moral facts. Thus, a capacity to track 
natural-normative identities is not obscure in relation to evolutionary pressures, so long as 
the by-product view is plausible. 
 
Apart from the issue of natural-normative identities, Street also examines another way that 
moral naturalists may attempt to overcome the Darwinian dilemma. Defenders of 
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naturalistic moral realism may claim that there is at least one case in which independent 
moral value can be identified with a certain natural property, without being undermined by 
the dilemma. Specifically, they could argue that the natural property of pain is intrinsically 
linked to mind-independent moral value. An argument to this effect could begin with the 
highly plausible assumption that pain is bad regardless of whether anyone thinks it is. 
Realists could thus claim that pain is intrinsically morally bad (in the sense of having 
negative moral value) due to its phenomenological qualities. This claim could then be used 
to demonstrate a truth-tracking relation between evolutionary influences and mind-
independent moral truth. The capacity to experience pain clearly has evolutionary benefits 
since it discourages actions that could reduce one’s chances of survival. However, if the 
badness of pain is due to its phenomenological character rather than its evolutionary 
function, then this would suggest that humans have evolved to recognise independent facts 
about the moral status of pain. Unlike some moral beliefs that change over time due to 
cultural factors and philosophical developments, the badness of pain remains a constant 
mind-independent truth if it is intrinsically linked to its negative phenomenology. 
One of Street’s main objections to a truth-tracking account of pain’s negative value 
is that it is less scientifically plausible than a simpler adaptive link explanation. This is 
essentially the same line of argument that Street used against the more general truth-
tracking account. No matter what natural facts one identifies moral facts with, the adaptive 
link explanation is always more parsimonious and seemingly better at explaining the 
phenomenon. In this case, it is simpler to say that we believe pain is bad because this belief 
tendency promoted behaviour that was conducive to our ancestors’ survival and 
reproduction, thus allowing them to pass down this tendency (Street 2006, p. 151). In 
Street’s view, mind-independent facts about the moral status of pain would have no 
explanatory role to add to the most scientifically plausible evolutionary account of pain. 
An analogous argument also applies to the positive mental states of happiness and 
pleasure, since they also plausibly have an evolutionary function. 
It must be admitted that it is philosophically challenging to attempt to demonstrate 
that pain is intrinsically morally bad. It may even be impossible to ‘prove’ such a reductive 
naturalistic identification, since it is a fundamental claim upon which other moral 
assertions can be based. However, Street’s argument does not necessarily change the status 
of existing philosophical problems of this kind. This is because philosophical debates 
employ our capacity for rational reflection, and it has been argued that Street cannot 
undermine this mental capacity without also undermining her own argument. Thus, 
philosophical reasoning in general is vindicated by the points used against Street. As such, 
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debates concerning moral value theories can continue in the same way that they proceeded 
prior to any challenges from EDAs. This is not to suggest that all EDAs are undermined by 
a defence of rational reflection; as will be seen in later chapters, the other discussed 
debunking arguments do not specifically try to undermine this capacity. More generally, 
this thesis does not aim to resolve any philosophical debates that have existed prior to 
evolutionary considerations from EDAs. Thus, for metaethical views such as moral realism 
and value theories such as hedonism, the only aim is to provide a response to EDAs in 
particular. 
Overall, it has been argued that Street’s argument fails to undermine moral realism 
on evolutionary grounds, regardless of the philosophical merits of realists’ positive 
arguments for their view. Although it is still a challenge for realists to vindicate their 
theory in a purely philosophical context, the rejection of any prominent EDAs targeting 
moral realism will allow this theory to revert to the status it held in philosophical debates 
prior to EDAs. It will be argued that the same applies to the philosophical views targeted 
by the other debunking arguments that are discussed in the upcoming chapters. Finally, 
while it has been suggested that non-naturalist realists can attempt to reduce the force of 
Street’s EDA, her argument provides us with one reason to favour a naturalistic account of 
moral realism. It has been argued that naturalists have a much stronger defence in the 
comparison to science and the associated by-product hypothesis. With these points in 
mind, the next chapter examines whether Richard Joyce’s EDA can avoid the problems 





















3.1 Overview of Joyce’s Argument 
 
Richard Joyce’s argument is another very prominent EDA in the literature (Brosnan 2011; 
Carruthers & James 2008; Cline 2015; Das 2016; FitzPatrick 2014, 2015; James 2009; 
Joyce 2006; Kahane 2011; Leibowitz & Sinclair 2017; Shafer-Landau 2013; Toner 2011; 
Tresan 2010; Wielenberg 2010). As with Street’s argument, Joyce draws upon 
evolutionary biology to support a certain philosophical position. His aim is to undermine 
the epistemic justification of moral judgements in general, leading to a conclusion of 
global moral scepticism. As such, his debunking argument also has an epistemological 
rather than metaphysical focus. Joyce’s argument may be considered more ambitious than 
Street’s in terms of its conclusion, as moral scepticism is an unpopular epistemic viewpoint 
even without the addition of controversial evolutionary claims. However, Joyce actually 
considers his argument to be less ambitious than Street’s, at least in the sense that his 
debunking target is not moral realism in particular (Joyce 2013, p. 140). Moral realists are 
nevertheless still affected by Joyce’s argument, since they are presumably required to be 
able to justify their belief in at least some moral facts. Thus, Joyce’s broad debunking 
target of moral belief justification entails that his argument could potentially have far-
reaching consequences for moral philosophy if left unchallenged. 
The current section of this chapter outlines most of Joyce’s argument, with most of the 
critical analysis occurring in the following sections. This chapter focuses on Joyce’s 
argument as developed in his 2006 book titled The Evolution of Morality, as this contains 
his most detailed and widely discussed presentation of the argument. It should also be 
noted that the terms ‘judgement’ and ‘belief’ will be used interchangeably. 
 
Joyce’s argument begins with a detailed evolutionary genealogy of morality. Since his 
evolutionary account spans several chapters, only the most important details will be 
covered. To begin with, Joyce notes that psychological mechanisms that were adaptive in 
our distant evolutionary past are not necessarily adaptive in the present day, as our living 
circumstances have changed drastically over time (Joyce 2006, p. 5). The next notable 
point is that Joyce acknowledges the role of non-evolutionary influences on the content of 
moral beliefs, just as Street admitted in her argument: 
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Though there is no doubt that the content and the contours of any morality are highly 
influenced by culture, it may be that the fact that a community has a morality at all 
is to be explained by reference to dedicated psychological mechanisms forged by 
biological natural selection. That said, it is perfectly possible that natural selection 
has taken some interest in the content of morality, perhaps favoring broad and general 
universals (Joyce 2006, p. 10). 
This passage represents one of the closest similarities between Joyce’s and Street’s 
arguments. On the possibility that natural selection has favoured some universal types of 
moral beliefs, Joyce refers to these universal elements of morality as ‘fixed’ content. This 
includes the types of judgements that tended to enhance reproductive fitness in the varying 
conditions of our ancestral environment (Joyce 2006, p. 10). Presumably, this fixed moral 
content would be along the lines of Street’s six examples of widespread adaptive beliefs, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. This appears to be supported by Joyce’s reference to cross-cultural 
studies that have identified various universal elements in human morality: negative 
judgements about harming others, values relating to fairness and reciprocity, different 
expectations depending on one’s status in a social hierarchy, and regulations concerning 
bodily matters (Joyce 2006, p. 65). 
Another aspect of Joyce’s evolutionary account that is similar to Street’s account is 
the idea that evolutionary forces would have operated on the most basic elements of moral 
judgements, rather than the specific content of the full-fledged judgements we are now 
capable of making. This is evident in Joyce’s second chapter, in which he considers how 
the biological theory of kin selection may explain why natural selection would favour 
certain prosocial emotions such as love for family members. He notes that an evolutionary 
explanation of prosocial emotions and behaviour is not sufficient to explain the 
phenomenon of morality as we understand it now (Joyce 2006, p. 49). The reason is that 
we can imagine a group of humans who cooperate effectively due to their prosocial 
emotions, without having to ascribe the concept of moral judgements to them: 
These imaginary beings have inhibitions against killing, stealing, etc. They wouldn’t 
dream of doing such things; they just don’t want to do them. But we need not credit 
them with a conception of a prohibition: the idea that one shouldn’t kill or steal 
because to do so is wrong. And moral judgments require, among other things, the 
capacity to understand prohibitions (Joyce 2006, p. 50). 
This is similar to Street’s point that natural selection would have operated on ‘proto’ 
versions of what we now regard as moral judgements. Joyce also speculates that the 
concept of moral judgements in particular—as opposed to just prosocial emotions—would 
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have been likely to increase reproductive fitness due to a link between moral judgements 
and adaptive behaviours: 
[S]elf-directed moral judgment may enhance reproductive fitness so long as it is 
attached to the appropriate actions. We have already seen that the ‘appropriate 
actions’—that is, the fitness enhancing actions—will in many circumstances include 
helpful and cooperative behaviors. Therefore it may serve an individual’s fitness to 
judge certain prosocial behaviors—her own prosocial behaviors—in moral terms 
(Joyce 2006, pp. 108-109). 
Although making certain moral judgements does not guarantee that an individual will 
perform any particular action, these judgements can still serve an evolutionary function if 
they at least raise the likelihood of adaptive behaviours occurring (Joyce 2006, p. 114). 
Furthermore, Joyce suggests that the evolutionary benefits of making moral judgements 
may be due to the idea that only moral rules can justify rules and regulations in a society. 
To use his example, an emotional state such as anger may cause a desire to punish 
someone, but only the judgement that they have done something morally wrong can be 
used to justify their punishment from the perspective of their society. In this way, moral 
judgements may be more effective than emotions at influencing the social behaviour of 
groups (Joyce 2006, p. 117). 
It is notable that Joyce’s argument focuses more on the evolutionary genealogy of 
moral judgements rather than the question of how they could be connected to moral truth. 
This is because Joyce intends to debunk the justification of moral judgements in general, 
rather than a particular metaethical view such as moral realism. To this end, the 
evolutionary component of Joyce’s argument develops the idea that humans have evolved 
to have an innate ‘moral sense’ that guides our moral judgements. Joyce uses this broad 
term to describe several different aspects of morality: our tendency to think in terms of 
certain moral concepts, our capacity for moral emotions such as guilt, and our inclination 
to make moral judgements. Joyce goes into much detail while drawing upon various 
studies in developmental psychology to make the case that the moral sense is innate in 
human beings (Joyce 2006, pp. 133-139). This chapter will accept the notion of an innate 
moral sense for the sake of argument, as a proper assessment of this idea would require a 
level of biological detail that is beyond the philosophical focus of this thesis. The 
following passage from Joyce highlights his view of the relation between our innate moral 
sense and our actual moral judgements: “No one would deny that cultural learning plays a 
central role in determining the content of the moral judgments that an individual ends up 
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making; the claim is that there is a specialized innate mechanism (or series of mechanisms) 
designed to enable this type of learning” (Joyce 2006, p. 137). 
 
Now that most of the important details of Joyce’s evolutionary account of morality have 
been summarised, the focus will turn to Joyce’s philosophical claims in his sixth chapter; 
this is the point at which he presents his debunking argument. While noting the obvious 
fact that every belief has a causal history, he observes that in some cases our knowledge of 
a belief’s genealogy can undermine our confidence in that belief (Joyce 2006, p. 179). The 
concept of genealogical debunking is demonstrated by a thought experiment that plays an 
important role in Joyce’s argument: 
[P]retend there were such things as belief pills, such that taking one would inevitably 
lead to the forming of a certain particular belief (while at the same time invoking 
amnesia about the taking of the pill and, to be on the safe side, amnesia about the 
existence of such pills in general). Suppose that there were a pill that makes you 
believe that Napoleon won Waterloo, and another one that makes you believe that he 
lost. Suppose also that there were an antidote that can be taken for either pill. Now 
imagine that you are proceeding through life happily believing that Napoleon lost 
Waterloo (as, indeed, you are), and then you discover that at some point in your past 
someone slipped you a ‘Napoleon lost Waterloo’ belief pill. It is not a matter of your 
learning of the existence of such pills and having no way of knowing whether you 
have ever taken one; rather, we are imagining that you somehow discover beyond 
any shred of doubt that your belief is the product of such a pill. Should this undermine 
your faith in your belief that Napoleon lost Waterloo? Of course it should (Joyce 
2006, p. 179). 
The belief pills in this thought experiment are supposed to be analogous to the 
evolutionary process of natural selection, while the Napoleon belief is an analogy for 
moral beliefs in general (Joyce 2006, p. 181). There are problems with this thought 
experiment’s representation of our epistemic position, as will be discussed in Section 3.2. 
For now, it is important to note Joyce’s intended message: although knowing that one has 
taken a belief pill is not sufficient to show that the resulting belief is false, it does 
undermine one’s justification for holding that belief. It is possible to obtain knowledge 
through unreliable methods and causes; this is why the thought experiment can only target 
the justification of beliefs, not their truth. In the belief pill case, it is clearly assumed that 
we have a reason to think the pill (representing natural selection) is an unreliable source of 
knowledge. The thought experiment would not work without this assumption of 
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unreliability; it will later be shown that this assumption is a problematic aspect of Joyce’s 
argument. 
Joyce thinks that in the belief pill case, discovering the unreliable cause of the 
belief should lead us to scepticism about that belief, at least until we obtain reliable 
independent evidence for or against it (Joyce 2006, p. 180). Importantly, suspending one’s 
judgement is not the same as assuming that it is probably false. Thus, Joyce’s conclusion 
that we should be sceptical of pill-induced beliefs applies to the analogous real case as 
follows: our discovery of the evolutionary causes of our moral judgements should lead us 
to suspend those judgements. Despite Joyce’s recognition of non-evolutionary influences 
such as culture, it appears that the notion of an innate moral sense underlying all our moral 
concepts provides his reason for global scepticism, rather than selectively undermining 
only moral beliefs that have clear evolutionary explanations. So although the belief pill 
thought experiment only involves one particular belief, it is just an illustration of how 
global evolutionary influences would apply to one particular case. 
Joyce anticipates the objection that natural selection does not affect our 
psychological traits in the same way that the belief pills directly cause certain beliefs. For 
instance, it may be objected that our evolved mental traits do not inevitably develop in a 
certain way without being affected by external factors. However, Joyce maintains that a 
belief requiring environmental input should not automatically be considered a learned 
belief, in the sense of contrasting it with an innate belief (Joyce 2006, p. 180). This is due 
to his claim that there is an innate psychological mechanism that enables the acquisition of 
moral beliefs; as such, all moral beliefs are fundamentally a product of this evolved 
mechanism (Joyce 2006, pp. 180-181). In order to demonstrate this point that the 
evolutionary influences on moral beliefs occur at the fundamental level of general moral 
concepts, Joyce presents a modified version of the belief pill scenario: 
Suppose that the imaginary belief pills do not generate particular propositional 
beliefs but, rather, dispose you to form beliefs involving a particular concept—a 
concept that otherwise wouldn’t figure in your beliefs. Thus, rather than a pill that 
makes you believe that Napoleon lost Waterloo, it’s just a ‘Napoleon pill’ that makes 
you form beliefs about Napoleon in general. Without this pill you would never have 
formed any beliefs about Napoleon at all. We needn’t worry too much about what 
other factors determine the precise content of these Napoleon beliefs; perhaps it is 
determined randomly, or perhaps there are certain environmental triggers… (Joyce 
2006, p. 181) 
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As with the first version, Joyce asks us to suppose that we discover with absolute certainty 
that we have taken such a pill. He maintains that this new scenario would undermine any 
beliefs we have about Napoleon, which represents the justification of all moral judgements 
being undermined. This follows from Joyce’s view that all it takes to undermine a belief is 
for any concept involved in that belief to be undermined (Joyce 2006, p. 181). As such, the 
genealogy of a belief is said to have a debunking effect even if the specific content of the 
belief is also shaped by other factors. Joyce’s global debunking of moral judgements 
clearly requires that our innate moral concepts must be very general. As such, he lists a 
few examples of fundamental moral concepts, such as obligation, fairness and virtue 
(Joyce 2006, p. 181). Joyce asserts that it is only due to our particular evolutionary history 
that we have certain moral concepts such as these. As a result, Joyce thinks we should be 
agnostic with respect to any beliefs that involve our innate moral concepts. He does not 
seem to consider it a possibility that any widespread moral beliefs could be sufficiently 
detached from the concepts granted by our innate moral sense. 
Joyce is aware of the possible objection that his belief pill thought experiment 
misrepresents the real case of natural selection and moral beliefs: “It may be objected that 
in the case of the belief pills the story has been carefully stipulated such that forming a 
belief as the result of taking a pill is entirely independent of whether or not the state of 
affairs necessary to render the belief true obtains in the world” (Joyce 2006, p. 182). 
However, Joyce maintains that we have no reason to think that natural selection would 
have led us to reliably form true moral beliefs. To this end, he follows a similar strategy to 
Street in arguing that moral knowledge is unlike other domains of knowledge, in terms of 
the evolutionary advantages of reliably tracking truths. Joyce refers to the case of 
mathematical knowledge to demonstrate this point. He begins by assuming that our most 
basic beliefs concerning arithmetic are innate, such as the belief that 1 + 1 = 2. An innate 
capacity for this type of reasoning would apparently be favoured by natural selection since 
we can conceive of its relevance to survival in prehistoric times: “False mathematical 
beliefs just aren’t going to be very useful. Suppose you are being chased by three lions, 
you observe two quit the chase, and you conclude that it is now safe to slow down” (Joyce 
2006, p. 182). Joyce thus thinks that a genealogical explanation of mathematical beliefs 
does not debunk them, although this raises the question of whether our highly developed 
capacities for abstract mathematical reasoning can be traced back to the evolution of much 
more basic capacities. Clearly, something like the by-product view discussed in the 
previous chapter would be necessary in order to vindicate abstract mathematical 
knowledge as with scientific knowledge. 
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Joyce also parallels Street’s argument by claiming that unlike mathematical beliefs, 
the evolutionary benefits of making moral judgements can be explained without having to 
suppose that any of them are true. He refers back to his evolutionary account of how 
judging actions in moral terms could promote prosocial behaviours and thus be adaptive, 
due to the benefits of living in a social group with regulated behaviour. Unlike 
mathematical beliefs, the truth of any moral belief seems unlikely to have ever had effects 
on adaptive behaviour (Joyce 2006, p. 183). Even if it is necessary for humans to believe 
there are objective moral truths in order for moral beliefs to sufficiently motivate adaptive 
behaviour, believing something is obviously not enough to make it true. Joyce’s points 
about truth detection only having evolutionary benefits for certain types of beliefs leads to 
the possibility of his argument being self-defeating, as he recognises. Clearly Joyce’s 
argument requires that the evolved mental faculties used in scientific reasoning—such as 
the evolutionary speculations that he draws upon—must be capable of reliably tracking the 
truth. Although he grants that these mental faculties are the product of natural selection, 
Joyce defends scientific reasoning by comparing it his aforementioned example of basic 
arithmetic. Presumably, the more advanced levels of scientific reasoning are ultimately 
built upon the basic reasoning capacities that were adaptive due to their truth-tracking 
reliability. These points allow Joyce to protect his argument from his own debunking 
claims (Joyce 2006, p. 183). 
Joyce recognises that merely defending the mental capacities that he uses to 
formulate his debunking argument is not sufficient to undermine the justification of moral 
judgements. His points that have been discussed so far do not rule out the possibility of 
some other relation between moral facts and natural evolutionary facts; there could be a 
relation that makes the notion of reliable moral judgements compatible with Joyce’s 
evolutionary genealogy of our moral sense (Joyce 2006, p. 184). Since a naturalistic 
account of morality could posit such a relation, Joyce devotes much attention to the task of 
rejecting moral naturalism. The issue of moral naturalism will be covered in Section 3.3, as 
it is essentially a separate component of Joyce’s overall debunking argument. 
After rejecting moral naturalism, Joyce very briefly considers two other metaethical 
views: moral supernaturalism and moral non-naturalism. The former view holds that some 
supernatural entity or entities are the only source of moral truths; this is central to many 
religious perspectives on morality. In contrast, non-naturalists do not need to posit any 
‘divine’ entities, but they still regard moral facts as being distinct from natural facts. Both 
non-naturalists and supernaturalists hold that moral properties exist beyond the natural 
world that can be described by the sciences. Whereas Joyce required a separate argument 
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against naturalism, he quickly dismisses these other metaethical views by referring back to 
his evolutionary genealogy of morality and combining it with Ockham’s Razor: both non-
naturalism and supernaturalism explain morality by positing extra entities, but these 
entities can be discarded since they add nothing to the explanatory power of the 
evolutionary account (Joyce 2006, pp. 209-210). Joyce extends this point to dismiss other 
ways that one might attempt to justify moral beliefs; in particular, he suggests that 
epistemological theories such as coherentism and foundationalism cannot compete with the 
explanatory power of his evolutionary account: “[A]n ‘explaining away’ strategy is 
preferable to persisting with the problematic project of trying to show that our moral 
beliefs are epistemically justified, since it recognizes no remaining mysterious phenomena 
or unanswered questions; it is explanatorily complete” (Joyce 2006, p. 219). 
Since Joyce rejects moral naturalism, non-naturalism and supernaturalism, it may 
seem that he is only left with moral nihilism: roughly the view that all moral judgements 
are false. However, he maintains that lacking any reason to believe in moral facts does not 
necessarily entail that we should disbelieve that they exist (Joyce 2006, p. 210). There are 
many cases in which we are not justified in holding a certain belief, but this does not 
automatically mean we are justified in believing the opposite. To use Joyce’s example, a 
person might be unjustified in believing they have an odd number of hairs on their head, 
but this does not mean they are justified in disbelieving this, as this would falsely suggest 
that they are justified in believing they have an even number of hairs (Joyce 2006, pp. 210-
211). As with Joyce’s questionable belief pill analogy, it is debatable whether this example 
is similar enough to the case of evolution and moral beliefs. Regardless, Joyce combines 
this general point about justification with his evolutionary genealogy of morality, leading 
him to conclude that although moral beliefs could potentially be true or false, we are not 
justified in holding any such beliefs until we have more reliable grounds for holding them 
(Joyce 2006, p. 211). With the main points of Joyce’s evolutionary argument now 
summarised, Section 3.2 critically examines the belief pill analogy and the notion of the 
moral sense, then Section 3.3 focuses on Joyce’s rejection of moral naturalism. 
 
 
3.2 Belief Pills and the Moral Sense 
 
One of the main problematic aspects of Joyce’s argument is his ‘belief pill’ thought 
experiment, in which the imagined belief pills represent evolutionary influences 
(specifically natural selection) and the resulting beliefs about Napoleon represent our 
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moral beliefs. As Russ Shafer-Landau points out, the belief pills in Joyce’s analogy seem 
to override any other factors that could potentially affect the formation of beliefs: “The 
doxastic influence of a belief pill is 100 percent. Its operation is direct and guaranteed. You 
take the pill, you have the programmed belief, no matter whether the belief is true or not” 
(Shafer-Landau 2013, p. 18). Although this applies most directly to Joyce’s original 
formulation of the belief pill story, it also applies to his modified version: even if the pills 
only directly determine the concepts involved in our beliefs, it is not clear that thinking in 
terms of these concepts would necessarily lead us towards moral truths. In other words, the 
belief pills still directly influence the range of beliefs we form, regardless of whether that 
range includes any true beliefs. If this interpretation is correct, then the belief pill story 
does not accurately reflect the nature of evolutionary influences on our moral beliefs. As 
with Street’s claims about our belief tendencies being ‘thoroughly saturated’ with 
evolutionary influences, Joyce’s story underestimates the impact of other factors such as 
rational reflection. As mentioned earlier, Joyce at least recognises other belief-influencing 
factors such as culture. Although when it comes to rational reflection, he only implicitly 
defends this capacity in the context of scientific and mathematical reasoning. Thus, it 
appears that the only reason he disregards this mental capacity in the context of morality is 
because of his claim that the moral sense does not necessarily require any connection to 
truth to serve its evolutionary function. 
However, just as it has been argued in Chapter 2 that rational reflection allows us to 
attain knowledge in both the scientific and moral domains, this point can be extended to 
reject even Joyce’s modified belief pill scenario. After all, even if we grant that the general 
concepts in our reflective moral judgements are traceable to evolutionary factors, this does 
not undermine the fact that we can apply rational reflection to moral issues, just as we use 
this capacity in science. It does not seem that debunkers such as Joyce could object to this 
point, as one does not need to hold any particular metaethical view to recognise the 
complexity of philosophical reasoning that humans are now capable of; this complexity is 
even demonstrated by Joyce’s own argument. Thus, any possible differences in the 
evolutionary origins of moral reasoning as opposed to other types of reasoning become less 
relevant now that our reasoning capacities in general have extended so far beyond their 
original functions.  
Apart from the issue of ignoring other potential influences such as rational 
reflection, the belief pill analogy is also questionable in terms of how much it 
overestimates the direct influence of evolution on particular moral beliefs. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, natural selection could only indirectly affect the kinds of beliefs that humans 
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have in the present day. The degree of influence could vary significantly depending on the 
type of belief; for instance, we would expect greater influence on the kinds of beliefs that 
would have been salient in our evolutionary past, such as Street’s examples relating to 
survival and reciprocity. These types of beliefs might require more extensive rational 
reflection to eliminate any indefensible evolutionary biases. Regardless, so long as we 
have the capacity to reflect upon any of our moral beliefs and potentially reject or alter 
them, this weakens the force of evolutionary influences as compared to the belief pills in 
Joyce’s analogy. This line of reasoning follows Shafer-Landau’s objections to Joyce’s 
EDA, as he refers to the potential for other ‘doxastic operations’ to correct for any 
distorting evolutionary influences (Shafer-Landau 2013, p. 19). 
Shafer-Landau raises another related point: evolutionary debunkers have not been 
able to demonstrate that evolutionary influences are different from cultural and historical 
influences, in terms of our ability to correct for biases (Shafer-Landau 2013, p. 19). Given 
that Joyce and Street do not present cultural debunking arguments, they do not seem to 
regard these other factors as distorting influences. As such, we should question why the 
case of evolution might be different. One possible explanation that debunkers might favour 
is the idea that only biological factors can ‘hardwire’ certain tendencies in humans, 
whereas cultural factors can only cause us to acquire certain belief-forming tendencies 
through learning; this presumably makes learned beliefs more susceptible to the effects of 
rational reflection. The concept of an innate biological mechanism is important for Joyce’s 
argument in particular, as he depends on the idea of an innate moral sense that explains 
why we have our particular moral concepts. Joyce tries to maintain a distinction between 
this moral capacity and our other reasoning capacities (as used in science and mathematics) 
by disregarding a possible objection to the notion of an innate moral sense: 
First, it might be pointed out, no human trait is ‘hard-wired’ in the sense of 
developing inevitably, irrespective of environmental factors; an innate belief would, 
like any other phenotypic adaptation, require environmental input in order to become 
manifest. This observation does not, however, compromise the very notion of an 
innate belief. A belief that requires environmental input is not thereby a learned 
belief, and not thereby a belief that is formed in a way sensitive to the evidence (Joyce 
2006, p. 180). 
Joyce notes that although cultural learning plays an important role in forming the content 
of our moral beliefs, his evolutionary story only claims that we have a specialised innate 
mechanism for acquiring general moral concepts. Thus, moral concepts may be innate 
even if the content of specific moral beliefs is influenced by external factors (Joyce 2006, 
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pp. 180-181). This point leads Joyce to argue that even our reflective moral beliefs are not 
justified since they draw upon the concepts granted by our moral sense, which evolved 
with no apparent need for any connection to truth. As he puts it, “We have no reason to 
think in the case of the moral sense that natural selection is likely to have produced true 
beliefs” (Joyce 2006, p. 182). In this way, both Joyce and Street attempt to debunk 
morality by identifying reflective moral beliefs as the product of a mental faculty that 
presumably did not evolve in such a way as to reliably track moral truths. 
Since the concept of an innate moral sense is central to Joyce’s argument, it is 
important to scrutinise this aspect of the argument when responding to his evolutionary 
challenge. One problem concerns the way he considers the relation between the moral 
sense and the content of our reflective moral beliefs. Christopher Toner focuses on this 
issue, pointing out that Joyce does not go into detail regarding the genealogy of any 
particular moral judgement, instead just listing a few general moral concepts: 
Joyce sometimes slides without warrant from talk of a genealogy of the moral sense 
to a genealogy of moral beliefs. Although he gestures in this direction, I am pretty 
sure he has not actually given us a genealogy of a single moral belief; I am certain 
he has not given us one of all of them. Thus it remains possible that moral facts that 
played no role in the genealogy of the moral sense still play a role in the genealogy 
of moral beliefs (Toner 2011, p. 530). 
This is especially problematic for Joyce when considering his claim that all moral 
judgements are unjustified by default, not just a subset of moral judgements that have an 
obvious evolutionary explanation. As such, it could be argued that Joyce faces a burden of 
proof, rather than defenders of moral beliefs. Joyce’s radical conclusion of global moral 
scepticism needs to be supported with enough specific examples to convince his opponents 
that any conceivable moral judgement can be traced back to the concepts granted by our 
evolved moral sense. In the absence of such examples, Joyce’s opponents can maintain that 
although the evolution of our moral sense may not have required any reliable connection to 
moral truths, our reflective moral judgements can still align with such truths (Toner 2011, 
p. 530). As with the similar point against Street’s argument, this depends on the idea that 
rational reflection allows us to track moral truths as a by-product of this mental capacity’s 
selection for relatively basic reasoning capabilities. 
Furthermore, just as the by-product view was defended by comparing moral 
knowledge to scientific knowledge, Joyce’s notion of an innate moral sense undermining 
moral judgements can be opposed by comparing the moral sense to other evolved traits 
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that are reliable despite their selection for other functions. This point is highlighted by 
Toner: 
Consider vision, which depends upon eyes possessing a certain transparency. The 
transparency of eyes stems from their being composed largely of crystallins in close-
packed arrays. But these crystallins were originally selected for purposes (such as 
heat resistance) that had nothing to do with perception. Are we thereby to conclude 
that vision is unreliable? Certainly not, for we can preserve our confidence in its 
reliability by noting that these crystallins, originally selected for one purpose, were 
later co-opted for another that had everything to do with perception (Toner 2011, p. 
533). 
Similarly, although the moral sense may have been naturally selected due to its promotion 
of behaviours that supported our ancestors’ reproductive fitness, it can now be utilised in 
the very different domain of modern moral philosophy. In this different context, 
judgements that are based in our moral sense are subject to reflection and gradual 
refinement; it can be argued that this allows us to align our moral judgements towards 
moral truths. 
Toner’s example of an evolved physical trait also provides a response to 
debunkers’ claims that moral beliefs are unlike perceptual beliefs, in that the former would 
not need to reliably track features of the world in order to be favoured by natural selection. 
The vision example shows that even our perceptual capacities need not have been directly 
selected for truth-tracking functions in order for us to now have reliable perceptual beliefs. 
This point clearly reduces any apparent distinction between the perception case and the 
case of the evolved moral sense. By reducing any apparent distinction that debunkers try to 
maintain between our moral and non-moral faculties, it can thus be argued that reliable 
moral faculties are like our perceptual faculties; both are by-products of traits that were 
originally selected for much more basic functions. 
 
Much of the discussion so far has focused on Joyce’s concept of the evolved moral sense, 
as the distinction between this innate mental capacity and the content of our actual moral 
beliefs is important to keep in mind when examining his belief pill analogy. For reasons 
that were also discussed in Chapter 2, it should now be clear that even if our moral sense is 
a ‘distorting’ influence with regard to moral truth, the content of our reflective moral 
judgements can still be shaped by more reliable processes such as our rational capacities. 
Thus, we can reject the idea that evolutionary forces such as natural selection (as 
represented by Joyce’s belief pills) would inevitably lead us to form certain types of 
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beliefs. As Shafer-Landau observes, evolutionary forces would only lead to sceptical 
concerns about morality if they actually worked like the belief pills, by forcing certain 
beliefs or tendencies upon us without the possibility of reflecting upon them and changing 
them: “[D]ebunkers have said nothing on behalf of this special status for evolutionary 
forces, nothing to show that evolutionary forces possess an immunity to correction that is 
unique among all possibly distorting doxastic influences” (Shafer-Landau 2013, p. 19). 
As mentioned earlier, Joyce presents an adjusted version of the belief pill analogy 
in which we only form beliefs with certain moral concepts because of pills that induce 
these types of beliefs. The analogy was suggesting that without natural selection we would 
not have the particular set of moral concepts that we have actually ended up with. This is a 
scientific claim about human evolution, so questions about its plausibility cannot be settled 
with philosophical speculation. It has been noted that debunkers often rely on untestable 
scientific speculations to support their philosophical conclusions, while demanding a much 
higher degree of certainty from philosophers who oppose their debunking arguments. In 
Joyce’s case, he claims to have shifted the burden of proof over to those who wish to 
reinstate the justification of any moral beliefs, as he argues that the evolutionary genealogy 
of morality makes our beliefs unjustified by default. Joyce reaffirms this point in his later 
work, in which he maintains that the widespread acceptance of many moral beliefs is not 
enough to put the burden of proof on moral sceptics (Joyce 2016). Thus, even though many 
moral beliefs seem initially well-justified, Joyce asserts that this intuitive feeling of 
justification should not just be taken for granted: “The fact that many people believe their 
moral beliefs to be well-justified clinches nothing; people believe all sorts of silly things” 
(Joyce 2016, p. 139). 
In addition to the points discussed so far, another issue is that there is a discrepancy 
between Joyce’s belief pill story and our actual epistemic position: Joyce’s analogy seems 
to assume that we definitely know the pill is an unreliable source of knowledge. In this 
way the analogy begs the question against moral justification, since it only works for 
Joyce’s argument if we already know or assume that some of the resulting moral beliefs 
are false. After all, we cannot be sure that a process is unreliable unless we know what 
proportion of the beliefs it causes are true. This point is highlighted by Erik Wielenberg, 
who describes Joyce’s reasoning in the following terms: “If S’s moral belief that P can be 
explained without appealing to the truth of P, then S’s moral belief that P is a product of an 
unreliable process” (Wielenberg 2010, p. 462). He notes that Joyce seems to assume this is 
obvious, considering the lack of argument for this point. Wielenberg discusses this in the 
context of one of Joyce’s examples that is supposed to show that holding certain false 
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beliefs could have evolutionary benefits; this extends to the idea that evolutionarily 
beneficial types of beliefs are not any more likely to be true. Joyce’s example is about a 
belief that a certain plant has magical properties; it is assumed that we know this belief is 
false, although the plant does have potent medicinal properties. The false belief that such a 
plant is magical could promote the survival of people whose environment contains this 
plant. The following passage demonstrates how Joyce applies this hypothetical example to 
the case of moral beliefs:  
If there were an innate belief that certain plants have magical powers, and this belief 
were the product of a dedicated psychological mechanism with a distinct 
evolutionary history … since in this case we would have an empirically confirmed 
hypothesis of how this belief-formation mechanism works which does not require 
that any of the beliefs be even approximately true, we would have to conclude that 
any such innate beliefs are products of an unreliable process. … We can now apply 
this lesson to the case of innate moral beliefs. What seems clear is that in the crucial 
respect such beliefs are like the imaginary belief about the plant’s magical properties. 
We have seen that nowhere does the evolutionary hypothesis outlined in earlier 
chapters assume that moral beliefs are or were true. … Thus I conclude that by the 
process reliabilist’s own lights a certain plausible view of how innate moral beliefs 
may have evolved leads naturally to the conclusion that such beliefs are epistemically 
unjustified (Joyce 2006, p. 215). 
For the current purposes, we do not need to consider the details of the epistemological 
theory of reliabilism that Joyce attempts to undermine. The important point here is the 
difference between the hypothetical plant case and the actual case of moral beliefs: while 
we do have prior knowledge that the plant belief is false, we cannot just assume in advance 
that moral beliefs are probably false. Comparing the case of moral beliefs to ‘magical’ 
beliefs would misrepresent our actual epistemic situation. We only know that the plant 
belief is formed by an unreliable process because it is assumed that we already know that 
magic-related beliefs must be false. As Wielenberg puts it, “That the mechanism routinely 
produces false beliefs is what makes it clear that the mechanism in question is unreliable, 
not the fact that the beliefs it produces can be explained without appealing to their truth” 
(Wielenberg 2010, p. 462). Our reasons for being sceptical of any magic-related beliefs 
clearly go beyond just explaining various phenomena without assuming their truth. In 
particular, theories involving the concept of ‘magic’ cannot compete with scientific 
theories when attempting to explain and understand any phenomenon, as evidenced by the 
much greater success of the latter. 
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Overall, it is reasonable to hold that Joyce’s belief pill analogy misrepresents our 
actual epistemic situation regarding moral knowledge. This concludes the main objections 
to two of the central elements of Joyce’s argument, specifically the concept of the innate 
moral sense and the belief pill thought experiment. Since this covers the main evolutionary 
aspects of Joyce’s EDA, the remainder of this chapter focuses more on the metaethical 
aspect of his argument in which he rejects moral naturalism. 
 
 
3.3 Moral Naturalism and Practical Clout 
 
Earlier in this chapter it was noted that Joyce recognises that moral scepticism cannot be 
established simply by explaining moral judgements without presupposing their truth; he 
must also be able to rule out any relation between his genealogical account of morality and 
the truth of our resulting moral judgements. Moral naturalism’s identification of moral 
facts with particular natural facts could accommodate such a relation, which is why Joyce 
devotes much attention to rejecting this metaethical view. Specifically, one could defend a 
naturalistic account of moral realism in which the moral facts are compatible with Joyce’s 
evolutionary explanation of our moral sense. Joyce’s points against moral naturalism are 
essentially a supplement to his main debunking argument, as he relies on metaethical 
claims that are fundamentally separate from his evolutionary considerations: “[W]hile I 
have argued that empirical evolutionary discoveries are sufficient to create a substantive 
burden for the moralist, I also recognize the need to appeal to a priori metaethical methods 
in bolstering the challenge” (Joyce 2013, p. 143). He begins by drawing upon some much 
earlier work by Gilbert Harman, in which Harman rejected naturalistic moral realism on 
explanatory grounds (Harman 1977, 1986). Joyce follows a similar line of reasoning and 
combines it with his own evolutionary genealogy of morality to complete his debunking 
argument. In particular, Joyce focuses on Harman’s idea that positing moral facts does not 
seem to add anything to a naturalistic explanation of morality. Joyce’s evolutionary story is 
clearly such an explanation, as it does not posit any non-natural or supernatural 
phenomena. 
One of the general ideas that Joyce follows is that naturalistic moral realism cannot 
be defended by merely suggesting how moral facts would fit within a naturalistic 
worldview if we assume that such facts could exist. Joyce illustrates this point by using the 
concept of ghosts in place of moral facts: “[O]ne might claim that talk of ghosts could be 
vindicated if it could be shown that ghostly properties may be comfortably integrated 
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within a naturalistic worldview. Quite so. However, this observation alone gives not a 
glimmer of a reason to believe in ghosts” (Joyce 2006, p. 189). As such, Joyce maintains 
that the burden is on moral naturalists to provide a plausible reductive account of moral 
facts that not only convinces us of their existence but is also compatible with his 
evolutionary genealogy of the moral sense. 
Although Joyce considers a full argument against moral naturalism to be beyond 
the scope of his book, he aims to provide a preliminary challenge to this metaethical view 
in order to raise the difficulty of overcoming its apparent explanatory burden. Thus, he 
argues that naturalists cannot account for certain aspects of morality that are typically 
thought to be essential to it (Joyce 2006, pp. 190-191). Specifically, Joyce uses the term 
‘practical clout’ to describe what he regards as two necessary features of moral claims and 
rules: they involve both a sense of inescapability and a sense of authority. The point about 
inescapability is that moral claims are usually taken to override apathy or any desires that 
conflict with the moral prescription (Joyce 2006, pp. 191-192). In other words, moral 
reasons take priority over selfish motivations. As for the point about authority, this notion 
is used to contrast morality with social etiquette: whereas a violation of etiquette is merely 
considered rude, a violation of morality is taken to be much more serious and ‘wrong’. The 
authority of morality also means that anyone automatically has a reason to comply with 
moral rules, whether or not they want to. Supposedly, moral reasons are distinct from our 
reasons to comply with etiquette, since the latter can be overridden under certain 
circumstances (Joyce 2006, pp. 192-193).  
In response to Joyce’s assertion that practical clout is a necessary feature of 
morality, moral naturalists could either deny its necessity or try to accommodate it. 
However, Joyce has objections to both of these options. When examining the naturalist’s 
option of denying this requirement, Joyce considers what naturalistic morality would be 
like without practical clout. He claims that such a conception of morality would not 
provide any grounds for caring about moral reasons:  
To be sure, there are moral reasons for caring about moral wrongness—that is, there 
are reasons pertaining to what can be justified from the point of view of that particular 
normative framework. But these aren’t the kind of reasons you are after, for what 
you are really asking is why, on this occasion and pertaining to this action, you should 
care about that justificatory framework at all (Joyce 2006, p. 205). 
If a person were to realise that they have no reason to care about the notion of moral 
wrongness, it would be rational for them to ignore any moral reasons that conflict with 
their motivations and desires. This would clearly not be conducive to any effective 
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conception of morality. Overall, Joyce’s point is that moral naturalism without practical 
clout fails to capture what we expect from the concept of morality, particularly in terms of 
its regulation of certain behaviours. Joyce does grant that moral naturalists can identify 
moral properties with certain natural properties in a way that is compatible with 
mainstream moral views, such as the view that theft is wrong because it causes distress to 
others. However, he maintains that this would still fail to accommodate practical clout: 
The problem is that thinking in moral terms seems entirely superfluous to such a 
person’s reasons and motivations. If the person wonders why she should not steal the 
newspaper, all the answer she is ever going to get can come from reflecting on the 
fact that it will cause unnecessary distress. Her identifying that causal property with 
moral wrongness seems to add nothing to her reasons or motivations (Joyce 2006, p. 
207). 
In Joyce’s view, his evolutionary account therefore suggests that a naturalistic conception 
of morality could not explain how moral judgements tended to promote prosocial 
behaviours by allowing early humans to overcome their conflicting desires or their lack of 
willpower to follow moral prescriptions. Importantly, Joyce thinks that morality still 
requires practical clout in order to have this desire-overriding effect in the present day, not 
just in our distant evolutionary past: 
Moral naturalism without clout, first of all, seems to enfeeble our capacity to morally 
criticize wrongdoers; second, it might actually encourage wrongdoing for certain 
persons; and third, it renders moral language and moral thinking entirely redundant. 
Such a value system is (to recycle a phrase used earlier) surely too wimpy to be 
mistaken for morality. Moral thinking has a function, I have argued—both 
evolutionarily and contemporarily—and deliberations in terms simply of what we 
want and need will not suffice (Joyce 2006, p. 208). 
Thus, Joyce concludes that moral naturalism without practical clout barely counts as a 
concept of morality, and that it does not seem possible for naturalism to accommodate 
practical clout in any case. Since moral naturalists can apparently neither accommodate 
practical clout nor deny its necessity, Joyce uses this point to reject naturalism. 
One way to vindicate moral naturalism in light of these issues would be to argue 
that practical clout is not a necessary feature of morality, at least not in the way Joyce 
conceptualises it. This aspect of Joyce’s argument has been examined by Jon Tresan. His 
interpretation of Joyce’s notion of practical clout is as follows: first, the ‘inescapability’ of 
moral obligations means that they don’t depend on our having certain motives; we have 
certain obligations even if our desires conflict with them. As for the ‘authority’ aspect of 
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practical clout, this means that moral obligations necessarily entail reasons for certain 
actions. Thus, moral obligations always count as reasons for or against certain actions, 
regardless of one’s motives that may conflict with these moral reasons (Tresan 2010, p. 
222). 
Tresan specifically opposes Joyce’s claim that moral naturalism without practical 
clout would make moral terms superfluous. In Joyce’s view, if thinking of an action as 
being ‘morally wrong’ provides some extra meaning that is not present when only 
considering the natural properties involved in that action, then this counts as a point against 
reductive moral naturalism (Joyce 2006, p. 207). Tresan objects that this begs the question 
against naturalists, since it assumes that an adequate explanation of our need for moral 
terms must involve the idea that they add some substantial meaning that is lacking in the 
relevant natural terms. Naturalists have no reason to accept such a standard of explanation: 
“Good explanations of our need for some type of discourse aren’t in general required to 
include a clause to the effect that the discourse does something more than facilitate our 
thought and talk about some part of the natural world.” (Tresan 2010, pp. 235-236). In 
other words, the use of moral terms is acceptable when describing certain aspects or 
properties of the natural world that are taken to be normatively relevant. This does not 
undermine the naturalist’s claim that the moral relevance of a particular natural property is 
intrinsically linked to that property, even before the introduction of moral terms to describe 
such a property. Although the normative relevance of any given natural property (such as 
pain or pleasure) can be contested, what matters is that describing such properties in moral 
terms does not require us to posit any non-natural properties; as such, moral terms can be 
included in a naturalistic worldview. In the end, any kind of terminology is just a way for 
humans to describe various aspects of the world in different contexts, so the use of 
specifically ‘moral’ terms does not necessarily imply the existence of any non-natural 
properties. 
Apart from rejecting the idea that naturalism without practical clout would make 
moral terms redundant, moral naturalists could also maintain that their account of morality 
is still functional in terms of regulating behaviour, due to contingent facts about human 
psychology. For instance, it could be argued that the moral aspect of certain natural facts is 
a relational property, in that the moral significance depends not only on the intrinsic 
features of particular natural facts but also on the nature of humans who stand in some 
relation to these facts. While it is beyond the current scope to properly defend any 
particular account of moral naturalism, it is worth raising this possible line of argument as 
a response to Joyce’s objections to ‘cloutless’ moral naturalism. Thus, even if it turns out 
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that ‘moral’ reasons only motivate us due to the necessity of prosocial behaviour for a 
fulfilling life, this could still provide a way to resist Joyce’s claim that moral naturalism 
would enfeeble our ability to criticise wrongdoers. After all, we could at least criticise their 
behaviour on the grounds of it being irrational due to the negative consequences for 
themselves and for society overall; such consequences can be identified in terms of natural 
properties such as pain and suffering. 
Joyce’s other objection was a similar point, namely that naturalism without 
practical clout might encourage wrongdoing in some individuals. However, there will 
always be some individuals who are not psychologically disposed to care about morality, 
regardless of how philosophers conceive of it. We cannot expect everyone’s behaviour to 
be successfully regulated by Joyce’s notion of practical clout. 
Overall, these points suggest that moral naturalists have various ways to resist 
Joyce’s non-evolutionary claims about the necessity of practical clout in any system of 
morality, which he used to support the main evolutionary component of his argument. 
When combined with the previous chapter’s points about moral naturalism being on safer 
ground than non-naturalism with regard to Street’s argument, it should now be clear that 
naturalists are able to resist a variety of different debunking strategies. 
 
So far, the concept of practical clout has been discussed in relation to moral naturalism. 
However, it is also worth considering how it relates specifically to moral realism. To 
examine this relation, it is useful to first recall how Joyce conceives of the evolutionary 
benefits of believing in a traditional conception of morality. This is one way to describe the 
default attitude towards morality that would be expected of most people; it refers to the 
conviction that morality is ‘real’ in some way, thus contrasting with Joyce’s moral 
scepticism. Although Joyce does not specifically state that we have evolved to 
unreflectively tend towards moral realism, this is a possible interpretation of his 
aforementioned claim that a specifically ‘moral’ sense would be more effective than non-
moralised prosocial emotions in terms of promoting reproductive fitness (Joyce 2006, p. 
117). 
While Joyce clarifies in later work that even a ‘subjective’ conception of morality 
could work in his debunking argument so long as it were still based in innate moral 
concepts (Joyce 2013, p. 140), it is hard to conceive of this having as many evolutionary 
benefits as a realist’s conception of morality. Our ancestors would not need to recognise 
the abstract philosophical concept of ‘moral realism’ in order to gain evolutionary 
advantages; rather, they would merely need to share a common belief that there are certain 
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objective moral truths. Joyce’s argument seems to entail that this default evolutionary 
tendency towards realism should lose its power over us now that we are capable of 
speculating about our own evolutionary history, including the genealogy of moral 
concepts. Without the ‘illusion’ of objective morality, Joyce’s argument suggests that we 
should be moral sceptics rather than moral realists. Nevertheless, he maintains that moral 
thinking still has practical benefits despite our awareness of its evolutionary origins: “The 
question of what we ought to do, once we have come to see that our moral discourse is a 
philosophically indefensible illusion, is a practical question. A neglected answer is that the 
discourse may be maintained, accepted, but not believed – that it may have the role of a 
fiction” (Joyce 2000, p. 730). In other words, there can be purely pragmatic reasons to take 
some of our unjustified moral beliefs seriously. This theme continues in his book that has 
been the main focus of this chapter, as his conclusion includes some reassurance that moral 
scepticism does not actually change much in practical terms: 
Moral skepticism amounts to the recognition that there is, or may be, nothing 
distinctively morally wrong with stealing, but it is absolutely not to be identified with 
the proposal that ordinary people have no reason at all to refrain from stealing … To 
claim otherwise is to admit that the only thing standing between us and a life of 
savagery and rampant spoon stealing is a sense of moral duty, which is a truly 
depressing thought. To cast into doubt one particular kind of normative framework 
is not to imply that ‘anything goes’ (Joyce 2006, p. 224). 
In other words, it may seem that our evolved tendency to favour the default idea of 
objective morality is no longer necessary in order to achieve morality’s original function of 
regulating social behaviour. This demonstrates how Joyce defends his position of moral 
scepticism, by suggesting that the practical aspects of morality can be maintained even if 
all our moral judgements are epistemically unjustified. 
However, Joyce’s argument fails to debunk the notion of objective moral truth for 
essentially the same reasons that his argument fails to undermine the justification of moral 
beliefs in general: first of all, it was noted that our capacity for rational reflection cannot be 
undermined by his misleading belief pill analogy. This allows moral realists to present a 
by-product defence of our capacity to track moral facts, as discussed in Chapter 2. Moral 
realists can also focus on Wielenberg’s aforementioned point that we can only know a 
mental faculty is unreliable if we already know or assume the truth or falsity of some of the 
resulting beliefs. Overall, if one takes a moral realist’s perspective when examining 
Joyce’s EDA, many of the same general strategies used against Street’s argument can also 
be applied to his argument.  
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With Joyce’s debunking argument rejected, this leaves our moral beliefs with the 
same epistemic status that they held prior to evolutionary challenges: it is a philosophical 
question whether our particular moral beliefs are justified, not a matter that can be settled 
with evolutionary considerations. This thesis has not made any commitments regarding 
which particular moral beliefs are true, it has merely defended naturalistic moral realism 
against evolutionary challenges. Such a defence only needs to show that evolutionary 
theories cannot rule out the possibility of natural moral facts existing and of humans being 
able to identify such facts. Now that Street’s and Joyce’s arguments have been examined, 

































4.1 Overview of Greene’s Argument 
 
Joshua Greene presents a debunking argument that differs from Street’s and Joyce’s 
arguments in several ways. Whereas Street aimed to debunk moral realism and Joyce 
targeted the justification of moral beliefs, Greene’s debunking target is a particular class of 
normative ethical theories. Specifically, his goal is to debunk deontological moral theories 
by developing an argument based on the results of neuroscientific experiments along with 
a certain theory of moral psychology (Greene 2008, 2014). The appeal to neuroscientific 
evidence is one of the most notable differences from the other discussed EDAs, as this is a 
case of drawing upon testable empirical claims rather than speculative evolutionary 
theories. Nevertheless, there is still an evolutionary component in Greene’s argument, so it 
can also be considered an EDA. 
Greene’s debunking target is selective, as he maintains that consequentialist moral 
theories are safe from his argument. Despite the selective nature of his debunking target, it 
is still broad in the sense that there are a wide variety of deontological theories, each with 
their own complexities. However, for the sake of simplicity, the term ‘deontology’ will be 
used to describe this broad approach to moral philosophy. The remainder of this section 
summarises Greene’s overall argument, with the later sections focusing on particular 
problems that should ultimately lead us to reject his selective debunking of deontology. 
Since Greene’s argument targets deontology while apparently leaving 
consequentialism unaffected, it is important to begin by defining these competing 
normative frameworks. Deontology and consequentialism are two different classes of 
normative moral theories that often come into conflict in particular moral cases: 
consequentialists hold that only consequences are of fundamental moral importance, 
whereas deontologists often allow or require actions that would not produce the best 
overall outcomes, due to various moral duties and prohibitions (Greene 2008, p. 37). In 
terms of moral rightness and wrongness, consequentialists judge actions purely in terms of 
their outcomes; depending on one’s preferred variety of consequentialism, this can either 
be the actual, possible or expected outcomes. The consequentialist approach to ethics is 
exemplified by utilitarian theories, which judge actions in accordance with their promotion 
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of the greatest overall good; the definition of goodness depends on one’s theory of value. 
For example, one might identify happiness as the type of value that should be maximised. 
On the other hand, deontological theories are less concerned with consequences, 
instead defining moral rightness and wrongness in terms of an action’s alignment with 
concepts such as duties and principles. Thus, deontology focuses more on the motives 
underlying an action, rather than the outcome. Different deontological theories can vary in 
terms of their lenience regarding exceptionally bad consequences that may arise from 
strictly following duties or prohibitions. Some examples of prohibitions are moral rules 
against intentionally harming others, lying, or using other people as a means to an end. 
Duties may include keeping promises, helping others, or perfecting one’s own personal 
abilities, just to name a few. 
Greene’s argument is similar to Street’s and Joyce’s EDAs in the sense that it 
depends on claims about the nature of moral judgements. In these previously discussed 
arguments, one of the main points was that moral beliefs can apparently be ‘explained 
away’ by appealing to evolutionary theory. In Greene’s selective debunking argument, he 
only intends to undermine deontological moral judgements, thus leaving consequentialist 
judgements unaffected. This is due to his view that the existence of competing moral 
theories can be explained by considering different types of psychological processes: “I 
believe that consequentialist and deontological views of philosophy are not so much 
philosophical inventions as they are philosophical manifestations of two dissociable 
psychological patterns, two different ways of moral thinking, that have been part of the 
human repertoire for thousands of years” (Greene 2008, pp. 37-38). The last part of this 
quote hints at the presence of evolutionary factors in Greene’s argument, which will 
become clear when examining a particular moral dilemma later on. Since Greene’s 
debunking argument depends on the application of a psychological theory to people’s 
responses to a certain moral dilemma, it is important to first examine the details of this 
theory. 
The theory of moral psychology that Greene endorses is the dual-process theory of 
moral judgements. The dual-process aspect of the theory states that the human brain 
operates in two distinct modes: on the one hand, there is the ‘automatic’ and intuitive type 
of mental processing that often involves emotional engagement. Since this type of 
processing occurs automatically without any conscious effort, we apparently rely on it 
most of the time (Greene 2014, p. 696). The other type of mental processing is the more 
effortful, conscious reasoning that we ‘manually’ engage in, rather than it simply being 
triggered by external factors such as our environment. This type of processing enables 
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highly complex and abstract reasoning, including moral reasoning. It also allows us to 
override our default ‘automatic’ processes in many cases; Greene gives the example of 
ignoring one’s immediate craving for chocolate cake in order to be healthier in the long 
term (Greene 2014, pp. 696-697). Greene has sometimes referred to this second type of 
process as ‘cognitive’ processing (Greene 2008, p. 36). As such, this term will frequently 
be used throughout the chapter. According to Greene, the way the dual-process theory 
applies to moral judgements is straightforward: “[M]oral psychology looks much like the 
rest of judgment and decision making. Moral judgment is influenced by both automatic 
emotional responses (automatic settings) and controlled, conscious reasoning (manual 
mode)” (Greene 2014, p. 698). 
While there may be debates regarding the details of the dual-process theory in 
general, the more relevant point of contention is Greene’s further claim that different 
normative theories are generally linked to different mental processes. Greene describes this 
as the ‘central tension’ principle: “Characteristically deontological judgments are 
preferentially supported by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically 
consequentialist judgments are preferentially supported by conscious reasoning and allied 
processes of cognitive control” (Greene 2014, p. 699). In order for this claim to support a 
selective debunking argument against deontology, Greene must be able to demonstrate two 
points. The first is the empirical matter of whether there is in fact such a connection 
between particular types of moral judgements and particular mental processes. The second 
point is the theoretical issue of whether emotional processing should be considered inferior 
in some way to cognitive processing, at least in the context of moral judgements. Greene 
requires an affirmative answer in order to argue that deontological theories are primarily 
based on an inferior type of moral thinking (emotion-based moral judgements), in contrast 
with consequentialism being based on cognitive moral judgements. Each of these two main 
points will now be examined in turn. 
To support the first point, Greene draws upon the results of neuroscientific 
experiments that he and his colleagues conducted (Greene et al. 2001). Their study 
examined the connections between mental processes and moral judgements. The 
participants were regular people (non-philosophers) who were tasked with reading various 
hypothetical moral dilemmas and then indicating whether they considered each proposed 
action to be “appropriate” or “inappropriate” (Greene et al. 2001, p. 2106). This research 
was notable for its use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), as this 
exemplified an empirical approach to the traditionally theoretical field of philosophy. The 
fMRI was used to examine the neural activity in participants’ brains during their 
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contemplation of the moral dilemmas. Participants’ levels of emotional engagement were 
measured through certain patterns of neural activity, based on prior studies of the neural 
correlates of emotion. A greater degree of brain activity in certain ‘emotional’ brain 
regions was interpreted as evidence of more emotional engagement (Greene et al. 2001, 
pp. 2106-2107). 
The investigation involved participants responding to 60 moral dilemmas while 
their brains were scanned. These 60 cases were divided into ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ 
categories, depending on how “up close and personal” the potential moral violations were 
(Greene et al. 2001, p. 2106). Some examples from the ‘personal’ category included the 
decision of whether to steal one person’s organs to help five other people, and whether to 
throw people out of a sinking lifeboat. Compared to the other category, these cases were 
expected to produce more emotional engagement in the participants. The ‘impersonal’ 
category included situations such as deciding whether to keep money obtained from a lost 
wallet, or whether to support a policy that would be expected to cause more deaths than its 
alternatives. Among the many hypothetical moral dilemmas were two well-known ‘trolley’ 
cases: the switch case and the footbridge case. Greene describes the switch case in the 
following terms: 
A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its 
present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley 
onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Ought you 
to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one? Most people say 
yes (Greene et al. 2001, p. 2105). 
This was included in the ‘impersonal’ category since it involves using a switch to 
indirectly cause death from a distance. Notably, the common intuitive ‘yes’ answer can be 
considered a consequentialist judgement. On the other side, the ‘personal’ category 
included the similar footbridge case: 
[A] trolley threatens to kill five people. You are standing next to a large stranger on 
a footbridge that spans the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five 
people. In this scenario, the only way to save the five people is to push this stranger 
off the bridge, onto the tracks below. He will die if you do this, but his body will stop 
the trolley from reaching the others. Ought you to save the five others by pushing 
this stranger to his death? Most people say no (Greene et al. 2001, p. 2105). 
Unlike the switch case, the most common intuitive response (a negative response in this 
case) aligns more with deontology than consequentialism. These two cases are notable 
because when considered together, they lead to the ‘trolley problem’ that has caused a 
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great deal of debate among philosophers. The problem lies with attempts to accommodate 
the different intuitive responses to both of the cases; these conflicting judgements occur 
despite the only notable difference being the method of sacrificing one person to save five. 
Neither consequentialists nor deontologists have been able to accommodate both common 
intuitions while maintaining a consistent moral theory. The trolley problem has been 
important in normative ethics since it appears to capture the main point of conflict between 
deontological and consequentialist reasoning. As Greene puts it, “We philosophers have 
puzzled over trolley dilemmas for decades because they capture a central—if not the 
central—tension in normative ethics, and the myriad scientific results these dilemmas have 
generated implies that they tap something deep—revealing the hidden tectonics of the 
moral mind” (Greene 2014, p. 705). 
Many philosophers have attempted to find a moral principle that would be 
consistent with both of the intuitive responses (Berker 2009, p. 297). One of the common 
assumptions underlying the trolley problem is the notion that there is some morally 
significant difference between the two cases. In particular, some philosophers think that 
the problem demonstrates a moral difference between different methods of inflicting harm. 
This idea is represented by the ‘doctrine of double effect’, which applies as follows: in the 
footbridge case, pushing the man off the bridge is impermissible since the harm is 
intentional; conversely, killing the one person in the switch case is permissible as the harm 
is merely foreseen, not intended (Kumar & Campbell 2012, p. 312). This view is just one 
of many contentious approaches to the trolley problem. 
Since the traditional philosophical debates have not led to any widely accepted 
solution to this problem, Greene and his colleagues hoped to make progress by taking their 
empirical approach, thus investigating why these two cases produce different intuitive 
judgements. Specifically, they considered whether the cause of the different judgements 
might involve the footbridge case triggering people’s emotions in a way that does not 
occur in the switch case. When considering the 60 moral dilemmas that participants 
responded to, Greene’s research team found that variations in emotional engagement 
during moral judgements correlated with a certain factor that differs between the trolley 
and footbridge cases. Due to methodological constraints, the relevant factor was 
represented as a clear distinction between ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ actions (Greene et 
al. 2001, p. 2107). The main finding was that there was greater emotional engagement in 
personal dilemmas; this was the category that included the footbridge case. 
The researchers acknowledged that this is merely a psychological finding, such that 
these experimental results cannot directly inform us about what is morally right or wrong. 
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However, these studies raised the question of how a better understanding of the 
psychological processes underlying moral judgements could potentially affect the 
philosophical status of these judgements (Greene et al. 2001, p. 2107). This extends to the 
idea that if certain classes of normative theories (such as deontological theories) are mainly 
associated with moral judgements based on one particular mental process, then this point 
could be used to assess the plausibility of these normative theories. Greene thus describes 
the connection between the empirical study of moral judgements and the philosophical 
study of normative theories along these lines: “Science can advance ethics by revealing the 
hidden inner workings of our moral judgments, especially the ones we make intuitively. 
Once those inner workings are revealed we may have less confidence in some of our 
judgments and the ethical theories that are (explicitly or implicitly) based on them” 
(Greene 2014, pp. 695-696). 
Since Greene’s experimental results are supposed to support his ‘central tension’ 
principle that associates deontological and consequentialist judgements with emotions and 
cognition respectively, it is important to consider how the switch and footbridge cases 
might represent the differences between these competing approaches to ethics. First, 
Greene clarifies that the most intuitive responses to these cases are ‘characteristically’ 
consequentialist and deontological judgements respectively. What this means is that one 
can make a judgement that is characteristic of a certain theory without knowing anything 
about that theory; all that matters is that one’s judgement happens to align with the theory. 
A similar point applies to people whose intuitive responses conflict with the normative 
theory that they explicitly prefer. For instance, one might have a ‘characteristically’ 
deontological intuition despite identifying as a consequentialist. 
Greene seeks to explain the tendencies towards these characteristic moral 
judgements in the switch and footbridge cases, but he does not follow the assumption that 
the most common intuitive judgements are necessarily correct or reasonable. Thus, rather 
than searching for a principle that could justify the different responses to these very similar 
cases, Greene presents what he considers to be a ‘purely descriptive’ partial solution to the 
trolley problem, which aims to explain the cause of the different judgements (Greene 2008, 
p. 42). Greene’s proposed explanation draws upon the aforementioned studies that 
identified the switch case as involving ‘impersonal’ harm while the footbridge case 
involves ‘personal’ harm. Here it is important to recall the details: the switch case involves 
an indirect method of killing someone by using a switch to remotely redirect a trolley 
towards them, while the footbridge case involves directly pushing a person off a footbridge 
to their death. Greene considers this difference to be significant purely from an 
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evolutionary perspective, rather than from a moral perspective: “Given that personal 
violence is evolutionarily ancient, predating our recently evolved human capacities for 
complex abstract reasoning, it should come as no surprise if we have innate responses to 
personal violence that are powerful but rather primitive” (Greene 2008, p. 43). These 
primitive emotional reactions are often described as ‘alarmlike’ emotions throughout 
Greene’s work, as they occur suddenly and cannot simply be ignored. 
As for cases of impersonal harm, Greene asserts that they would not trigger our 
evolved emotional alarm responses, thus allowing us to carefully contemplate these cases 
with our cognitive capacities (Greene 2008, p. 43). This is because early humans 
presumably lacked the means to intentionally cause long-distance indirect harm; devices 
such as switches had not yet been invented. Greene notes that his earlier experimental 
results (Greene et al. 2004; Greene et al. 2001) confirm predictions that follow from the 
evolutionary considerations about personal and impersonal harm: 
The contemplation of personal moral dilemmas like the footbridge case should 
produce increased neural activity in brain regions associated with emotional response 
and social cognition, while the contemplation of impersonal moral dilemmas like the 
trolley [switch] case should produce relatively greater activity in brain regions 
associated with ‘higher cognition.’ This is exactly what was observed (Greene 2008, 
p. 43). 
Furthermore, Greene states that his experiments also confirmed predictions about response 
times: “Trials in which the subject judged in favor of personal moral violations took 
significantly longer than trials in which the subject judged against them, but there was no 
comparable reaction time effect observed in response to impersonal moral violations” 
(Greene 2008, p. 44). Since emotional responses are quick and automatic, the slower 
cognitive responses would require some time to override this initial reaction when a person 
ultimately decides to approve of personal harm in cases that involve this type of harm. For 
example, the consequentialist judgement that one should push the man off the footbridge 
would have to override an emotion-based deontological judgement that opposes this 
instance of personal harm. 
Greene provides further support for the evolutionary explanation of certain types of 
moral judgements responding to certain factors in moral dilemmas, by examining another 
case in which most people perceive an apparent moral distinction. The case he refers to is 
the ‘drowning child’ scenario from Peter Singer: 
[I]f one notices a small child drowning in a shallow pond, one is morally obliged to 
wade in and save that child, even if it means muddying one’s clothes. … Why, Singer 
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asks, do we have a strict obligation to save a nearby drowning child but no 
comparable obligation to save faraway sick and starving children through charitable 
donations to organizations like Oxfam? (Greene 2008, pp. 46-47) 
Greene observes that one’s interaction with the drowning child is up close and personal, as 
with the types of situations that were possible for early humans to encounter. In contrast, 
helping distant people from across the world would not have been possible in our 
evolutionary past, which may explain why we have not evolved with any strong emotional 
inclinations to help others in such impersonal cases (Greene 2008, p. 47). Greene thinks 
that this explains why most people (unlike Singer) do not have a consequentialist intuition 
in this situation, thus spending money on luxuries rather than promoting better overall 
consequences by relieving the suffering of distant strangers. Along with the trolley cases, 
this exemplifies how evolutionary factors may explain tendencies towards or against 
certain types of moral judgements. 
In order to demonstrate how evolutionary considerations link to Greene’s 
debunking of deontology, there are some further points regarding emotion-based 
judgements in response to personal moral dilemmas. Greene speculates that personal harm 
triggers automatic emotional responses that evolved in our vastly different ancestral 
environment. Moral judgements based on these emotional responses may have been an 
effective natural solution to the types of social cooperation challenges that early humans 
encountered (Greene 2008, p. 59). Here one may recall Joyce’s concept of the moral sense, 
which offered a similar account of moral judgements serving the function of promoting 
prosocial behaviour. Thus, it is not difficult to conceive of negative emotional responses to 
personal harm having evolutionary benefits, by discouraging unnecessary violence among 
early humans. In Greene’s argument, the idea is that the quick and automatic nature of 
emotional responses makes them well suited for their original evolutionary function. In 
contrast, cognitive processing is slower and more mentally demanding, so it presumably 
would have been less reliable in the circumstances of our evolutionary past (Greene 2008, 
pp. 59-60). The cognitive capacities that are uniquely developed in humans are presumed 
to have evolved relatively recently in comparison to our emotional capacities. 
Although the living circumstances for humans have changed significantly over the 
time since our emotional capacities evolved, Greene argues that our primitive emotional 
responses have now been codified by philosophers into a certain class of normative moral 
theories: specifically, deontological theories. Greene thus puts forth the controversial idea 
that deontological philosophy is a rationalisation of our evolved emotion-based moral 
judgements. One point that he raises in support of this bold claim is that humans have a 
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strong tendency to attempt to explain and justify their behaviour. He refers to 
psychological studies that have found that people invent seemingly plausible stories to 
explain their own behaviour, even when they do not know why they are actually behaving 
in a certain way (Greene 2008, pp. 60-61). However, even if we grant that humans have 
this tendency, this would not be sufficient to ‘explain away’ deontological philosophy, 
which represents a significant portion of normative ethics. Greene thus attempts to provide 
more support for his point about deontological rationalisations by focusing again on the 
footbridge case. Pushing the man off the bridge involves direct personal harm, which is a 
type of harm that was possible to inflict in our evolutionary past. Due to our evolved 
alarmlike emotional reactions to personal harm, this action seems intuitively wrong to most 
people. According to Greene, this sense of wrongness is perfectly captured by deontology: 
“[W]hat better way to express that feeling of non-negotiable absolute wrongness than via 
the most central of deontological concepts, the concept of a right: You can’t push him to 
his death because that would be a violation of his rights. Likewise, you can’t let that baby 
drown because you have a duty to save it” (Greene 2008, p. 63). Although these are 
particular cases, Greene takes this to support his view that general deontological concepts 
such as ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ can be explained away as a rationalisation of our emotional 
responses. 
Greene recognises that his selective debunking of deontology would be incomplete 
without an explanation of why consequentialism is immune to his claims about 
rationalisation. He maintains that consequentialist theories do not merely rationalise 
intuitive responses to moral issues: although such theories may ultimately be based on 
consequentialist intuitions, these theories do not aim to match our moral intuitions on a 
case-by-case basis. Rather, consequentialists are supposed to accept any unintuitive 
prescriptions of their theory. According to Greene, consequentialists can determine their 
response to a moral problem without even considering their intuitions about it: “An act 
consequentialist can know what she thinks about a case without knowing anything other 
than the answer to this question: Which choice produces better consequences?” (Greene 
2014, p. 724). Thus, unlike deontologists, consequentialists apparently cannot be accused 
of simply rationalising or ‘chasing’ intuitions (Greene 2014, p. 724). 
Greene also supports his selective debunking argument by claiming that 
consequentialism is superior to deontology in terms of recognising morally relevant factors 
in moral problems. To make this point, he first refers back to the purported link between 
different normative theories and different mental processes: 
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I argued earlier that there is a natural mapping between the content of deontological 
philosophy and the functional properties of alarmlike emotions. Likewise, I believe 
that there is a natural mapping between the content of consequentialist philosophy 
and the functional properties of ‘cognitive’ processes. Indeed, I believe that 
consequentialism is inherently ‘cognitive,’ that it couldn’t be implemented any other 
way (Greene 2008, p. 63). 
This forms the basis of his claim that consequentialist reasoning makes use of our 
cognitive capacities to properly account for relevant factors in a moral dilemma; the 
consequentialist ideal is to impartially weigh up every competing moral concern (Greene 
2008, p. 64). This is supposed to stand in contrast with a notion of deontologists 
excessively focusing on certain factors that our emotional responses draw our attention to. 
Greene substantiates this picture of superior consequentialist reasoning by asserting 
that cognitive processes are behaviourally neutral, unlike emotional processes. By this he 
means that cognitive processing does not automatically trigger certain behaviours; 
cognition is flexible enough to allow for a wide variety of responses to a situation (Greene 
2008, p. 40). This flexibility gives cognitive processing a theoretical advantage over 
emotional processing in terms of decision-making based on factors in moral dilemmas. 
Greene gives the following example of a morally relevant consideration in the footbridge 
case: 
‘Is it okay to push the guy off the bridge if he’s about to cure cancer?’ … 
Deontologists can dismiss these sorts of complicated, situation-specific questions, 
but consequentialists cannot, which is why, I argue, that consequentialism is 
inescapably ‘cognitive’ (Greene 2008, p. 64). 
In this way, Greene’s view suggests that deontologists would generally stick with their 
intuitions about ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ even though this may lead them to disregard various 
morally relevant factors. Greene recognises that his normative assumptions about moral 
relevance are made independently of the empirical findings from his experiments. As such, 
he proposes the following relation between these aspects of his argument: 
Such experiments identify factors to which our moral judgments are sensitive. This 
information may be combined with independent normative assumptions concerning 
the kinds of things to which our judgments ought to be sensitive. This combination 
can lead us to new, substantive moral conclusions. In other words, scientific 
information can allow us to trade in difficult ‘ought’ questions for easier ‘ought’ 
questions, and thus advance ethics (Greene 2014, p. 711). 
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Greene specifically relies on the normative assumption that the ‘personalness’ or proximity 
of inflicted harm is morally irrelevant. To clarify, the claim is not that harm itself is 
morally irrelevant, but rather that the particular method of inflicting harm is irrelevant 
when the outcome would be the same from another method. This would entail that our 
evolved tendency for emotion-based disapproval of personal harm must be considered a 
distorting influence on our moral judgements, since these emotional responses are not also 
triggered by considering impersonal harm. If we grant Greene’s empirical claims about the 
association of emotional processing with deontology, this then leads to his conclusion that 
deontological philosophy is debunked, as it merely rationalises our misguided emotion-
based judgements. 
Greene is aware that the issue of different responses to personal versus impersonal 
moral dilemmas does not provide sufficient grounds for debunking an entire class of 
normative theories. He therefore supplements his debunking argument with some further 
points, which concern the relative suitability of different mental processes in different 
situations. We may recall that Greene draws upon the dual-process theory of moral 
judgements, which distinguishes between ‘automatic’ emotional processing and ‘manual’ 
cognitive processing. He clarifies that he does not consider emotion-based moral 
judgements to be worse than cognitive moral judgements by default; rather, the usefulness 
of each type of mental process depends on the context. The general idea is that emotion-
based processing is efficient but inflexible, while cognitive processing is less efficient but 
more flexible (Greene 2014, p. 714). 
Using this empirical claim as a foundation, Greene makes the normative claim that 
manual cognitive reasoning is therefore better suited to assessing complex moral problems, 
due to its greater flexibility. Specifically, he suggests that we should rely more on manual 
cognitive reasoning than automatic emotion-based responses when faced with ‘unfamiliar’ 
moral problems (Greene 2014, p. 715). This refers to situations that would not have been 
encountered by early humans, so it is an evolutionary consideration. Greene provides some 
examples: “[M]oral problems that arise from recent cultural developments, most notably 
the rise of modern technology and the intersection of disparate cultures, are especially 
likely to be unfamiliar. Think climate change, global terrorism, global poverty, bioethics, 
etc” (Greene 2014, p. 716). It seems unlikely that natural selection would have favoured a 
capacity for automatic emotional responses that happen to produce reliable moral 
judgements regarding these modern issues. This appears to be similar to the idea in Street’s 
argument that evolutionary influences on our moral judgements may have no relation to 
purported moral facts. However, Greene’s argument only applies to moral judgements 
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based on emotional processing, as he argues that cognitive processing is flexible enough to 
properly account for morally relevant factors in unfamiliar moral problems. 
To emphasise how these claims favour consequentialism over deontology, Greene 
applies what he describes as a ‘no cognitive miracles’ principle: we should rely more on 
manual cognitive reasoning when faced with unfamiliar moral problems (Greene 2014, p. 
715). The idea is that it would be a cognitive miracle if emotional processing allowed us to 
properly account for morally relevant factors in these cases. This is based on a further 
claim that Greene makes: that only three mechanisms are known to provide our automatic 
mental processes with the information required for them to function reliably. These 
mechanisms are cultural transmission, genetic transmission, and learning from personal 
experiences (Greene 2014, pp. 714-715). Since we lack a sufficient degree of prior 
experience with unfamiliar moral problems, this rules out these mechanisms for reliability. 
Thus, consequentialism should apparently be favoured over deontology at least in 
unfamiliar cases, due to consequentialism’s association with the more flexible cognitive 
processes that allow us to properly account for morally relevant factors. This claim 
provides the final component of Greene’s selective debunking of deontology, as it 
demonstrates some apparent advantages of consequentialist reasoning; this can be 
combined with the various negative points about deontology that have been noted. The 
negative points mainly concerned the apparent rationalisation of emotional responses, such 
as responses to morally irrelevant factors. 
The discussion so far has covered the main points in Greene’s argument. The 
remaining sections turn the focus to various problems with his overall argument. The main 
problem covered in Section 4.2 is the difficulty of selectively debunking particular theories 
without collapsing into a broader debunking argument. Section 4.3 then focuses on the 
issue of Greene’s reliance on undefended normative assumptions, such as the notion of 
morally relevant or irrelevant factors. These points will lead into the conclusion that 
Greene’s EDA must be rejected along with the arguments from Street and Joyce. 
 
 
4.2 Moral Judgements and Selective Debunking 
 
One of the problematic aspects of Greene’s argument is the selectiveness of the debunking 
target: he attempts to undermine deontology while maintaining that consequentialism is 
safe from his debunking claims. Whereas ‘global’ EDAs may face the challenge of 
justifying ambitious debunking claims about moral judgements in general, one difficulty 
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for selective EDAs is to avoid collapsing into a global argument. Selim Berker considers 
the selective aspect of Greene’s argument, noting that Greene has not adequately defended 
his consequentialist intuitions from his evolutionary debunking of deontological intuitions: 
“Presumably consequentialist intuitions are just as much a product of evolution—whether 
directly or indirectly—as deontological intuitions are, so an appeal to evolutionary history 
gives us no reason to privilege consequentialist intuitions over deontological ones” (Berker 
2009, p. 319). For example, it seems plausible that the consequentialist intuition that one 
should maximise welfare in one’s society would have had evolutionary benefits. This type 
of intuition could have encouraged our ancestors to focus on the survival of the majority of 
their social group, which would clearly provide survival advantages over other groups that 
refrain from sacrificing a few individuals for the sake of the majority. Although Greene 
combines his evolutionary claims against deontology with his empirical findings, the 
evolutionary story about personal harm is just as speculative as any evolutionary account 
of consequentialist intuitions. After all, experiments cannot directly tell us why certain 
mental capacities and behavioural tendencies evolved. 
One of Greene’s reasons for favouring manual cognitive reasoning (and thus the 
associated consequentialism) was that it is supposedly more likely to be reliable when 
faced with unfamiliar moral problems. However, Victor Kumar and Richmond Campbell 
oppose the idea that problems like the trolley cases are unfamiliar in evolutionary terms 
(Kumar & Campbell 2012). Although such cases involve modern inventions such as 
switches and trolleys, the necessity of harming some people in order to save or benefit a 
greater number of people is surely a very old type of dilemma, and thus likely to have been 
relevant during human evolution. As such, they assert that the burden is on Greene to 
demonstrate that there is something new and unfamiliar about such cases (Kumar & 
Campbell 2012, p. 321). Although it seems obvious that indirectly causing death via a 
vehicle or other similar means could not have happened during early human evolution, any 
further claims regarding our evolutionary familiarity with these types of problems would 
be purely speculative. Since we lack the ability to empirically test evolutionary hypotheses 
about the types of situations faced by early humans, we cannot simply assume that 
Greene’s evolutionary speculations are accurate. As such, claims about familiarity do not 
adequately support the selective debunking of deontology. Debunking an entire class of 
normative theories is a very ambitious project, so relying heavily on speculations is not 
sufficient for this purpose. 
Furthermore, even if we were to grant that situations such as the trolley cases 
involve unfamiliar factors, this point would only support Greene’s ‘no cognitive miracles’ 
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principle that is limited to favouring consequentialism in unfamiliar cases. Favouring 
consequentialism in these cases would not be the same as debunking deontology, as it still 
leaves open the possibility of deontological reasoning being reliable for familiar types of 
moral problems. Greene attempted to debunk deontology in familiar cases by arguing that 
it is merely a rationalisation of our evolved emotion-based responses, some of which are 
triggered by morally irrelevant factors. The notion of moral relevance will be examined in 
Section 4.3; the current focus is on the rationalisation claim. We cannot simply assume that 
any deontological judgement involving familiar factors such as personal harm is merely a 
rationalisation of evolved emotional responses. To recall one of the main points from 
earlier in the thesis, the relatively recent evolution of advanced rational capacities has 
enabled philosophers to think about moral principles in the abstract. This type of complex 
reasoning surely involves cognitive processing on Greene’s dual-process model. These 
points can be used against the notion that deontology merely rationalises emotion-based 
intuitions about particular moral issues: even when we consider the types of moral issues 
that early humans could have encountered, the abstract moral concepts that we now apply 
to such cases have been developed in our modern living circumstances, using our more 
recently evolved rational capacities. Therefore, it is plausible to maintain that 
deontological concepts that apply to familiar moral problems are not merely 
rationalisations of evolved emotional responses. 
On the issue of abstract moral concepts and rationalisation, it is worth examining 
some of Greene’s points against Kantian deontology in particular, which have not yet been 
discussed in this chapter. Greene takes Kant to be a prime example of a deontologist. He 
notes that many Kantians focus on constructing seemingly rational moral principles, rather 
than attempting to identify moral principles that may be true in themselves. Kantian moral 
philosophy thus appears to represent an anthropocentric approach to morality, as it 
attempts to rationalise intuitions rather than supporting principles that could challenge 
them (Greene 2008, p. 75). In response to Greene’s characterisation of Kantian 
deontology, Kantians could argue that it is difficult to conceive of their theory as a mere 
rationalisation of emotion-based intuitions. Along these lines, Richard Dean notes that 
Kant’s moral theory is based on abstract intuitions about the nature of morality, not 
intuitions about particular moral issues (Dean 2010, p. 52). He also points out that Kant in 
his Metaphysics of Morals explicitly disapproves of constructing moral theories from the 
starting point of intuitions about particular cases (Dean 2010, p. 52).  
However, from Greene’s perspective the problem with Kantian deontology is not 
so much its starting point, but rather its end point: Greene’s view targets any normative 
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theory that is primarily concerned with justifying emotion-based intuitive responses to 
moral issues, even if it purports to begin from a rational conception of morality itself. 
Nevertheless, Greene cannot simply assume that the main function of deontological 
principles is to rationalise intuitive responses to particular issues. Presumably, any 
sufficiently general moral principles would be applicable to a variety of both intuitive and 
counterintuitive judgements, and such principles can remain relevant even as dominant 
intuitions change with regard to specific moral issues. 
Furthermore, one could challenge Greene’s claims about deontological 
rationalisation of intuitions by undermining the ‘central tension’ principle that follows 
from his dual-process theory. Thus, if it can be demonstrated that deontological 
judgements also involve a significant degree of cognitive processing, then this would 
weaken Greene’s argument since he mainly associates intuitions with emotional processing 
(Greene 2014, p. 696). To exemplify how one could criticise Greene’s argument along 
these lines, we may consider how Guy Kahane and Nicholas Shackel have addressed this 
aspect of the argument (Kahane & Shackel 2010). They point out that even if one type of 
mental process (either cognitive or emotional) were more closely associated with a 
particular class of moral judgements, the same process would surely also be involved in 
contrary moral judgements (Kahane & Shackel 2010, p. 579). For example, it is highly 
unlikely that subjects who make a characteristically deontological judgement in footbridge 
cases are ignoring facts about the total expected harm to all individuals. A more reasonable 
interpretation is that most subjects simply judge that pushing a man to his death is worse 
than saving more lives through this action; this judgement clearly involves weighing up the 
total harm. As Kahane has noted, “Deontologists are not numerically challenged. It is near 
certain that all subjects considering Footbridge and similar dilemmas make this simple 
calculation, whether or not they reach a ‘utilitarian’ conclusion.” (Kahane 2012, pp. 529-
530). 
Thus, when attempting to determine what kind of neural processing leads to 
deontological judgements, what really matters is the process that causes deontological 
considerations to be prioritised over consequentialist considerations. Kahane and Shackel 
consider this to be important because this processing could turn out to be a significant 
component of deontological reasoning, such as weighing up conflicting duties or deciding 
whether overall expected harm outweighs a deontological prohibition. As they summarise, 
“[S]uch deontological reasoning might underlie many common decisions merely 
conforming to utilitarianism, a point utterly obscured when we describe such choices as 
‘utilitarian’. Hence, what are reported as the uniquely cognitive processes underlying 
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utilitarian judgment might, for all we know, reflect deontological reasoning” (Kahane & 
Shackel 2010, p. 579). 
Kahane and his colleagues have also provided empirical support for criticisms of 
Greene’s dual-process theory and the associated ‘central tension’ principle (Kahane et al. 
2012). Their aim was to investigate what type of connection really exists between intuitive 
moral judgements and different normative theories. Using fMRI brain scanning as in 
Greene’s experiments, Kahane’s study presented subjects with a range of moral dilemmas 
including the usual switch and footbridge cases. Notably, they included some previously 
unstudied moral dilemmas in which a ‘deontological’ judgement would be 
counterintuitive, such as following a moral duty against lying even though the refusal to lie 
would result in considerable harm (Kahane 2012, p. 538). To see how this is significant, 
first we may recall that Greene’s studies typically compared counterintuitive utilitarian 
judgements—such as pushing the man off the footbridge—with intuitive deontological 
judgements, such as refusing to push the man. Greene interpreted the differences in neural 
activity (emotional versus cognitive processing) as being characteristic of the difference 
between utilitarian and deontological judgements. However, Kahane presents an 
alternative interpretation: the differences in processing may actually be linked to how 
intuitive certain moral judgements are, rather than their specific content. He describes the 
implications of this different interpretation: “If this is correct, then, again, the apparent tie 
between process and content is really just an artefact of the kinds of scenarios that 
researchers have studied, reflecting nothing deep about utilitarian and deontological 
judgments” (Kahane 2012, p. 536). This was supported by results from Kahane’s study, 
which provided much stronger evidence for his interpretation than Greene’s. In particular, 
it was found that ‘utilitarian’ judgements—such as approving of pushing the man off the 
footbridge—involved very similar neural activity to ‘ultra-deontological’ judgements such 
as refusing to lie even to prevent significant harm. This demonstrated that moral 
judgements with vastly different content could be associated with similar neural processes 
(Kahane 2012, p. 538). Ultimately, Kahane concludes with a more modest dual-process 
model of moral judgements as compared to Greene’s model: intuitive moral judgements 
are more associated with automatic mental processes, while counterintuitive moral 
judgements involve more controlled cognitive processing (Kahane 2012, pp. 539-540). 
Since Kahane’s points undermine Greene’s association of deontology with 
emotion-based intuitive judgements, this provides further evidence that deontological 
philosophy does not merely rationalise automatic emotional responses. Nevertheless, even 
if both deontological and consequentialist principles can support a wide variety of intuitive 
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and counterintuitive moral judgements, the actual plausibility of these principles is a 
separate philosophical issue. As such, it remains unclear whether questions concerning the 
plausibility of normative theories themselves can be guided by empirical findings. 
 
The discussion up to this point has focused on how deontologists may resist Greene’s 
selective debunking claims that were based on the notion of evolved intuitive responses to 
moral issues. However, it is also worth considering how consequentialists may defend 
some of their own intuitions that appear to have clear evolutionary explanations. As noted 
earlier, Greene recognises that such a defence is necessary in order to avoid his 
evolutionary claims causing a collapse into a broader (potentially global) debunking 
argument. His claim was that consequentialism is not a mere rationalisation since it does 
not attempt to follow moral intuitions on a case-by-case basis; instead, consequentialists 
must accept any unintuitive prescriptions that follow from their theory. However, apart 
from some notable examples such as Peter Singer, it is not apparent that many 
consequentialists are always willing to defend highly unintuitive moral prescriptions for 
the sake of maintaining consistency in their reasoning. 
Regardless of whether consequentialism is supposed to ignore intuitions in theory, 
consequentialist prescriptions can at least coincidentally align with many common 
intuitions that happen to be amenable to evolutionary explanations. Although 
consequentialism and deontology may each support a different subset of all the widespread 
intuitions that people have, the important point is that at least some consequentialist claims 
can align with such intuitions. One example of a ubiquitous moral intuition held by 
philosophers and non-philosophers alike is the belief that we are obliged to care for our 
own children more than the children of others; the widespread acceptance of this view is 
noted by Street (2006, p. 115). For the sake of argument, it will be assumed that beliefs 
such as this one can indeed be attributed to evolutionary factors. Consequentialists might 
attempt to defend such inflexible evolved intuitions by asserting that our inability to 
overcome them entails a practical reason to maintain them. For instance, it could be noted 
that more overall well-being (a better consequence) would be promoted by maintaining 
such beliefs, rather than hopelessly attempting to resist them. In this way, consequentialists 
could argue that these types of practical considerations override any concerns about 
possible evolutionary explanations of certain intuitions. This reasoning would also align 
with Greene’s view that consequentialism is based on highly flexible cognitive processes, 




However, this still leaves the question of whether this line of reasoning would only 
selectively support consequentialism and not deontology. In order to rule out the 
possibility of deontologists defending their theory in a similar manner, Greene would have 
to rely on his central tension principle along with the idea that any cognitive deontological 
reasoning is a rationalisation of emotion-based intuitions. Unfortunately for Greene, this 
aspect of his argument has already been argued against, thus leaving deontologists in a 
similar situation as consequentialists. Thus, defenders of either type of theory can make 
similar points about their theory’s general principles being unaffected by evolutionary 
considerations. 
Greene’s apparent underestimation of the versatility of deontological principles is 
also noted by Richard Dean, who argues that Greene’s neuroscientific findings fail to 
establish the conclusion that consequentialism should be favoured over deontology (Dean 
2010). He observes that deontological philosophy encompasses many moral duties, rights 
and obligations that do not appear to be based on evolved automatic emotional responses 
to certain factors in moral dilemmas. For example, we would not expect obligations 
relating to lying and promise-keeping to be based on alarmlike emotional responses that 
may have carried over from our evolutionary past (Dean 2010, p. 49). These are just some 
examples of moral issues that do not necessarily have to involve immediate danger or any 
other sense of urgency, thus allowing enough time for cognitive processing to influence 
one’s eventual moral judgement. 
Furthermore, Dean notes that even if we were to accept Greene’s dual-process 
model as it applies to the trolley problem, the neuroscientific experiments have not shown 
that this model can account for moral judgements in general (Dean 2010, p. 50). Due to 
Greene’s primary focus on the trolley problem and related personal and impersonal 
dilemmas, the scope of his studies is too narrow to account for the complexity of 
deontological philosophy, which could be highlighted by considering a wider variety of 
moral issues. As Dean observes, Greene is well aware that the brain areas he identifies 
with cognitive processing are involved in much more than just quantitative calculations 
when faced with moral dilemmas. Since these brain regions are also implicated in tasks 
such as general abstract reasoning, deductive reasoning and planning, it should not be 
surprising that cognitive processes would also have significant involvement in non-
consequentialist moral judgements (Dean 2010, p. 52). 
Selim Berker also observes that deontology is more multifaceted than its depiction 
in Greene’s examples of ‘characteristically’ deontological judgements (Berker 2009). He 
points out that the distinction between deontological and consequentialist judgements is 
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surely based on more than just personal versus impersonal means of inflicting harm 
(Berker 2009, p. 311). As such, Greene’s studies seem to involve an overly narrow 
conception of what is distinct about consequentialist and deontological theories, which 
may also be attributed to his excessive focus on the trolley problem and related dilemmas. 
Guy Kahane has also criticised Greene’s excessive focus on the trolley problem 
and similar cases: he notes that this is problematic for Greene’s dual-process theory of 
moral judgements, as it is supposed to be applicable to these judgements in general, not 
just those about trolley problems and similar scenarios (Kahane 2012, p. 521). However, 
even if a more general dual-process model turned out to be accurate, this would still leave 
an explanatory gap between the basis of different moral judgements and the nature of 
particular normative theories. So far we have little more than speculation regarding the 
connections between moral judgements and moral theories (Kahane 2012, p. 522). This 
relates to a previously discussed criticism of Street’s and Joyce’s evolutionary claims: for 
appeals to science to have any chance of helping us resolve philosophical disputes, we 
require strong evidence rather than a heavy reliance on speculation. Speculation is more in 
line with traditional philosophical methodology, which conflicts with Greene’s intention of 
advancing philosophical debates by utilising scientific methods. 
One final methodological issue with Greene’s studies is that presenting subjects 
with descriptions of hypothetical situations is not ideal for testing mental processes 
involved in moral judgements, particularly emotional processing. Normative ethical 
theories are supposed to be directly applicable to real situations, not just to imagined 
situations such as thought experiments. In the neuroscientific experiments that have been 
discussed, neural activity was examined while subjects merely read about and 
contemplated moral dilemmas in which their own involvement was merely imagined. As 
such, the findings may not necessarily indicate what kind of mental processing would 
occur when people are actually involved in such situations. It seems reasonable to expect 
that there would be more emotional engagement if subjects actually found themselves in 
the described situations, rather than just being informed about them. It is also possible that 
the required use of imagination when considering these moral dilemmas may affect the 
results, depending on what kind of mental processing is involved in imagination. These 
points raise broader questions about the use of thought experiments in philosophy, which 
are unfortunately beyond the current scope. 
In summary, this section has focused on various problems with the selective aspects 
of Greene’s debunking of deontology, along with issues relating to moral judgements and 
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the dual-process theory. Now that these points have been covered, the next section 
examines the issue of Greene’s reliance on certain normative assumptions. 
 
 
4.3 Normative Assumptions and Moral Relevance 
 
So far, most of the discussed criticisms of Greene’s argument have related to empirical 
issues such as the association between certain mental processes and certain types of moral 
judgements, as well as Greene’s rationalisation claims against deontology. However, the 
discussion has yet to directly address whether emotion-based moral judgements are in fact 
less reliable or in any way inferior to cognition-based moral judgements. The notion of 
‘reliability’ is normative in the sense that its definition depends on what one considers to 
be a desirable or appropriate outcome of a certain process. In the case of moral 
judgements, reliability may refer to the frequency with which these judgements align with 
moral truths, but this would obviously depend on the assumption of particular moral facts. 
Greene’s assumptions about reliability are criticised by Kumar and Campbell, who 
point to his unsubstantiated claims about the comparative reliability of emotional versus 
cognitive moral judgements (Kumar & Campbell 2012). They observe that Greene 
provides three main reasons for disfavouring moral judgements based on the ‘automatic’ 
side of the dual-process theory: this automatic type of processing is emotion-based, it is an 
evolutionary adaptation, and it is relatively simple and inflexible compared to ‘manual’ 
cognitive processing. The problem is that Greene has not adequately explained how each 
of these claims is supposed to undermine the reliability of emotion-based moral 
judgements (Kumar & Campbell 2012, pp. 319-320). Before addressing Greene’s three 
main points, it is important to recall that he does not think emotional processing is 
inherently worse than cognitive processing (Greene 2014, p. 714). Rather, his view is that 
manual cognitive reasoning is at least better suited to dealing with unfamiliar moral 
problems. 
Regarding the first of Greene’s three points, he has not presented a compelling 
argument that the emotional component of automatic processing makes it worse than 
cognitive processing. He seems to rely on other questionable assumptions to support this 
view, which is evident in his discussion of the footbridge case. In this case, he suggested 
that our alarmlike emotional responses that underlie deontological judgements about this 
dilemma are responding to a morally irrelevant factor: the ‘personalness’ or proximity 
involved in pushing the man off the bridge. His conclusion that emotion-based 
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deontological judgements are unreliable thus depends on this particular assumption of 
moral irrelevance. While this assumption could turn out to be plausible, it needs to be 
adequately defended even if we grant Greene’s point that our responses to such factors are 
primarily emotion-based. Berker focuses on this aspect of Greene’s argument, particularly 
how the notion of moral relevance is supposed to fit in with the overall debunking of 
deontology (Berker 2009). Berker describes this component of Greene’s overall debunking 
argument as the ‘argument from morally irrelevant factors’, which he interprets as follows: 
P1. The emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions responds to 
factors that make a dilemma personal rather than impersonal. 
P2. The factors that make a dilemma personal rather than impersonal are morally 
irrelevant. 
C1. So, the emotional processing that gives rise to deontological intuitions responds 
to factors that are morally irrelevant. 
C2. So, deontological intuitions, unlike consequentialist intuitions, do not have any 
genuine normative force (Berker 2009, p. 321). 
Greene recognises that the notion of moral relevance cannot be directly derived from 
empirical facts; it is simply a matter that must be assumed. Berker thus considers the 
second premise to be a positive aspect of the argument, as it avoids any controversial leaps 
from purely empirical claims to substantive normative claims (Berker 2009, p. 322). 
However, in Berker’s view, this reliance on independent assumptions also highlights the 
normative insignificance of neuroscience (Berker 2009, p. 325). If this empirical 
component of Greene’s argument is indeed irrelevant, then the argument may have no 
significant advantage over more traditional philosophical arguments against deontological 
theories. 
Berker’s point about normative insignificance still seems to apply to Greene’s 
updated, more modest view of the significance of neuroscientific studies, which he 
presented subsequent to Berker’s article and other criticisms. As we may recall, Greene 
simply claimed that scientific information can allow us to exchange difficult ‘ought’ 
questions for somewhat easier ‘ought’ questions, thus facilitating progress in ethics 
(Greene 2014, p. 711). However, moral philosophers tend to be more concerned with the 
most fundamental issues that do not appear to be resolvable by an appeal to empirical 
evidence. Thus, philosophers generally focus more on the plausibility of normative 
assumptions themselves, rather than the processes underlying moral judgements. Rather 
than making normative issues easier to resolve, Greene’s work might just shift the focus to 
a somewhat different set of difficult questions. No matter what philosophers choose to 
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focus on, there will always be untestable assumptions since philosophy deals with the most 
fundamental questions, including questions about knowledge itself. 
In addition to these points, Greene’s view of the unreliability of emotion-based 
moral judgements can also be challenged by making a positive case for emotions in this 
context. On this note, Folke Tersman considers how moral judgements may actually be 
enhanced by emotional processing: unless we adopt a radical conception of morality that 
has no relation to people’s needs and interests, we should grant that emotional capacities 
such as empathy could be important in evaluating moral issues (Tersman 2008, p. 393). 
We cannot expect to properly account for factors such as people’s interests and well-being 
if we are too emotionally detached from a situation involving such people. Tersman thus 
suggests that moral reasoning may need to be treated differently from other types of 
reasoning: even if empirical studies show that emotional processing interferes with 
judgements in other domains (such as science), this would not necessarily extend to the 
moral domain. In his words, “[E]thics is in many ways different, and it could be argued 
that the reliability of moral judgements, as contrasted with judgements in other areas, is in 
fact enhanced by certain kinds of emotional involvement” (Tersman 2008, p. 393). 
Admittedly, this objection to Greene requires its own set of normative assumptions, 
specifically about the nature of morality and how it differs from ‘non-moral’ domains. 
However, the general subject matter of morality is surely less controversial than Greene’s 
criticisms of emotion-based judgements. For instance, deontologists and consequentialists 
may disagree about the importance of factors such as well-being, duties and rights, but 
most would at least agree that such factors are all within the scope of morality. Thus, given 
that Greene’s normative assumptions are much more contentious, and that emotions could 
enhance moral judgements as suggested by Tersman, it can be argued that Greene faces the 
burden of proof. So, even if Greene were to successfully demonstrate that deontology is 
mainly based on emotions while consequentialism is more associated with cognition, such 
an empirical finding would be irrelevant without normative assumptions about the relative 
merits of cognitive versus emotional moral judgements. Berker also draws attention to this 
point, noting that Greene’s argument is incomplete without such assumptions: 
We need a substantive reason for thinking that intuitions based in emotion are less 
likely to be reliable than those based in ‘reasoning’ for this argument to be at all 
convincing. After all, there is a venerable tradition that sees emotions as an important 
way of discerning normative truths. One might disagree with this tradition, but 
showing that it rests on a mistake requires more than mere name-calling (Berker 




The points discussed so far demonstrate some of the ways in which one could argue that 
the burden is on Greene to demonstrate the unreliability of emotion-based moral 
judgements. At this point, Greene might fall back on his second point that was mentioned 
by Kumar and Campbell, which concerned the evolutionary adaptiveness of alarmlike 
emotional responses to certain factors. After all, Greene’s claims about the unreliability of 
emotions were linked to his speculations about the evolutionary advantages of automatic 
emotional responses to personal harm. The general idea was that the alarmlike nature of 
these responses is not conducive to careful consideration of moral dilemmas. However, as 
with the first point about emotions in general, the significance of evolutionary explanations 
of emotion-based judgements also depends on normative assumptions: specifically, the 
apparent moral irrelevance of the factors to which our evolved emotional processes are 
sensitive. 
Furthermore, even if we were to grant Greene’s evolutionary speculations about 
this apparent adaptation, he has neglected to defend the more general notion that 
evolutionary adaptations are unreliable in terms of aligning with moral truth. Greene could 
at least attempt to draw upon ideas from Street and Joyce, but then he would encounter the 
problems discussed in the previous chapters. In opposing these types of evolutionary 
arguments, it has been argued that rational reflection is a by-product of our adaptive mental 
faculties, which may nevertheless allow us to identify moral facts. Nothing about this 
concept of rational reflection limits it exclusively to the ‘cognitive’ type of processing in 
Greene’s dual-process model, at least in the context of morality. Although rational 
reflection was earlier defended by comparing its use in moral philosophy to its use in 
science, this does not necessarily mean that emotional and cognitive processes would play 
the same role across all domains. Following Tersman’s suggestion, emotional processing 
may be more relevant and useful in some areas than in others. 
Having rejected two of Greene’s main points against emotion-based moral 
judgements, we may now consider the last of these points: the claim that emotional 
processes are relatively inflexible and simplistic compared to cognitive processes. This 
was supposed to favour cognition-based consequentialist judgements at least in the case of 
unfamiliar moral problems, as the greater flexibility would apparently allow us to properly 
consider the morally relevant factors involved. However, it has been noted that Greene’s 
normative assumptions about moral relevance have not been sufficiently defended. More 
generally, even leaving aside the issue of moral relevance, it is not obvious that the more 
complex cognitive moral judgements would necessarily be superior to efficient but 
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inflexible emotion-based judgements. Since Greene considers these different types of 
moral judgements to underlie different respective moral theories, this point can be 
demonstrated by considering how complexity may affect the plausibility of moral theories 
themselves. Whereas too much simplicity in a theory may cause it to be unclear in its 
applications to certain issues, excessive complexity in any type of theory—not only in the 
moral domain—can introduce its own problems. Due to the limitations of human 
knowledge, more detail in a theory can raise more epistemic issues regarding the certainty 
of particular claims and their implications. As such, a more complex and detailed theory 
will generally depend on many other background theories and assumptions, thus opening 
up more ways to indirectly challenge and potentially undermine the theory. Therefore, 
even if flexible cognitive processes enable us to consider more factors in moral dilemmas, 
it does not necessarily follow that a theory more associated with such processes would be 
superior to a simpler theory that is more associated with emotion-based judgements. 
Additionally, even if we were to grant Greene’s point that automatic and manual 
processes are respectively better or worse in different situations, it would still be unclear 
how we could determine which kinds of moral issues are best suited to which type of 
processing. Greene’s idea that we should favour manual cognitive processes in unfamiliar 
cases is weakened by the earlier points against his notion of evolutionary familiarity. If we 
cannot rely on evolutionary speculations to determine which cases favour which type of 
processing, then this further demonstrates the limited impact of Greene’s empirical 
evidence: at most, all it could show is that our brains process different types of moral 
dilemmas in different ways. 
 
Although more could be said about the reliability of different types of moral judgements, 
the discussion will now move to one last topic to conclude the assessment of Greene’s 
argument. The issue concerns the notion of ‘debunking explanations’ in the context of 
Greene’s argument, which also leads into some of the next chapter’s points. To begin with, 
we may recall from Berker’s points that Greene’s evolutionary and empirical claims do not 
affect the argument from morally irrelevant factors. This was because Greene’s debunking 
of deontology depended on his view that deontologists, due to their rationalisation of 
emotion-based judgements, focus more on morally irrelevant factors in moral dilemmas. 
Although the notion of moral relevance is clearly independent of Greene’s empirical and 
evolutionary claims, he considered these aspects of the argument to be important in 
making his case. As noted by Tersman, Greene’s evolutionary speculations are supposed to 
have a debunking effect because they can explain the different moral judgements between 
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footbridge and switch cases without supposing that there actually is a morally relevant 
difference (Tersman 2008, p. 395). In this sense, Greene’s argument uses the same method 
as in Street’s and Joyce’s debunking arguments: they all claim to provide a non-moral, 
scientific explanation of phenomena that are traditionally regarded as being distinctly 
moral. On this note, Tersman describes the concept of debunking explanations as follows:  
Consider a fact F that is offered as evidence for a theory T. A debunking explanation 
of F is an explanation that does not entail that T is true or significantly likely. To 
provide such explanations is a common way to question the relevance of 
considerations offered as evidence (Tersman 2008, p. 395). 
However, it is debatable whether normative ethical theories require any ‘evidence’ beyond 
a sufficient level of rational argumentation in their favour. On Greene’s view, it seems that 
deontologists are expected to prove that considerations against pushing the man off the 
footbridge are based on the plausibility of their theory, rather than being ‘explained away’ 
by evolutionary speculations. 
On this point, it is worth noting that because normative ethical theories have 
existed since long before neuroscientific experiments and EDAs were possible, normative 
claims have long been provided by traditional ‘armchair’ philosophy. This leads into the 
broader issue of whether moral theories now need to be supported by empirical evidence in 
order to be taken seriously. An affirmative answer would radically change moral 
philosophy, as it would require a significant integration of current scientific and 
philosophical methodology (Berker 2009, p. 295). Greene’s experiments are just one 
example of an attempt at such integration. It is currently uncertain whether we could test 
much beyond the prevalence of certain intuitions, the neural activity during moral 
judgements, and the factors that people respond to in moral dilemmas. As such, it currently 
seems unlikely that scientific methods could enable us to test or prove any kind of ‘first 
principle’ in moral philosophy, such as the consequentialist view that only consequences 
have any direct moral relevance. It is also unclear how the notion of morally relevant 
factors could be empirically supported. This is because such principles and assumptions 
concern the fundamental nature of morality. The situation may be comparable to the 
relation between metaphysics—representing the most fundamental assumptions about 
reality—and empirical science, which focuses more on verifiable claims and theories that 
depend on background assumptions. 
Ultimately, these points suggest that Greene’s argument fails partly because his 
empirical findings lack any significant debunking role in the argument. If debates between 
consequentialists and deontologists depended on empirical questions such as which factors 
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our moral judgements respond to, then the types of experiments conducted by Greene 
could certainly be useful. However, the debate has always been much broader than this, as 
it traces back to the different fundamental principles underlying each opposing theory. 
Greene thinks that his empirical findings can help us resolve philosophical problems when 
combined with independent normative assumptions, but the experiments cannot tell us 
what assumptions to make. This is the case even if we already assume that there must be 
some kind of independent moral truth about the trolley and footbridge cases, and even if 
we think that only one normative theory or framework can accommodate the truth. 
Overall, it has been shown that Greene’s debunking argument against deontology 
does not fare much better than Street’s or Joyce’s arguments. Now that three of the most 
prominent EDAs have been rejected, the final chapter examines some issues that apply to 






























Much of the EDA literature has passed over the evolutionary premises in these arguments, 
often taking these speculative accounts for granted at least for the sake of argument. Since 
this aspect of EDAs has often been overlooked, this chapter now focuses on general issues 
that pertain to evolutionary claims in these types of arguments. The first point to be 
examined is whether the kinds of evolutionary claims from debunkers are actually 
plausible. This general question arises from the issue of whether evolutionary premises in 
particular—as opposed to non-evolutionary debunking accounts of morality—are essential 
to the discussed EDAs. Various perspectives on this matter will be considered, beginning 
with the view that specifically evolutionary claims have essential importance in EDAs. In 
Section 5.1 it will be argued that any EDAs that specifically rely on evolutionary accounts 
are weakened by some general problems with these types of explanations. 
In Section 5.2, the next perspective to be considered is the contrasting view that 
evolutionary claims in EDAs may be interchangeable with non-evolutionary accounts of 
morality, such as sociological or historical explanations of moral beliefs. The discussion 
focuses on the implications of the limited relevance of specifically evolutionary 
explanations in debunking arguments. This then leads into another view that reduces the 
apparent significance of evolutionary claims: the notion that any explanation of morality—
whether evolutionary or otherwise—will have a limited role compared to the philosophical 
assumptions in debunking arguments. For instance, EDAs may primarily depend on 
epistemic claims about the reliability of certain belief-influencing factors with regard to 
moral knowledge. Although these types of claims are to be expected in a philosophical 
argument, this point will be used to suggest that debunking arguments lack any inherent 
advantage over certain positive arguments in moral philosophy, such as defences of moral 
realism. 
Since one of the main apparent advantages of EDAs is their appeal to scientific 
explanations of morality, the focus in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 then turns to explanatory issues 
that are relevant to EDAs at a more general level, such as the relation between scientific 
and philosophical accounts of morality. The discussion will particularly focus on ways in 
which scientific explanations—such as evolutionary explanations—can be compatible with 
philosophical accounts. This compatibility view will be used to oppose the general 
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‘explaining away’ strategy of EDAs, which is partly based on the point that evolutionary 
explanations make no reference to philosophical concepts, such as moral facts. 
Finally, this chapter will conclude that future EDAs and discussions surrounding 
them should pay more attention to these general explanatory issues and the points 
concerning evolutionary premises, especially if future debunking arguments hope to 
overcome the problems with the current EDAs in the literature. 
 
 
5.1 The Plausibility of Evolutionary Premises 
 
When assessing EDAs in general, one of the main points to consider is the status of their 
evolutionary premises. One possible view is that specifically evolutionary premises play an 
essential role in EDAs, such that they could not be substituted with non-evolutionary 
debunking explanations. If one holds this view and aims to oppose EDAs by targeting their 
evolutionary premises, there are various points that can be used to challenge the general 
plausibility of evolutionary debunking accounts of morality. Some particularly relevant 
points are found in David Buller’s assessment of various ways in which the popular 
understanding of evolutionary psychology tends to be limited and misguided. According to 
Buller, one problematic assumption is that we can understand how our minds have been 
‘designed’ by selection by speculating about possible adaptive problems faced by our early 
human ancestors (Buller 2009, p. 76). Street speculated about the types of widespread 
moral beliefs that would have been adaptive, Joyce speculated about the adaptiveness of 
our supposedly innate moral sense, and Greene’s conjectures focused on the adaptiveness 
of moral beliefs that rationalise an aversion to personal violations such as directly inflicting 
harm. These evolutionary accounts are all problematic, as Buller notes that we do not 
know nearly enough about the living circumstances of our distant ancestors to identify the 
adaptiveness of certain types of mental traits. Unfortunately, the only way to provide a 
more detailed account of mental adaptations is to rely more on speculation (Buller 2009, p. 
76). 
Debunkers’ reliance on speculation has been noted in previous chapters; this will 
not help their case that evolutionary accounts provide the most plausible explanations of 
moral beliefs, as opposed to truth-conducive explanations such as the by-product account 
of rational reflection. We cannot expect many more evolutionary details to be filled in, as 
most of the evidence has been lost over time. Thus, if a specifically evolutionary account 
 
 79 
of morality is required for EDAs, then these arguments will be troubled by the lack of 
evidence, which compromises the explanatory power of such accounts. 
Despite the limited evidence for evolutionary explanations, their appeal may be 
partly due to their potential to support global rather than selective debunking arguments 
(O’Neill 2015, p. 1078). After all, evolutionary forces have undoubtedly influenced our 
general mental capacities to some extent. In contrast, certain non-evolutionary 
explanations of moral beliefs may be more amenable to empirical confirmation, at the cost 
of a more limited scope for debunking claims. For instance, a debunking argument could 
be based on the notion that certain measurable emotional responses are a ‘distorting’ 
influence on moral judgements: one example is Daniel Kelly’s view that we should be 
sceptical of moral judgements that involve the emotion of disgust (Kelly 2011, p. 140). 
Clearly, emotional responses can be empirically tested, as demonstrated by Greene’s 
experiments. 
The choice between selective versus global debunking arguments appears to be a 
choice between explanatory scope or certainty, assuming that only evolutionary accounts 
are sufficiently broad to support global arguments. Whereas the more speculative 
evolutionary factors may influence a vast array of adaptive moral beliefs, direct causes that 
can be ascertained through empirical methods only seem applicable to much narrower 
debunking arguments. In other words, we would not expect any particular type of direct 
cause (such as a certain emotion) to be involved in all or most moral judgements. Thus, in 
Street’s global debunking argument against moral realism, her appeal to an evolutionary 
account may be partly motivated by the idea that it provides a particularly broad non-truth-
tracking explanation of moral belief tendencies, as compared to narrower debunking 
explanations based on more immediate influences. In this way, global debunkers might 
hold that evolutionary influences on moral beliefs have more philosophical significance 
than the more immediate influences such as emotions, since they ultimately explain why 
we have particular emotional responses to moral issues. 
On this note, Greene’s argument is an interesting case as he uses evolutionary 
premises for a selective debunking argument, exclusively targeting deontology. However, 
he still faces the problems of global debunking arguments, as it cannot be empirically 
confirmed that the examined emotional influences on certain moral beliefs are ultimately 
due to distorting evolutionary factors. Thus, Greene’s argument still relies on evolutionary 
speculations as with global EDAs. Overall, the inability to empirically confirm 
speculations about evolutionary influences on our moral beliefs is problematic for any 
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EDAs that cannot replace their evolutionary premises with a testable, non-evolutionary 
explanation of the moral views that they intend to debunk. 
There are further difficulties facing debunking arguments that specifically depend 
on evolutionary claims: apart from the lack of evidence that would support evolutionary 
debunkers’ explanations of morality, there is also counter-evidence against their 
explanations. This can be seen by considering debunkers’ assumptions regarding the extent 
to which humans have retained primitive psychological tendencies, as opposed to the by-
product view of rational reflection that allows us to overcome such tendencies. The notion 
that humans essentially still have a ‘Stone Age’ mind would support EDAs by suggesting 
that our mental capacities have not significantly evolved beyond the adaptive functions 
that they granted in our evolutionary past, at least in the case of the moral reasoning 
underlying philosophical views that debunkers oppose. Debunkers have defended their 
own moral views from this point by arguing that they cannot be explained away as 
adaptations; for instance, Greene claimed that only deontology is a rationalisation of 
evolved alarmlike emotions, whereas consequentialism is apparently unaffected.  
On this point about adaptations, Buller opposes the view that our minds are still 
primarily adapted to the distant past. He notes that popular conceptions of evolutionary 
psychology tend to underestimate the rate of evolutionary change, particularly in the 
context of rapidly changing human environments: 
Any Pleistocene-selected genes we possess will interact with these new 
environments to produce psychological traits that may differ in important ways from 
those of our Pleistocene ancestors. So there is no good reason to think that all of our 
evolved psychological characteristics remain adapted to the lifestyle of Pleistocene 
hunter-gatherers (Buller 2009, p. 79).  
This supports the view that our more recently evolved capacity for complex rational 
reflection can overcome distorting evolutionary influences relating to adaptiveness in our 
ancestral environment, as argued in Chapter 2. Buller notes that although the timeframe 
since the Pleistocene epoch is a relatively short evolutionary period of around 10,000 
years, it is not as though the human brain would have needed to evolve completely new 
complex designs over this period in order to significantly alter our psychological 
tendencies. Thus, in as few as 400 generations our previously Pleistocene-adaptive 
psychological tendencies could be substantially modified by selection (Buller 2006, p. 
206). 
Buller substantiates these points with specific examples of rapid evolutionary 
change in humans, which can be used to support the case that humans have had enough 
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time to develop a moral reasoning capacity that is sufficiently autonomous from the 
evolutionary influences of our past environment. For instance, there are clear cases of 
relatively recent physiological adaptations in humans, such as the increased prevalence of 
lactose tolerance being driven by the domestication of cattle, which enabled dairy farming 
(Buller 2006, p. 207). In terms of human behaviour and morality, Buller cites the 
agricultural and industrial revolutions as notable examples of major changes in the 
organisation of societies, which have changed the selection pressures that affect 
interpersonal behaviours. In particular, living among much larger groups of people in 
modern cities has changed the challenges related to mating and forming alliances (Buller 
2006, p. 206). 
Partly as a result of changing social structures, prevailing moral attitudes 
throughout the world have changed significantly in recent history; this point will be 
examined shortly (Huemer 2016, pp. 1988-1994). These points about rapid evolutionary 
change—which has enabled humans to reflect on moral beliefs and reconsider them—
clearly conflict with the notion of our moral capacities still being ‘saturated’ with 
evolutionary influences relating to the adaptive challenges of our distant past. Buller’s 
points thus suggest that we humans have had sufficient time to adjust our psychological 
tendencies away from primarily adaptive functions and towards truth-seeking reasoning 
capacities. The capacity for rational reflection is able to thrive in our modern environment 
where the prospects of survival and reproduction have been greatly enhanced by our 
changing social structures and medical advances. Since most of us do not need to worry so 
much about survival in these circumstances, we can devote our mental capacities to the 
investigation of highly abstract and complex issues, as demonstrated by science and 
philosophy. However, it is a separate question whether our capacity for non-adaptive moral 
reasoning has actually enabled us to identify moral truths. Nevertheless, even if it turns out 
that the prevailing moral beliefs of our time are still not closely aligned with moral truths, 
these points at least suggest that our moral reasoning capacities have advanced due to 
changing circumstances; our capacities are not significantly constrained by the 
circumstances of our distant evolutionary past. 
This view is further supported by Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell, who argue 
that evolutionary explanations of morality cannot account for contemporary moral attitudes 
(Buchanan & Powell 2015). They focus on recent moral developments, which serve as 
evidence of Buller’s claims about rapid evolutionary processes enabling significant 
psychological changes: “[C]ontemporary morality, as experienced and exhibited by 
significant numbers of people, is strikingly more inclusive than one would expect if 
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selectionist explanations were the whole story, or even most of it” (Buchanan & Powell 
2015, p. 48). To substantiate this claim, they refer to various ‘inclusivist’ elements of 
contemporary moral views that have become increasingly prevalent in recent history. For 
instance, we have seen the emergence of the view that non-human animals are subjects of 
proper moral consideration, not merely for instrumental reasons regarding human interests. 
Another example is the notion that moral norms can be universalised rather than varying 
based on an individual’s group membership, such as one’s ethnicity or religion. There is 
also the idea of human rights applying regardless of an individual’s status and 
contributions in society (Buchanan & Powell 2015, pp. 48-50). These are just some 
elements of contemporary morality that do not seem amenable to debunkers’ evolutionary 
accounts. Rather, these points support the idea that human rational capacities have become 
sufficiently autonomous from evolutionary influences, including in the moral domain. 
 Having challenged the evolutionary accounts offered by debunkers, this makes way 
for the development of a positive account of moral knowledge. This is exemplified by 
Michael Huemer’s account of moral realism (Huemer 2016), which will be briefly 
examined to illustrate how evolutionary explanations of morality can be compatible with 
the views that debunkers have targeted, such as moral realism. Huemer’s argument 
includes his own account of how humans have gradually headed towards moral truths from 
an evolutionary starting point. He argues that although early humans started off with 
mostly distorted moral beliefs under the influence of evolutionary forces, many different 
societies have gradually converged towards moral truth over time. Thus, he describes the 
initial primitive state of human moral beliefs as follows: 
In primitive times, human beings begin with badly misguided moral beliefs. This 
parallels the widespread and severe error that primitive societies begin with in all 
other areas of inquiry. In the case of morals in particular, we have non-rational 
emotions and desires influencing our beliefs and hence leading us astray—the very 
sort of influences that the debunking skeptics advert to in their effort to impugn all 
moral beliefs (Huemer 2016, p. 2004). 
He notes that despite these primitive origins, in recent history various moral beliefs that 
seem to indicate evolutionary influences have fallen out of favour while liberal moral 
values have become more prevalent. For instance, the belief that it is right or permissible to 
conquer other societies for their territory and resources, and the different standards of 
sexual morality for males and females have been challenged (Huemer 2016, p. 2001). 
Huemer uses this point about gradual convergence towards liberal moral values to argue 
that these values reflect moral truth. It is not necessary to assess the plausibility of this 
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particular account of realism, as it merely serves to illustrate how opponents of debunking 
arguments—such as moral realists—may account for evolutionary factors while 
developing a positive argument. This demonstrates that an acknowledgement of our 
evolutionary history need not be limited to debunking arguments:  
In one trivial sense, an evolutionary account of ethics must be correct: human beings 
evolved; therefore, however our capacity for moral judgment works, that capacity is 
“a product of evolution,” in the same sense that our capacity for any sort of judgments 
is a product of evolution. This thesis of “an evolutionary origin for ethics” poses no 
threat to moral realism (Huemer 2016, p. 1994). 
As such, the philosophical significance of evolutionary accounts of morality crucially 
depends on certain assumptions, particularly epistemic claims about the reliability or 
unreliability of our moral reasoning capacities that have initially been shaped by 
evolutionary processes. Thus, a scientific explanation of human morality can be combined 
with either positive or negative epistemic claims about the effects of evolutionary 
influences, leading to either a positive account of moral knowledge such as Huemer’s, or a 
negative account as exemplified by EDAs. 
The points that have been discussed so far in this chapter are most relevant to any 
EDAs that specifically depend on evolutionary accounts of morality, as it is clear that we 
should not simply take their evolutionary claims for granted. Unless debunkers can account 
for modern developments in moral reasoning, their evolutionary premises are questionable 
since they overstate the continuing influence of our distant evolutionary past. As it stands, 
the current debunking explanations of morality do not seem any more plausible than 
accounts offered by those who resist EDAs, such as moral realists’ accounts of moral 
knowledge. Overall, this suggests that proponents of EDAs may be better off developing 
non-evolutionary debunking arguments. However, the following discussion will show that 
even this option presents some difficulties for debunkers. 
 
 
5.2 The Relevance of Evolutionary Premises 
 
Although debunkers’ evolutionary explanations of morality are problematic, the general 
structure of debunking arguments could be preserved if it turns out that evolutionary 
premises in particular are not essential to EDAs. Thus, it might be the case that any 
explanation of morality could serve the same function in these arguments, as long as such 
an account does not seem conducive to the truth or plausibility of the targeted 
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philosophical position, such as moral realism or deontology. To use Joyce’s argument as 
an example, although it may appear to depend on specifically evolutionary claims since he 
devotes a major portion of his work to developing an evolutionary genealogy of morality, 
Joyce has made the following statement about his position: 
[T]he evolutionary perspective is, strictly, dispensable. Were we to explain our moral 
beliefs by reference to, say, developmental and socialization processes, then, so long 
as these processes similarly nowhere imply or presuppose that our or anyone else’s 
moral judgements are true, the same epistemological conclusion could be drawn 
(Joyce 2016, p. 125). 
Thus, if there is nothing special that distinguishes evolutionary explanations of morality 
from non-evolutionary debunking explanations, then EDAs may simply be treated as one 
variety of genealogical arguments that target moral beliefs; this view clearly reduces the 
apparent relevance of evolutionary premises. On this point, Russ Shafer-Landau notes the 
similarities between different kinds of genealogical critiques of moral beliefs: “Despite the 
variety of specific forms that such critiques have taken, all instances of the form share a 
common structure. They first allege an empirical claim about the causal origins of our 
moral beliefs, and then proceed to raise doubts about the reliability of beliefs formed on 
that basis” (Shafer-Landau 2017, p. 175). This seems to entail that debunking explanations 
are essentially about the causation of moral beliefs, as moral beliefs are being questioned 
specifically due to their causes. 
However, considerations about belief causation cannot have a debunking effect 
unless supplemented by some account of the relation between certain belief causes and 
moral truth. This relation must also be accounted for by proponents of positive views of 
moral knowledge, even in the absence of any debunking challenges. In this sense, 
debunkers are essentially attempting to shift the explanatory burden to their opponents, by 
suggesting that a debunking account of this relation is more plausible than any positive 
account. This is noted by Jeff Behrends in a discussion of debunking arguments against 
moral realism: “[T]he challenge that the realist must meet is that of explaining how, in 
light of a non-normative genealogy of our normative judgments, those judgments could 
come to be correctly correlated with the normative facts, realistically construed” (Behrends 
2013, p. 487). The challenge of explaining a connection between moral beliefs and facts is 
nothing new for moral realists; debunkers simply provide their own allegedly more 
plausible accounts of morality that are supposed to rule out the possibility of any reliable 
connection. It has been argued throughout the thesis that EDAs are unsuccessful in both 
regards: the evolutionary accounts in EDAs have been criticised, while Chapter 2 
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presented the by-product view of rational reflection that enables positive accounts of moral 
knowledge. 
Thus, given that both debunkers and their opponents need an account of the relation 
between moral beliefs and moral truth, the relevance of particular debunking accounts of 
morality may depend on their plausibility as compared to that of positive accounts. 
Although evolutionary accounts are problematic, debunkers who seek alternative 
debunking explanations should aim to present accounts of morality that are at least as 
detailed as the philosophical accounts they intend to undermine. On this note, Shafer-
Landau’s criticisms of insufficiently detailed evolutionary debunking accounts are also 
relevant to other kinds of debunking explanations: “Absent a specific story about how 
selective pressures actually did work to form our moral dispositions and beliefs, the 
debunker is left with an unsubstantiated allegation of unspecified influence, which cannot 
be enough to warrant a skeptical attitude toward our moral beliefs” (Shafer-Landau 2017, 
p. 179). Similarly, William FitzPatrick maintains that evolutionary debunking explanations 
should not just be regarded as the most plausible accounts by default: 
The debunkers could of course turn out to be correct. They do not, however, win by 
default, and they cannot legitimately use science to provide decisive leverage in favor 
of their position, since the science itself fails to provide adequate support for the very 
strong and generalized explanatory claims on which they rely (FitzPatrick 2017, p. 
201). 
In other words, strong claims about morality require strong explanations, rather than the 
highly speculative and problematic accounts in the discussed EDAs. These points also 
apply to any kind of debunking explanation of morality, so although other explanations 
could potentially avoid the problems with evolutionary accounts, it would still be difficult 
to develop a plausible debunking explanation with a significant scope. 
Following on from the idea that any genealogical account of morality could be used 
in debunking arguments, this may seem to suggest that any given explanation of morality 
will be relatively unimportant as compared to the philosophical aspects of such arguments, 
such as the application of certain epistemic principles to particular causes of moral beliefs. 
Epistemic principles are certainly required in order to demonstrate the significance of 
certain claims about causes of moral beliefs. For example, debunkers may use the notion of 
‘sensitivity’ to argue that a complete explanation of the causes of our moral beliefs reveals 
them to be insensitive to moral truth, as we would hold the same beliefs whether or not 
they are true (Leibowitz & Sinclair 2017, p. 217). This idea seems applicable to each of the 
three main EDAs that have been discussed: they all identify evolutionary adaptiveness as 
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the main influencing factor, which presumably requires no connection to moral truth. 
Another relevant epistemic principle is that of ‘safety’, which can challenge moral beliefs 
by suggesting that even if some of them are true, this would not indicate reliability unless 
we can rule out the possibility that their truth is purely a matter of luck (Leibowitz & 
Sinclair 2017, p. 218). 
Regardless of which epistemic principles are used, it appears that such claims will 
do most of the important work in debunking arguments, rather than the debunking 
explanations of morality (Leibowitz & Sinclair 2017, p. 220). It is therefore important for 
debunkers to recognise the limited role of their purported explanations; this point has at 
least been acknowledged by Joyce: “No one, though, thinks that genealogical empirical 
data alone can secure a sceptical victory; at most it battles alongside sceptical arguments of 
an a priori metaethical nature” (Joyce 2016, p. 136). As such, debunkers should not 
overstate the importance of their explanations as compared to the philosophical aspects of 
their arguments. 
This view of debunking explanations can be demonstrated by briefly examining 
Michael Klenk’s assessment of Street’s EDA (Klenk 2017). As Street mainly focuses on 
debunking non-natural versions of moral realism, Klenk argues that her evolutionary 
argument actually depends on a more general epistemic challenge: specifically the 
Benacerraf-Field challenge of explaining how we can have knowledge of any kind of 
causally inert, mind-independent properties (Klenk 2017, p. 786). The causal isolation 
problem can be avoided by naturalistic moral realism, since it identifies moral facts with 
certain natural facts that are accessible to us. Thus, the idea is that Street’s argument partly 
depends on a problem inherent to non-natural moral realism, which is just as problematic 
in the absence of any evolutionary considerations. As such, Klenk asserts that evolutionary 
premises are not merely insufficient to reach Street’s conclusion, they are actually 
redundant since the causal isolation problem does the debunking work (Klenk 2017, pp. 
787-788). For any purported non-truth-conducive causes of moral beliefs—whether 
evolutionary or otherwise—such causes would be irrelevant if it turns out that no belief-
forming mechanism could allow us to reliably identify non-natural moral facts. 
Similar points have been made by Daniel Crow, although his overall view contrasts 
with Klenk’s in some ways (Crow 2016). Crow distinguishes between causation-based 
objections and evolutionary objections to non-natural moral realism. He observes that the 
former type of objection depends on the claim that non-natural moral properties cannot 
influence our moral beliefs, whereas the latter objection is that our beliefs have been 
influenced by evolutionary processes that are presumed to not involve any such moral 
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properties (Crow 2016, p. 380). Thus, even if non-natural moral facts are potentially 
accessible to us, the point of the evolutionary challenge is that our beliefs have been 
influenced by evolutionary factors rather than these facts. As such, Crow’s view is that 
evolutionary objections to non-natural moral realism are not dependent on or reducible to a 
causal isolation claim; this clearly differs from Klenk’s perspective (Crow 2016, p. 381). 
However, even this position suggests that debunking explanations have a limited role, as 
all that matters is the assumption that the causes of our moral beliefs are something other 
than moral facts; the actual method of causation is not particularly important. Since 
debunking arguments can target views other than non-natural moral realism, the more 
general point here is that both Klenk’s and Crow’s perspectives downplay the role of 
debunking explanations as compared to the epistemic assumptions in debunking 
arguments. 
Overall, these points indicate that debunking arguments are not so different from 
more traditional philosophical arguments in which the premises are not based on scientific 
claims. This can be taken as a negative assessment in the case of EDAs, since they appear 
to draw much of their initial appeal from the assumed scientific credibility of evolutionary 
explanations. Reducing the importance of evolutionary premises thus suggests that EDAs 
lack any inherent advantage over non-evolutionary arguments in moral philosophy. At the 
least, this challenges the notion that defenders of positive moral views face the burden of 
proof in light of evolutionary explanations, as opposed to the debunkers who are sceptical 
of these moral views. 
 
 
5.3 Explanatory Issues for EDAs: Incompatible Accounts? 
 
Since EDAs appeal to the apparent credibility of their scientific explanations of morality to 
challenge certain philosophical accounts of morality, the relation between scientific and 
philosophical accounts warrants further discussion. Scientific investigations of morality are 
concerned with explaining why human moral thought has developed in certain ways, 
whereas moral philosophy is primarily focused on the nature of moral truth and moral 
knowledge. Debunking arguments attempt to draw a link between explanatory scientific 
premises and philosophical conclusions, in such a way that seems conducive to ‘explaining 
away’ certain philosophical views. On this point, the role of debunking explanations could 
potentially be expanded if debunkers could show that their scientific explanations are 
incompatible with the philosophical views that they aim to debunk, in such a way that 
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favours their own scientific accounts and allows them to ‘explain away’ these particular 
philosophical views. 
Debunkers such as Street, Joyce and Greene present evolutionary explanations of 
morality that are supposed to override or challenge certain philosophical views that seem 
incompatible with these explanations. However, it should not simply be taken for granted 
that scientific explanations of morality necessarily conflict with certain philosophical 
moral views such as those targeted by debunkers. Before discussing ways in which 
scientific and philosophical accounts may be compatible, the first point to address is the 
incompatibility view that appears to be represented by the ‘explaining away’ approach of 
EDAs. This incompatibility view will be rejected, thus reducing the philosophical 
significance of debunkers’ explanations which are supposed to challenge certain moral 
views. 
The incompatibility view is the notion that we must identify just one type of 
explanation as correct, or at least much more plausible than any alternatives. For instance, 
Joyce considered his evolutionary explanation of morality to be plausible despite the fact 
that it does not presume any moral judgements to be true. Therefore, the incompatibility 
view would suggest that the apparent completeness of this scientific explanation makes it 
more plausible than positive philosophical accounts of moral knowledge. As such, the 
philosophical significance of Joyce’s evolutionary account partly depends on the notion of 
scientific completeness, which does not seem attainable by non-sceptical philosophical 
accounts of morality. 
With this example in mind, it is worth considering a principle that is used when 
assessing multiple proposed explanations: inference to the best explanation (IBE). IBE is 
often used in epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of science in general, and is 
considered by some philosophers to be essential and fundamental (Day & Kincaid 1994, 
pp. 271-272). Since the term ‘best’ requires a point of comparison, IBE is only applicable 
when there are multiple proposed explanations. Thus, if several proposed explanations 
seem plausible when considered on their own merits, their relative plausibility must then 
be assessed according to some general criteria. Some examples of explanatory criteria may 
be recalled from Chapter 2: Street cited parsimony, clarity and overall explanatory power 
as points in favour of her debunking explanation, as opposed to a truth-tracking account of 
moral beliefs. 
Notably, debunkers such as Street have applied explanatory criteria to moral 
philosophy in the same way that these criteria would normally be applied in science. As 
such, the philosophical significance that they ascribe to their evolutionary explanations 
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seems to draw upon the notion that certain philosophical views cannot be compatible with 
their scientific perspective on morality, thus leading them to ‘explain away’ these views. 
This highlights a general issue with EDAs: debunkers have not elaborated on why they 
hold metaethical and normative moral theories to the same explanatory standards as 
scientific theories, such as evolutionary theories. Debunkers need to adequately defend 
their view that scientific methods can be used to derive philosophical conclusions, as the 
use of such methods in philosophy remains contentious. On this note, FitzPatrick asserts 
that we cannot simply take it for granted that science provides the best explanations of 
moral beliefs, as this assumption largely depends on debunkers’ own philosophical views 
that cannot be directly supported by appealing to science (FitzPatrick 2016, pp. 397-398). 
Thus, to determine whether science and philosophy require different explanatory standards 
or frameworks, it will be helpful to briefly consider some aspects of the relation between 
these disciplines, in order to identify some of the relevant points of difference. As this is a 
very broad topic, only some of the most relevant aspects can be discussed here. 
The differences between philosophy and science have been examined by Robert 
Hartman, who observes that scientific theories are generally more precise and complex 
than theories in moral philosophy, particularly in the natural sciences such as physics 
(Hartman 1963, p. 353). Although some philosophers such as Kant have developed highly 
complex and rigorous moral theories, these still do not compare with the level of precision 
and detail in modern physics (Hartman 1963, p. 354). This can be partly attributed to the 
nature of philosophy, which deals with issues at the most abstract and general level, such 
as what kinds of assumptions about the world are reasonable to hold. In contrast, each field 
of science focuses on specific subject matter and investigates particular phenomena in as 
much detail as possible, under the guidance of various underlying assumptions. Thus, it is 
an important point that scientific inquiry is situated within the broader philosophical 
framework of fundamental assumptions about knowledge and reality; these underlying 
assumptions are usually examined separately in the philosophical domains of epistemology 
and metaphysics. As such, although science encompasses physics—which investigates the 
most fundamental components of the universe—philosophy is still more fundamental as it 
is concerned with such abstract and general topics as truth and knowledge itself. 
As topics such as the nature of moral truth and moral knowledge are highly abstract 
compared to scientific topics such as evolution, it may therefore be unreasonable to expect 
a scientific standard of precision or parsimony in philosophical accounts that involve 
concepts such as moral facts. Thus, the scientific completeness of an evolutionary account 
that makes no reference to abstract philosophical concepts does not necessarily undermine 
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certain philosophical views. At the least, it cannot be assumed without argument that moral 
theories should be held to the same standards as theories in the natural sciences. This is 
partly because the abstract nature of moral philosophy presents difficulties for any attempt 
to verify moral theories, or particular claims about moral truth. As Hartman observes, 
“Ethics is still a philosophy and not a method. It lacks the precision, and hence the 
complexity, to be applicable to definite human situations” (Hartman 1963, p. 354). If it is 
not possible to develop or assess philosophical theories with the rigorous processes used in 
science, then there is no reason to hold moral claims and theories to unattainable scientific 
standards; we may simply have to accept the limitations of moral philosophy. This raises 
many issues regarding methodological naturalism in moral philosophy, which are beyond 
the current scope: the important point here is that it is controversial to apply scientific 
methods to philosophy. As such, the standing of EDAs in general partly depends on 
contentious methodological issues that will have to be resolved separately. 
 Although EDAs have attempted to overcome some of the limitations of traditional 
philosophical arguments by appealing to science, they will always be constrained by the 
abstract nature of moral philosophy, as debunkers are still concerned with matters such as 
moral knowledge. Since this point about abstract subject matter clearly applies to any 
argument in moral philosophy, it cannot be used to exclusively criticise EDAs. Rather, the 
point is that EDAs must not only justify their own methodology and their adoption of a 
scientific perspective; they must also justify holding their targeted philosophical views to 
these standards. For instance, the principle of parsimony has been used in EDAs to 
undermine moral realism, but the application of this principle in philosophical contexts is 
more controversial than its role in science (FitzPatrick 2016, p. 398). 
Overall, it appears that debunkers cannot rely on an incompatibility view as the 
basis for deriving negative conclusions about certain philosophical views from their 
scientific explanations of morality. As will be discussed in the next section, opponents of 
EDAs could favour a compatibility view of evolutionary explanations with their own 
views, which will be demonstrated by focusing on non-conflicting differences between 
scientific and philosophical accounts of morality. 
 
 
5.4 Explanatory Issues for EDAs: Compatibility 
 
Before considering the non-conflicting differences between scientific and philosophical 
views, it is important to note that emphasising the differences between these disciplines 
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does not necessarily undermine the by-product rational reflection account of moral 
knowledge, which has been presented as an objection to EDAs such as Street’s. This view 
involved a comparison between scientific and moral knowledge, but this does not 
contradict the present chapter’s discussion: the comparison was purely in terms of our 
evolved mental capacities enabling both kinds of complex knowledge. The view does not 
entail that our mental capacities are limited to knowledge of precise scientific subject 
matter. As such, the relatively abstract nature of moral concepts does not necessarily 
support evolutionary debunkers’ view that certain moral beliefs are hopelessly misguided. 
Despite the differences between scientific and philosophical accounts of morality, 
one way to defend a compatibility view is to argue that these may just represent different 
levels or aspects of explanation. The notion of multiple viable accounts of a 
phenomenon—morality in this case—can be used to counter the incompatibility view that 
would favour EDAs. This general idea of different but compatible levels of explanation is 
exemplified by Brad Majors in his defence of moral realism against scientific explanatory 
challenges. His argument essentially supports the view that focusing exclusively on the 
most basic causes or aspects of a phenomenon does not necessarily provide the most 
complete and useful explanation of it (Majors 2003). Specifically, he uses the example of 
biological and psychological explanations as compared to purely physical explanations. In 
this context of different descriptive theories, physics provides the most fundamental level 
of scientific explanation; physical explanations only refer to the basic physical properties 
of the universe. In contrast, biological and psychological explanations are at a different 
level, as they refer to non-basic properties and relations that are not mentioned in purely 
physical explanations. 
However, the fact that a phenomenon can be explained without appeal to certain 
levels of explanation does not entail that these other explanations are inaccurate or 
redundant. As Majors expresses this point, “[E]xplanations at different levels do not 
generally compete with one another. The fact that a certain phenomenon has a 
physiological explanation does not prevent it from having a true and valuable 
psychological explanation” (Majors 2003, p. 126). Just as Majors rejects the view that 
physical explanations make other accounts redundant, this can be extended to the idea that 
moral theories may be viable even if there are plausible parsimonious explanations of 
morality. On this note, the role of non-basic levels of explanation is highlighted by David 
Owens: 
[T]here is a hierarchy made up of different levels of explanation. Physics is at the 
base of this hierarchy and the rest of the structure depends upon it. But the higher 
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reaches of the scientific edifice have explanatory features which could not be 
discerned by someone who confined himself to exploring the ground floor (Owens 
1989, p. 59). 
This suggests that certain levels of scientific explanation—such as physical explanations—
do not necessarily provide useful accounts of all phenomena, at least not to the extent of 
making other types of explanations redundant. This idea is supported by the fact that 
physicists have been unable to ‘translate’ other kinds of explanations—such as economic 
explanations—into the language of physics (Owens 1989, p. 59). The same point may be 
applicable to parsimonious evolutionary explanations of moral beliefs: even if such 
explanations are complete from a scientific perspective, their lack of reference to moral 
facts does not clearly entail the non-existence of such facts. This could be considered 
analogous to the view that a physical explanation’s lack of reference to any biological 
properties does not entail that there are no biological facts. However, this analogy raises 
issues concerning the relation between descriptive and normative theories, as opposed to 
different levels of description such as physical versus biological explanations. Some 
philosophers have nevertheless argued along these lines; for instance, Nicholas Sturgeon 
makes the following point in the context of moral and non-moral explanations:  
[T]he question of how we decide when nonmoral explanations conflict with, or 
support or amplify moral ones. The answer, I believe, is that abstractly the procedure 
is no different from that used in answering similar questions about chemical and 
biological explanations, or about psychological and sociological ones. Conflict 
between explanations is virtually never a matter of outright contradiction (Sturgeon 
1992, p. 100). 
David Copp has also suggested that different types of explanations can be compatible in 
the case of moral and non-moral explanations: 
[W]e would not want to say that the existence of a neurophysiological alternative to 
every psychological explanation would show automatically that no psychological 
explanation is evidence of any psychological postulate. A scientifically viable 
alternative to a moral explanation is not necessarily in competition with the moral 
explanation, and its mere existence does not show that the moral explanation is 
evidentially impotent (Copp 1990, p. 243). 
Although there is insufficient space to assess these views, the point is that explanatory 
issues in the context of EDAs can be traced back to more general issues regarding moral 
and non-moral explanations. If it turns out that philosophers such as Sturgeon and Copp 
are correct that moral explanations can be compatible with non-moral explanations, this 
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could undermine EDAs at a more general level. For instance, Street would no longer be 
able to argue against moral realism on the grounds that her evolutionary explanation of 
morality does not refer to moral facts; this may just be a different level of explanation from 
that offered by moral realists. Overall, these points suggest that the relation between moral 
and non-moral explanations may warrant further attention in discussions of EDAs. 
Even if it turns out that debunkers cannot undermine particular moral views by 
highlighting the apparent problems with moral explanations, there are other ways in which 
they might argue that their scientific explanations of morality have implications for certain 
philosophical views. For instance, they might criticise certain moral theories on the 
grounds that they lack any method of confirmation: it is not clear how we could verify 
moral facts if they lack any observational consequences. In response, it could be argued 
that science is not completely different from philosophy in this regard. It can thus be 
observed that the ‘a priori’ methodological aspects of moral theories are not exclusive to 
philosophy: science also depends on assumptions that may be untestable or involve 
unobservable phenomena. The essential role of such assumptions is noted by Robert Audi: 
A priori explanations are non-scientific; but they need in no way be such that 
philosophers or others who are scientifically oriented should reject them. Logic and 
pure mathematics, after all, are essential for science—and for scientific 
explanations—but contain a priori explanations (Audi 2014, p. 161). 
This commonality between science and philosophy seems to be downplayed or overlooked 
by EDAs that criticise particular moral views on the basis of scientific standards of 
explanation. As such, debunkers should take note of the following point: “[W]e must not 
take the prominence of scientific methods and explanations as paradigms to give the 
impression that they are the only instances of theoretical methods and of genuine 
explanations” (Audi 2014, p. 146). 
The issue of confirmation in moral theories has also been examined by Geoffrey 
Sayre-McCord (1988, p. 433). He makes the similar point that moral theories cannot be 
challenged on the grounds that they posit unobservable entities, as scientific theories do the 
same (Sayre-McCord 1988, p. 435). Following on from Audi’s point that a priori 
assumptions are essential in both science and philosophy, Sayre-McCord also notes that 
theories in both disciplines require background assumptions in order to be testable; as 
such, we should not reject a scientific or moral principle just because it is untestable when 
considered in isolation (Sayre-McCord 1988, pp. 436-437). It can thus be asserted that the 
acceptance of background assumptions in science should also be extended to fundamental 
assumptions in moral philosophy. In this case, debunkers must either grant their opponents 
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some assumptions as with their own scientific accounts, or they must convince us that 
philosophical theories are entitled to fewer untestable assumptions as compared to 
scientific theories. Considering the abstract nature of philosophy, this latter option would 
surely be an unreasonable constraint to place on moral theories. This leaves debunkers 
with the other option of granting their opponents some basic assumptions, which could 
provide the necessary foundation for developing positive moral theories and resisting 
EDAs. By allowing such assumptions, debunkers would have to concede that their 
scientific explanations of morality do not necessarily put pressure on certain philosophical 
accounts. Overall, these points support a compatibility view of evolutionary theories and 
moral theories by highlighting important similarities between science and philosophy, 






To summarise the overall perspective of this thesis, it is now worth recalling some of the 
main points from each chapter. Chapter 1 introduced the concept of evolutionary 
debunking arguments, along with a brief account of how such arguments rose to 
prominence. The next three chapters each focused on a particular prominent EDA. Chapter 
2 criticised Sharon Street’s argument, which primarily targets non-naturalistic versions of 
moral realism. One of the main points against her argument was the by-product view that 
could be used to vindicate moral realism, while also showing that her opposition to this 
view would undermine scientific theories, including her own evolutionary claims. Chapter 
3 examined Richard Joyce’s argument against the justification of moral beliefs in general, 
in which his conclusion was a form of global moral scepticism. One of the main issues was 
his reliance on a separate, non-evolutionary argument against moral naturalism, as well as 
his problematic ‘belief pill’ analogy which does not accurately represent our epistemic 
situation. 
Chapter 4 focused on Joshua Greene’s selective debunking argument against 
deontological moral theories. His argument had the advantage of drawing upon more 
empirical evidence rather than depending so heavily on untestable evolutionary 
speculations. However, the evidence was still insufficient to support his criticisms of 
deontology in general: Greene relied on a narrow conception of deontological philosophy 
along with various normative assumptions that he had not defended, such as the apparent 
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moral irrelevance of personal versus impersonal harm. Finally, the present chapter has 
examined issues that affect the standing of EDAs in general, specifically the plausibility 
and relevance of evolutionary premises, along with explanatory issues such as the relation 
between philosophical and scientific accounts of morality. 
Despite all the problems with the discussed debunking arguments, it is important to 
reiterate what was mentioned at the outset in Chapter 1: the aim is not to rule out the 
possibility of any plausible EDAs being developed in the future. Rather, the main purpose 
has been to examine the flaws in the debunking arguments from Street, Joyce and Greene, 
which may allow future debunkers to learn from their mistakes. Any forthcoming EDAs 
and discussions of them should also take note of the more general issues surrounding these 
types of arguments, as discussed in this final chapter. After all, these general points could 
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